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
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SINO-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING AND POLICY ANALYSIS

Muhammad Khan* Arshmah Jamil**

Abstract

In a rapidly changing world, China's close ties with Russia have aroused curiosity particularly due to the nature of their relations in the past. The Sino-Russian bilateral relationship restored and strengthened after years of mutual suspicions. After the cold war, geostrategic realities and converging interests have brought Russia and China closer in an attempt to bring a change in the global structure; the uni-polar model of world. Institutions in this regard, are playing the decisive role in enhancing the converging policies of the two countries. The paper therefore, aims at analyzing the role of institutions in advancing the rapprochement between these former communist giants. The paper also elaborates the importance of Shanghai Cooperation Organization in becoming an effective platform to address the regional concerns of these two. Furthermore, this rapprochement is viewed in the context of United States and the distinct policies it must adopt to tackle the Sino-Russian alliance. The institutionalization of bilateral relations between Russia and China should be used as an example for countries that have ongoing conflicts with their neighbors.

Introduction

The post-cold war geostrategic developments at the international arena have impelled re-establishment of closer linkages between former Communist powers; Russia and China. Rather making use of ideological bases and commonalities, this time, linkages through institutions played a

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key role in bringing Russia and China closer to each other. Over the years, many multilateral and bi-lateral institutions have emerged playing a key role in bridging the past gap and meeting the future strategic challenges of the contemporary world. This network of institutions, takes into consideration all aspects of Sino-Russian bilateral relationship as well as multilateralism, which is a common concern for rest of the world, apart from these two global giants. The contemporary warmth in the bilateral relationship owes a lot to the coordination mechanism, which has gone through a dormant phase, due to conflicting situation, took place in late 1960s to a firm institutional shaping from 1996-1997 onwards. In the past fifteen years, a comprehensive mechanism of regularized exchanges between the two countries have gradually expanded.

This paper explores the significant role of institutions in promoting interaction and cooperation between Russia and China. The paper would also objectively analyze, as to how this institutional structures has brought an extraordinary change, in the approaches of Moscow and Beijing for greater cooperation and coordination at the international arena. Besides, the institutional strength and sustainability of these institutions to support the rapprochement for a long period would also be scrutinized.

The process of institutional building commenced in China, once Beijing made a formal start of opening up of its markets for the rest of world, especially the West.¹ With the enhancement of Chinese integration into the international community, its demand and reliance on foreign policy actors for reliable information also increased. The role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in being an important multilateral institutional link as well as its importance in enhanced Sino-Russian dialogue will be evaluated.²

What remains to be discovered is the role of multilateral institutional networks in promoting bilateral rapprochement between the two countries. Moreover, the convergence and divergence of the policies towards the region will be assessed. This would lead us to question whether institution building between the two counties was a symptom or factor for this Sino-Russian rapprochement and whether its impact on the conduct of bilateral relations has actually been felt. Furthermore the rapprochement will be analyzed in the context of United States. The policies United States must adopt to counter the challenges posed by the two countries will be evaluated. The theoretical approach employed in this paper is Neoliberal Institutionalism theory which stresses on importance of regularity, consistency of interactions within the institutional framework.³ According to

¹ Morrison, W., "China's Economic Rise." *Congressional Research Service*. 2014, pp 2-3.

² Aris, S., *Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*. Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, pp 54-89.

³ Keohane, R., *After Hegemony*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp 245-247.

Neoliberal Institutionalists such as Keohane,⁴ institutions enhance confidence between states by guaranteeing regular movement of information between governments through regularized exchanges. Resultantly, it allows an environment where both sides can have expectations of ensuring peace. Institutions are advantageous in enhancing interaction as they monitor the implementation of agreements, raise the costs of negligence and deception and reduce the reasons of change in policies to occur midstream which enhances the credibility of the commitments between states. Consequently, the problems of credibility are reduced when international bargaining occurs due to the presence of formal international institutions.

The Institutionalization of Sino-Russian Relations

Since 1950s, institutions played a key role in establishing various inter-party and inter-agency contacts between China and former Soviet Union. These institutions provided linkages between senior officials and decision makers to meet regularly and work for the better cooperation and collaboration between both ideologically similar states.

A two branched Sino-Soviet friendship society was established post Cold-War⁵. Ever since the formation of the Chinese and Russian part of the society in 1949 and 1957 respectively, a significant change was observed in the bilateral relations between the two countries. These societies promoted cordial relations despite being separate entities⁶. A disruption in the cordial relations occurred in the 1960's due to various reasons. The problem analyzed as the cause of the swift deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations was an augmentation of mutual suspicions and failure to understand each other due to cultural barriers. In the 1960's China and USSR were the leading proponents of communist ideology. It is argued that the division occurred when Chinese Communist Party denounced the Soviet variety of communism and deviated from the core Marxist ideology in 1961. Further research reveals that the full scale split occurred when Khrushchev succeeded Stalin and his peaceful approach towards the United States incensed the Chinese leader Mao Zedong⁷. The situation was exacerbated when Khrushchev ordered Soviet technicians working in China to return to Russia. The Sino-Soviet split (1960-1989) can be seen as the worsening of both political and ideological relations.

⁴ Robert, K., *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, p 2.

⁵ Jersild, A., *Privilege and Inequality: Cultural Exchange and the Sino-Soviet Alliance*. Wilson Center. Retrieved from <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/privilege-and-inequality-cultural-exchange-and-the-sino-soviet-alliance>, accessed on January,1, 2015.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Gaddis, J., *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, pp 212-213.

Despite the contact between the two countries getting re-established in 1983 after 19 years of non-interaction, the intergovernmental consultations between the foreign ministers of the two countries remained weak. The meetings in 1984 between the foreign ministers of the two countries also followed a similar pattern. Gradually, the relations warmed up in 1989 after Gorbachev's visit to China which was reciprocated by Jiang Zemin in 1991. China-Russia elevated the status of their relations to the level of 'constructive' partnership only after 1994 when an interdepartmental protocol was signed. This protocol was pertinent as it was the basis on which regular consultations between the two countries occurred.⁸

The Bilateral Commission for the Preparation of Regular Meetings of the Head of Governments⁹ was the first significant step that triggered the pace of mutual cooperation between the two countries. These commissions facilitated the frequent meetings between Russian and Chinese heads of state on regular basis. The success of these institutions has been credited to the presence of various bilateral sub-commissions and working groups. These institutions filled an important gap which existed in the institutional interaction between the two countries, whether it was on the question of security, anti-terrorism, migration or dialogue between the top level officials.¹⁰

The regularity of these meetings was a remarkable achievement of these institutional channels. In fact the '*Agreement on Establishment of Organizational Basis of the Mechanism of Regular Meetings of the Heads of Government of China and Russia*' ensured consistency of these meetings. In the past when only two meetings occurred annually between the two countries, increased to eight meetings by 2009 as a result of institutional linkages.¹¹ The presence of international institutions in enhancing the rapprochement between the two countries cannot be undermined. The multilateral institutions lead to a persistence of increasing interaction of high level contacts between Chinese and Russian officials¹².

The most important institution in terms of multilateral interaction of China and Russia is Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It must be analyzed whether SCO only enhanced the bilateral relations between the two countries and the member states or whether it became a platform for addressing essential regional issues.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ "Cooperation With China Energy Protocol," *Russian Foreign Ministry*, 2001, Retrieved from http://www.businesspress.ru/newspaper/article_mId_20644_aId_75128.html, accessed December 2, 2014.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Dittmer, L., *Political and Cultural Roots of Sino-Russian Partnership*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, p 57.

¹² Jacobson, H., and M. Oksenberg., *China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and Gatt: Toward a Global Economic Order*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990, p 28.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Regional Importance

Since its inception, Shanghai Cooperation organization played a pertinent role in reduction of armed forces in contentious regions and enhanced confidence building in border areas between the two countries. The dimensions of the discussion at Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) gradually increased to fighting the three key problems i.e. terrorism, separatism and religious fundamentalism. The institutional structure also went through rapid transformations with the creation of specialized organs and committees. The structural organization of the institution lead to regularization of meetings between the SCO's heads of government since 2001 and formulation of practical policies to address the various challenges faced by the two countries¹³.

The SCO structure composed of SCO Secretariat and Regional Anti-terrorism structure played an essential role in the effective collection and distribution of intelligence related to suspect terrorist groups present in Central Asia.¹⁴

In terms of its regional role SCO's role has not been limited to one geographic area, but focuses on the holistic peace and security. Korea is one country where both China and Russia pursued independent but parallel policies. The converging position of the two countries during Korean War was evident in their support to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime. Russia on one hand provided support in the form of armaments and military advisors and China on the other hand provided thousands of armed volunteers. The SCO became a platform where the converging concerns of China and Russia regarding North Korean security were articulated. China and Russia dreaded North Korea's disintegration as they did not want it to cause instability in East Asia resulting in cross-border migrations. The two countries also opposed North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapon but they also wished to influence the regime out of "self-destruction isolation"¹⁵. In 2013, SCO Summit, it was highlighted that discussions and negotiations are the drivers to stability and peace on the Korean peninsula¹⁶.

On the other hand, SCO has been inefficient in reducing the weariness with which Japan is viewed due to the troubled relations of both countries with Japan. China's military modernization has threatened Japan and they have an ongoing Senkaku (Diaoyu) island dispute. Russia-Japan relation in

¹³ Joseph, C., "The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China's Initiative in Regional Institutional Building," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 41, 4(2011), pp 632-656.

¹⁴ Lanteigne, M., "The Development of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization as a Security Community," *Pacific Affairs* (2007), pp 611-612.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "Shanghai Cooperation Organization Discusses Syria in Bishkek." *The Moscow Times*, September 13, 2013.

contrast is equally problematic as they had a history of territorial disputes over what Russia term as their Southern Kurils and Japan term as their Northern Territories. These Islands (Kunashir, Shitokan, and Habomai) were in Moscow's control at the end of World War II and have now become the bone of contention between the two countries due to claims of control of these Islands¹⁷.

When it comes to Iran, the SCO became a platform for China and Russia to address their concerns regarding its nuclear program. Regarding sanctions on Iran's nuclear program, both countries proposed to soften the sanctions if Iran adhered to the provisions of NPT.¹⁸ In 2013, during SCO Summit, China and Russia noted their concern towards Iran's nuclear program but were against the threat of military force and one-sided sanctions of individual governments and this was noted in Bishkek Declaration.¹⁹

The SCO also became a platform for Sino-Russian partnership to address their concerns regarding the troubled region of Syria. Previously both countries had pursued significant level of coordination in the United Nations Security Council to prevent a UN mandate for a military strike on the Bashar al-Assad regime. But a significant convergence of their policies regarding Syria was observed when 'The Bishkek Declaration' was issued at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit on September 13, 2013. The declaration was pertinent as it pointed towards conflict resolution in Syria. The solution identified by them was a political dialogue between the authorities and the opposition without prerequisites on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué of June 30, 2012.²⁰

SCO: Catalyst To Improving Indo-Pak Relations

On July 10th, 2015 President Vladimir Putin announced acceptance of India and Pakistan as members of SCO at the annual summit²¹. The inclusion of Pakistan in SCO will have a broader implication for the harmony and stability for South Asia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. The spirit of SCO restrains from coercion in international affairs and due to its consent based decision making process, it instills assurance in members. This will be a new development in the context of Eurasian Regionalism where all four members of SCO i.e China, Russia, India and Pakistan favor regional collaboration while operating under the umbrella of the

¹⁷ Richard, W., "China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion?" *Strategic Studies Institute*, 2008, pp 51-117.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ "Shanghai Cooperation Organization Discusses Syria in Bishkek." *The Moscow Times*, September 13, 2013.

²⁰ McDermott Roger, "Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership Boosted By Syrian Crisis." *Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 164, 2013, p 1

²¹ "Pakistan, India join Shanghai Cooperation Organisation," *Dawn*, July 11, 2015.

organization to resolve the major issues of security due to the problems caused by terrorism, extremism and separatism, The distinctive style of regional cooperation based on Shanghai Spirit provides an important platform to involve regional powers in South Asia in a permanent cooperation on the basis of mutual principles.

The strengths of this organization are based on its aims to bring consensus amongst the members regarding decision making and to prevent belligerent neighbors (Pakistan and India) from bilateral disputes. Undoubtedly, no regional organization can replace bilateral relations that countries utilize nor are able to resolve long-standing tensions between confrontational neighbors. However, even in the most optimal situations, European Union which is one of the most accomplished regional organizations has not been able to completely align the western and central European nations economic and security policies²². SCO on the other hand has tremendous potential in reducing tensions between conflicting parties by utilizing diplomatic methods to influence the group actions. The fact that both Pakistan and India have been admitted together in SCO manifests that SCO members especially China and Russia realize the sensitivities of India and Pakistan. The strength of the SCO is that its leading members' i.e China and Russia share a unique relation with India and Pakistan. While Russia has closer ties with India, China has closer relations with Pakistan and they would not desire to offend either while being part of SCO. The simultaneous membership of Pakistan and India will also make SCO a South Asian organization.

It is lucid that both India and Pakistan are victims of extremism, terrorism and separatism the three core concerns identified by SCO. The fact that most terrorist organization work through strong transnational networks, it is difficult to combat them single-handedly. SCO has an added advantage in this regard as it has been engaged in countering terrorism through a coordinating point known as Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) established in Tashkent and Uzbekistan in 2003.²³ The inclusion of Pakistan and India in RATS will facilitate formulation of a joint counter terrorism strategy to dismantle the safe havens of terrorism in both South Asia and Eurasia.

In addition to enhancing cooperation in counter-terrorism, SCO can also play a pertinent role to facilitate economic cooperation between the two countries whose trade ties are weak and prone to disruptions.

²² Julie, B., "Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: A Lost Decade? A Partner for the U.S?," 21st Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, *Brookings*, 2011, pp 8-13.

²³ Haas, M., "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the OSCE: Two of a kind?," *Clingendael*, 2014, p 248.

The U.S Dimension of Rapprochement

An interesting dimension of Sino-Russian rapprochement is their common desire to respond to the influence of United States and NATO expansion in the region²⁴. During 1999, opposition to the emerging world order was considered *Raison d'être*, in 1999 which lead to the strengthening of China-Russia cooperation. During this period, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov approached China proposing the formation of a "strategic triangle" with the purpose of counterbalancing the hegemony of United States. Boris Yeltsin (Russia's first President) had opposed NATO's 1999 military operations against Serbia and his visit to Beijing was for the purpose of holding military consultations and formulating multiple responses to Anti-Ballistic Missile Plans of the United States²⁵.

Despite the U.S opposition not being part of the official rhetoric of both countries, it certainly was an important dimension to the rapprochement. This was evident when Russia and China were unified in their opposition to the anti-ballistic missile plan and a Joint statement on the question of Anti-Ballistic missile plans were issued in July 2000 as well as 2003 invasion of Iraq²⁶. A noteworthy bilateral document known as the Sino-Russian treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was signed in July 2001, signifying their close cooperation²⁷. Their views regarding the structure of Post-Cold War international order were also similar. Both wished to strengthen a 'Multipolar World Order' in the joint statements as well as the statements issued by high-ranking foreign policy officials. This was also articulated in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization formed in 2001. The statement issued in July 2005 by SCO urging Washington to set a timetable for the withdrawal of troops from Central Asia demonstrates their convergence of policies regarding United States²⁸.

The economic policies adopted by China and Russia independently also indicate their desire to respond to the economic dominance of United States. American economic success seems pale in comparison with China's economic rise in the past decade. Whether it was pursuing private equity in western markets or investing in Africa's vast natural resources²⁹, China has actively enhanced its global influence through economic integration. While

²⁴ Olcott, M. B., M. McFaul., *Rapprochement or Rivalry?: Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia*. Washington DC: Carnegie, 2000, p 36.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Donaldson, J., and R. Donaldson., "The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations." *International Studies Quarterly*, 2003, p 710.

²⁷ Bates Gill and Matthew Oresman, "China's New Journey to the West: China's Emergence in Central Asia and Implications for US Interests," *Center for Strategic and International*, 2003, pp 10-12.

²⁸ Bobo, L., "The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership." *International Affairs*, 2004, pp 296-298.

²⁹ Schoen Douglas and Kaylan Melik, *The Russia-China Axis: The New Cold War and America's Crisis of Leadership*. New York: Encounter Books, 2014, p 73.

Russia's economy cannot be compared to that of mighty Chinese it is pursuing its interests with renewed vigor. Despite its gas dominance being challenged by United States fracking³⁰, Russia is actively engaging former Soviet neighbors to join Eurasian Economic Union in order to reduce its dependence on the Western Markets.

In essence, United States has to formulate an adequate response to address the challenges posed by the China–Russia Axis.

United States' Response towards China and Russia

China's Rise and its rapprochement with Russia is observed with caution by United States. Chinese booming economy will further strengthen, once Russia meets its energy needs. One of the key challenges that United States might face is loss of primacy to China which would undermine the national security interests of United States³¹. Therefore, the objective of United States policy would be to prevent this from happening.

The various options that have been explored in the past by United States have remained counterproductive. The first option was centered on suppression of China through deliberate force and is not feasible in the contemporary era. The Second option based on changing the '*internal character of China itself*' by the process of democratization is not clear in its purpose and would result in creating tensions between the two countries.. The third approach was the Cold-War style containment, which is outdated in the contemporary era and remains inappropriate in the Chinese context. In the contemporary era, Chinese imperialism and ideology is viewed differently by United States as compared to Russia³², so specific policy approaches must be formulated in this regard

The adequate approach would be to balance Beijing's growing capabilities by pursuing policies that simultaneously increase China's stake in the existing global system. The advantage of balancing is that it will not require United States to try to stop China's economic expansion. This balancing is composed of four key elements. Firstly, it requires supporting the rise of states around China. The increasing coordination and collaboration between these states will enhance their ability to resist misuses of power by PRC in the region. Secondly, this balancing should include the selective deepening of globalization which would be carried out by involving the states of the Pacific Rim in a network of trade and investment liberalization agreements including the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). The success of this approach is based on the proposition that China should be kept out of these regional free trade agreements for as long as possible. The

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ashley, T., *Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China*. Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Press, 2014, pp 11-85.

³² Ibid.

Third element of balancing strategy would involve the military which will be used as deterrent force to reassure U.S allies and dissuade PRC's heavy handedness with its neighbors. In essence, the military superiority should be maintained indefinitely. The fourth element of strategy is revitalization of the domestic economy through fast paced technological change and economic innovation which is the key to economic capacity, productive efficiency and long term growth. It is recommended that the serious competitive strategy with China would involve the promotion of highest level of technical change '*across the spectrum of civilian to military endeavors*'.³³

With Respect to Russia, an altered policy must be adopted by United States. The U.S imposition of sanctions due to the Ukraine issue and record-low oil prices has already built pressure on the Russian economy.³⁴ One key aspect that United States must look at, while dealing with Russia is the impact of free markets and free trade on this situation. Russia gains its strength by controlling energy supplies and distribution systems in this region. The key elements of United States stratagem would be to decrease Russia's economic influence in this area. This could be done by liberalizing global energy markets as well as lifting restrictions on exporting LNG and crude oil. For the broader liberalization of global markets, United States needs to encourage private sector development and enhance market-driven U.S production. Despite the fact that the approval of the process of lifting gas export restriction would take a considerable amount of time and might not lead to immediate impact on the Ukrainian crises, it would be a long term strategy that capitalizes on power derived from control over energy interests. Greater energy supplies for the global market and diversity of suppliers would be a result of opening markets and would benefit the economy of both United States and Ukraine and a way to challenge Russia's position in the global markets.³⁵

The Way Forward

While United States adopts distinct policies to maintain its influence in the region, China and Russia continue to strengthen their alliance through institutions. The institutional structures between China and Russia have greatly enhanced and stabilized the implementation of

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Barry, B., "Effect of Sanctions on Russia's Economic Slide," *Brookings*, 2014.. Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2014/12/bosworth-effect-sanctions-russia-economic-slide>, accessed on January 1, 2015.

³⁵ Spencer, J., L. Coffey., N. Gardiner and N. Loris., "*Beyond the Crimea Crisis: Comprehensive Next Steps in U.S.Russian Relations*," *Hertiage Foundation*, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/beyond-the-crimea-crisis-comprehensive-next-steps-in-usrussian-relations#_ftn16, accessed on April 1, 2015.

cooperative mechanism. Nevertheless, there is a strong need to strengthen these policies in the areas pertaining to economy, defense and educational sectors. Sino-Russian rapprochement due to the presence of effective institutions can be used as a model by Pakistan and India where institutional cooperation must be strengthened to enhance mutual trust, confidence and to provide mutual reassurance. This can also be applicable in the economic and energy sector where there is minimal cooperation between the two countries (India and Pakistan). As Shanghai-Cooperation Organization enhanced the trust between Russia and China with the latter playing an active role in it, China should be given the status of full membership of SAARC. China as a SAARC member, could play an active role in alleviating tensions between India and Pakistan and greater regional peace and stability.

Conclusion

The rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing owes a lot to the bilateral and multilateral institutional set of connections. These institutions formed an infrastructure of interaction between the two countries and facilitated the implementation of the cooperative bilateral policies. They also enhanced mutual reassurance and open exchange of information. The expansion of SCO's functionality encompassing various issues beyond border security and confidence building is an evidence that regional institutional links have expanded between China and Russia. The institutional dynamics of Russia and China must be considered in this broadened context. What remained to be determined was whether institution building between the two countries was a symptom or factor for bilateral rapprochement. Besides, it has to be observed, whether its outcome has impacted on the conduct of bilateral relationship of the two major powers. With respect to practical and policy impact these institutions worked in accordance with the central themes of Neoliberal Institutionalism which lay emphasis on the significance of monitoring rules, pacts, agreements, and standards within the institutional framework. The fundamental contribution of these institutional linkages and channels have been the promotion of enhanced communication of the long term policy goals intentions of both sides as well as transfer of exact information to the higher officials and policymakers. These institutions have led to more functional, sustainable and dependable Sino-Russian relations and altered the nature of cooperation between the two countries productively.

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A CONCISE INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. – KAZAKHSTAN RELATIONS, 1991-2013

*Hujjathullah M.H. Babu Sahib**

Abstract

The United States' new interest in the Central Asian region has seen its relations with Kazakhstan, continually but incrementally, getting more important. The United States is having increasing ties with Kazakhstan in political, economic and strategic terms. These ties are reviewed here using a sector-oriented analytical lens, viewing in turn the origins of their diplomatic relations, their bilateral interactions, addressing, specifically, development assistance, trade, investments, business presence, energy dealings and their defense and security ties. This article, thereby, attempts to provide, simultaneously, a loose chronological, thematic and an interpretative analysis of the, clearly, broad-based United States and Kazakhstan relationship, noting there through also the changes taking place in it, over time. Geo-political aspects are mentioned, as and where necessary, contextually and the multi-lateral aspects of the relationship are merely hinted at, in passing.

Key Words: Kazakhstan, United States, Foreign Policy, Diplomatic Relations, Evolution of Relations, Bilateral Trade, Investments, Business Presence, Bilateral Development Assistance, Energy Dealings, Defense and Security Ties, Central Asian Region

Introduction

As one of the newly independent states (NIS) to emerge out of more than seven decades of political isolation under the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan is comparatively a new country to initiate and develop relations with the United States. Nevertheless, upon independence, Kazakhstan was quick in establishing a broad range of ties with the U.S., including in the political, economic and strategic domains. Despite the enormous distance and lack of

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direct land access, any boundary, not to mention a border, between Kazakhstan and the United States, both the countries have managed to develop an increasing trade relationship. The United States has given Kazakhstan much transformational and developmental aid under its various politico-economic and strategic programs. The United States has made significant investments in various energy related projects in Kazakhstan but its investments are, by no means, confined to the energy sector alone but instead also involves investments in industrial, business and services sectors too, often, initially, along with Turkish partners.

Even before Kazakhstan became independent, it had continually, if sparsely, figured in American media,¹ including in the *Washington Post*, in the various contexts of: a) strategic developments within the Soviet Union, b) ecological and other disasters within the Soviet space, c) Gorbachev's anti-corruption campaigns under *glasnost* and d) in the immediate past even in the context of Central Asian leaders' reactions to the Gulf War (*Washington Post*, various issues). Incidentally, it was actually American media coverage of coup-affected Moscow that enabled Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev to save both Mikhail Gorbachev and then Boris Yeltsin too from falling prey to the trouble-making hardliners. Proving, thereby, that the U.S. even through its media had for long tuned in and been attentive to developments even within Soviet Kazakhstan, not to mention too, of course, catering to the informational imperatives of a Kazakhstan teetering at the verge of independence.

Actually, continuing the momentum of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, Gorbachev began granting greater degree of autonomy, from 1988 on, to the union republics of the USSR, including to Kazakhstan. Taking this up the Kazakh people established their own governing structures, determined their own future course by choosing their own national emblems and even declaring their sovereignty, finally on the 25th of October 1990. Though Western observers generally, both at Kazakh independence and immediately prior to it, have considered the Kazakhs as lacking in nationalistic spirit, in comparison to the Balts for example, and highly nomadic in their socio-political make-up to merit national independence, American elites in particular have shown some interest, given their long, praise-worthy, commitment to anti-colonialism, in an independent Kazakhstan and in wanting to establish separate relations with it (Olcott 1995, pp. 290-94; Weller 2006; Weitz 2008, p. 122 and p. 127). Thus, it came as no surprise, when the U.S. became one of the first nations to recognize Kazakhstan's independence and to rapidly open diplomatic relations with it, thereafter.

¹ For example, *Washington Post*. Retrieved from <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/historical/results.htm>, accessed on 15/05/2007. The search feature at *New York Times'* website: <<https://mobile.nytimes.com>> may also be used between the year ranges 1951-1991 for verifying the same.

Strategically and more, mutual relations have now proceeded beyond two decades and a half, rather amicably with only minor tensions along the way. Specifically, this article addresses the following questions: When and how politico-diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Kazakhstan took shape? How has these relations evolved since then? What are the various sectors of their economic relations? And how have vital energy and security issues fared in their strategic ties since the inception of their relationship? The structure of the rest of this article proceeds, henceforth, under three key rubrics, namely: Political Front, Economic Sphere and Strategic Realm. Each of these are further divided into sub-sections or sectors, i.e.: Political Front is divided into Political Recognition and Diplomatic Representation, Evolution of Relations Generally, and Bilateral Development Assistance; Economic Sphere consists of Bilateral Trade, Business Presence, and Investments; and the Strategic Realm is occupied by Energy Dealings, and Defense and Security Ties. This article ends with some concluding thoughts and proffers some integral but tentative suggestions therein.

Political Front

Though there had been a number of informal first encounters between U.S. citizens and Kazakh natives before and around Kazakhstan's independence, their first formal diplomatic encounter, however, obviously had to wait for Kazakhstan's, independence. When independence did come, alas, the United States was amongst the first countries to grant it its diplomatic recognition. Freed unwillingly of the yoke of Union and unsure of how to proceed ahead into the approaching twenty-first century without the protection of the Soviet umbrella, Kazakhstan earnestly embraced the welcome of the remaining superpower, the United States of America.

In fact, it was this very sense of non-confidence and unpreparedness for independent statehood that made Kazakh leaders, including the Gorbachev-loyal Kazakh nationalist Nazarbayev, having himself been in the chief executive slot only since 1989,² to root, earlier and vainly, for a renewed Union (Olcott 1995, pp.264-265). Kazakhstan, like the rest of ex-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus, was instead, non-consultatively and unceremoniously booted-out, figuratively speaking that is, of the Soviet Union by the key Slav states, decisively so, after their Belovezh Conspiracy (Olcott 1995, p.270; Dave 2007, p. 8 and p.178 f. 4). Finding itself insecurely left out of the previously well-acclimatized Russian cold, Kazakhstan, for the same non-confidence, unlike the Baltic States, enthusiastically pushed for a looser confederal arrangement in the shape of a Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loyal member of which it remains till today.

² He had, of course, been the Chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1984.

Political Recognition and Diplomatic Representation

With the encouragement of the West, of western allies like Germany and Turkey and the increasing indifference of Russia itself to their fate, the Kazakhs declared their independence quite reluctantly on 16th December 1991, particularly, after the failure of the August coup against Gorbachev. Having had a paramount role in the Soviet endgame, it was somewhat surprising that the United States, led then by President George H.W. Bush, lagged behind states like Turkey and Italy in granting political recognition to an independence-poised Kazakhstan. According to Jonathan Aitken, Turkey was the first in this regard (Aitken 2009, p.125).³ When recognition was given to it finally, it came *en mass*, the United States recognized Kazakhstan along with the rest of the CIS on Christmas Day, 25th December 1991. Still, “the United States was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan on December 25, 1991 and opened its Embassy in Almaty in January 1992; the Embassy moved to Astana in 2006,” cleverly states the official *Background Note* of the US Department of State (DOS-BN 2009).

Nevertheless, at independence, unlike with the other Central Asian states, and despite the initial euphoria, the U.S. welcome of Kazakhstan was somewhat restrained, given Kazakhstan’s too high an affinity to a non-Gorby-led Russia, and was also critically underpinned demographically then (Olcott 1995, p. 265; Tokaev 2004, p. 125). Having established diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan relatively quickly the U.S. went on to open its diplomatic mission and embassy in its then capital Alma Ata (the present Almaty) in January 1992. Besides having its embassy/chancery in Astana, the US also maintains a consulate and regional offices of the USAID and Peace Corps at Almaty, in view of its closeness to the Kazakh concentrations in southern Kazakhstan and to the heart of the rest of native Central Asia. Similarly, too Kazakhstan has its embassy in Washington, D.C. and it has a consulate at New York, to be close to not just the world of American business but also to attend to the United Nations and partake in the business of global affairs, thereby.

The United States’ first resident envoy to Kazakhstan was William Harrison Courtney, who started his mission in Alma Ata as *Charge d’ Affaires ad interim* on 3rd February 1992, later the contemporary U.S. ambassador then was Kenneth J. Fairfax till somewhat replaced by Michael S. Klecheski. In between stints as the Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Yerlan Abilfayizuly Idrissov also had served as Kazakhstan’s ambassador to the United States from July 2007 to October 2012. Recently, Idrissov stepped aside as foreign minister in favor of Kairat Kudaibergenovich Abdrakhmanov. Since 2015 George Albert Krol, a region-savvy, well-

³ In this regard, the present researcher is heartened to note that the EKUSA has, rightly, revised its 2016 Infographics (EKUSA 2016), to reflect this fact. Cf. the 2013 Infographics, also by Kazakhembus. A number of versions are still available over the Internet. Retrieved from <http://kazakhembus.com/>, accessed on 6/03/2017

accomplished career Foreign Service specialist, has remained as the U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan in Astana. Similarly, multi-stinting Kairat Yermekovich Umarov has been, till recently, his counterpart for Kazakhstan in Washington, D.C. (*The Washington Diplomat* 2013).

Trade relations began to take shape and U.S. exports to and imports from Kazakhstan gradually rose but only continually so. Not having common border has its impact on trade relations between Kazakhstan and the U.S. Having rather limited economically-sensible outlets to the world market including to those of the U.S., Kazakhstan in the initial years had rather limited volume of trade with the U.S. Thus, it was no surprise to find Russia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan figure as greater trade partners than of Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan's exports to and imports from the U.S. has rapidly, if continually, grown since its independence (as may be seen elucidated further in the later sub-section on Bilateral Trade).

Episodes of elite visits to either country usually mark upswings in relations. Besides periodic visits by top elites like presidents and cabinet members, there have been some visits and numerous authoritative statements by intermediate policy practitioners at the level of special envoys, deputy secretaries, assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries of various relevant executive departments/ministries and security officials too, from, of and to Kazakhstan. Similarly, delegations of key members of the U.S. legislative branch have visited their counterparts in Kazakhstan and vice-versa. As you may see later, the re-election year 2004, for example, saw more U.S. elites visiting Kazakhstan. Despite the 5-years visa given, Kazakhstan is still not a visa-waiver country, indicating it has still some grounds to cover before it could be deemed a U.S. friendly-country; and hence Kazakhs visiting the US and vice-versa do need visas for mutual visits. Obviously, more steps need to be taken for both to keep in step!

Being among the more Russo-friendly Central Asian peoples and only recently having been freed from Soviet-imposed atheism, the Kazakhs, like the rest of Central Asia generally, take an evolutionary approach to inevitably but gradually rediscovering their Islamic faith and Muslim traditions. Having uneasily accommodated even the despicable atheism in their midst for so long, they have no trouble, unlike some of their Islamic brothers in the more orthodox areas of their Muslim periphery and beyond, at being tolerant of and accepting the presence of numerous minorities holding radically diverse faiths from theirs. Thus, Americans either visiting or stinting⁴ in Kazakhstan can easily observe the unmolested presence therein of adherents of not just the Russian Orthodoxy – the faith of their immediate past overlords – but also members of other churches of Christianity, e.g. Autocephalous Orthodox, Apostolic Orthodox (both of Eastern Orthodoxy), Protestant (of evangelical

⁴ For example, see John Ordway's interview with Dina Bukayeva of Khabar Television on 27 Feb. 2005. Retrieved from <http://kazakhstan.usembassy.gov/khabar-interview.html>

and Baptist varieties including Lutheran, Jehovah's Witness and even Seventh-Day Adventist) and Catholic; Judaism, Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, the rather native Tengrism (Nysanbayev 2004, p.183) and Shamanism, and the blooming of all their various institutions and/or organizations in Kazakhstan. Conversely, Kazakhs visiting the U.S. can similarly see Muslims in general and Turkic-Muslims on average and members of even the Kazakh diaspora⁵ doing reasonably well in the United States. If Kazakhs can survive even in communo-atheistic Soviet Union till Gorbachev's openness granted them overt practice then they certainly can flourish in god-loving, capitalistic America where no U.S. president, neither a Republican nor a Democrat, would hinder them from peacefully practicing their religion and extolling their faith, given that, after all, America, conveniently for the free-spirited Kazakhs, is both the modern Mecca for freedom of religion and, ironically, for freedom from religion too.

Evolution of U.S.- Kazakhstan Relations

Not wanting to offend Gorbachev, his partner in the Cold War endgame, George H.W. Bush was overly cautious in welcoming an independent Kazakhstan initially. Nevertheless, with his popularity slipping by the day and having just over a year of his term left, he rushed his secretary of state James Baker to Alma Ata to register America's keenness on Kazakhstan nonetheless, and to serve to the Kazakhs the appropriate pointers for pursuing future co-existence. Baker, of course, met, literally, naked success in this during his "sauna diplomacy" with Nazarbayev! Unsurprisingly, in the initial year of ties there was not much of a trade figure to show for, though, like in the security sector, important agreements on trade, investment protection and avoidance of double taxation were signed. Given America's disdain for the Political Islam espoused by Iran, the U.S. held up Europe and Turkey as models for the Central Asian states to emulate, as pointedly noted by Gareth Winrow (Winrow 1995, p.13). Nevertheless, having taken the full measure of, initially Western-backed and Russia-ignored, Turkey to help in their restructuring processes, Nazarbayev still, needfully, proceeded to Iran to develop a more lucrative economic relation with it in the wake of the Ankara Summit of October 1992.

Given the United States' long running obsession with non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and also with an eye on Central Asian strategic realities, the U.S. enacted a facilitating legislation: the Nunn-Lugar Act. Later, in pursuance of this, the United States made a priority of effecting nuclear threat reduction in Central Asia particularly, though not exclusively, so in Kazakhstan.⁶ H.W. Bush's administration did not extend much, in terms of aid, to Kazakhstan but Nazarbayev was aware of and, helped much by the

⁵ Including so-called "defectors" like Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov and "dissidents" like Bigeldin Gabdullin.

⁶ For the text of an U.S. Senate bill that reflects the legislative evolution of this process, see Bill Text, 109th Congress (2005-2006) S. 313. Retrieved from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.313>:

Nunn-Lugar-visit, was determined to get Kazakhstan's fair share of whatever was given out as CTR aid. In Kazakhstan itself their elites were quite divided into hawks, bargainers and doves on the nuclear issue (Tokaev 2004, p.128; Aitken 2012, p.79). Some, including Nazarbayev himself, well aware of the pre-independence Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, were only too keen to rid Kazakhstan off these standing symbols of Soviet administered radioactive, environmental and health abuse of Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev 2001; Saudabayev and Nunn 2006). Others, more cognizant of Kazakhstan's geopolitical vulnerability, in a growing nuclear neighborhood, and aware of the bargaining value of even under-maintained Soviet/Russian nukes, slated for destruction under START, thought otherwise. For these legitimate reasons, Kazakhstan took its time, first, in renouncing nukes, then, further delaying the total removal and/or conversion and varying destructions of its strategic weapons and their associated components.

The Freedom Support Act (FSA), which largely duplicates the earlier language of the CTR program legislation (P.L.102-228), is a facilitating legislation enacted, in a timely fashion, to give substantive backings to pursue America's diplomatic and politico-economic missions in the newly independent nations of the ex-Soviet Union, including in Kazakhstan. The United States took the early disinterest of Russia on Central Asia, in general, and in Kazakhstan, in particular, as a sort of cue and moved ahead, if hesitantly, to build a broad-range of ties with all the NIS of Central Asia. This fact, is reflected in the broad politico-economic coverage of the FSA (P.L.102-511) of 1992, though, Russia was still its intended primary beneficiary, more so by default than by design, it appears. Anyway, Russia was also not too much disturbed by the initial American interest in the ex-Soviet space and especially by the facilitating structure of the FSA because, in the early years, this initiative, as mentioned earlier, was, as if intended to appease, primarily Russia-centric.

This was not surprising given that Russia was, undeniably, the pre-eminent state to emerge from the disintegrating Soviet Union and that all the other successor states were much inferior to it in their politico-economic weightage. Russia was also the United States' working partner in ending the original Cold War episode and, along with other Slav states, the prime mover of the Soviet end-game. But having eased the Soviet collapse and helping Russia towards finding its proper nationally-independent *albeit* reduced space and place in the international community and its various institutions, the U.S. also felt that it should do likewise to the ex-Soviet rest, particularly, to key states like Ukraine and Kazakhstan. As the years passed and as things evolved, in that reconfigured space, the need to pay greater attention to these key states and the rest of the non-Russian NIS also grew apace. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. went on, in later years, to reinvigorate its diplomatic relations and further extend its presence in the NIS generally, and particularly so, variously, in the Central Asian states. The U.S. was overly

keen on Kazakhstan, along with Russia, given both their overwhelming territories and the obvious natural resources that these represent. In the context of ex-Soviet Central Asia, Kazakhstan was, somewhat inexplicably, also given a greater priority, by the ostensibly market-focused US, initially, than Uzbekistan, which clearly has a larger population and, by implication, a bigger market (Legvold 2004, p.1).

In 1993, the U.S. Department of Defense, wanting to gain friendly access to a newly-freed region, used its National Guards SPP (1991), that grew out of EUCOM, to lure the former Soviet republics, including Kazakhstan, to participate in its program (National Guard 2011; Balaban 2012). In doing so, it perhaps encroached on some of the much earlier interest there of the U.S. Dept. of State, giving rise to a latent inter-Departmental turf war of sorts. The U.S. media, while sharing the coolness of the American government towards Kazakhstan, also covered the dealings of U.S. oil firms in Kazakhstan's energy sector, besides also noting, quite uneasily, Kazakhstan's continued sheltering under Russian hegemony, if not imperialism too, as disturbingly symbolized by the on-going lease of Baykonur⁷ Cosmodrome to Russia. More on these, in context, would be dealt with, in the later section on Strategic Realm.

The first William J. Clinton administration, not wanting to be left out of the loop, for its part, had Strobe Talbott and Warren Christopher making a beeline to Alma Ata (later Almaty) quite early too. However, it is believed that Nazarbayev, seeing Christopher to be relatively a weak player in the U.S., sent him back to the U.S. to fetch vice-president Albert Arnold Al-Gore, for signing any more pithy agreements like the Disarmament and Democratic Partnership ones, which were signed later on (Aitken 2009, p.143). This keenness on the U.S. Democratic side was also amply reciprocated by the Kazakhstanis when Nursultan Nazarbayev established a pattern of, mostly biennial, visits to the U.S. during Clinton's total tenure. His foreign minister in those times Kassymzhomart Kemeluly Tokaev also engaged his counterparts in both Clinton administrations. During these visits they met top U.S. elite in-charge of the State, Defense, Energy and Commerce departments. In the security sphere, Clinton's astute secretary of defense William Perry was particularly instrumental, in proposing a regional non-aggression pact (Kasenov 1995, p. 278) and also, in over-seeing the top-secret Operation Sapphire (1994), involving the sale of Kazakh HEU,

⁷ Also spelt Baikonur; American unease at this is justified, as strategic missiles and even other secret pyrotechnic devices continue to be launched or otherwise liquidated, presumably with U.S. understanding but, worryingly, without a corresponding U.S. verification role, from this more than mere cosmodrome. In fact, one of the recent took place on 27 Dec. 2011, when an RS-18 (aka SS-19 Stiletto) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was launched from there. Also, it is believed, about 20 space-related missile launches have taken place there, daily, since then. Better variants of, or alternatives to, the RS-18/Mod 2, like the Topol-M and RS-24 too are either tested or are in service with the Russian/CIS Strategic Missile Forces based thereabout.

roughly sufficient for making 25 atomic bombs, to the U.S. (Potter 1995). The U.S. was delighted, again in 1994, when Kazakhstan joined NATO's PfP program, thereby displaying Kazakhstan's relative capacity for independent foreign policy action (Yerzhan 2009, p.13). Though Russia was uneasy about this, it drew some consolation, in the initial years at least, from the fact that this was not the NATO of old and that it no longer appears to be arranged against Russia and that NATO now is more poised to tackle out-of-area responsibilities. On Kazakhstan's part, it too, not wanting to appear as moving too close to the West, tried to balance such sentiments by proposing a Eurasian Union and later joined a Russia-led Customs Union too in May 1995, under the same spirit.

With the confidence of Western, especially American, support and aid tucked securely under his belt Nazarbayev cancelled the scheduled election and went for a referendum to consolidate further his rule, instead. It was perhaps under this sense of confidence too that Kazakhstan oversaw successfully the last nuclear "blast" or rather destruction, in May 1995, in its territory, though some Kazakhs did have their reservations about their compliance to these earlier joint U.S.-Soviet strategic undertaking and consequent obligations. Clinton, the First Lady that is, also took U.S. – Kazakhstan ties up, along a different dimension, when she toured Kazakhstan. She, in particular, can be credited with the start of a parade of high-powered petticoats into Kazakhstan; for her precedent was later competitively followed up by the likes of Condoleezza Rice and Madeleine Albright, with the latter curiously and particularly incensed over Kazakh sale of even old MIGs to North Korea. During both Clinton administrations, trade saw steady but continual growth with the United States registering both surplus and deficit balances with Kazakhstan. There were relatively remarkable trade volumes notched up in both 1997 and 2000 (see Table 1, later). In terms of aid, the U.S. extended relatively high amount of aid in both 1994 and 1995. It began declining after 1996 with it again picking up thereafter only in 2000 (Nichol 2013a, p. 65).

Though Kazakhstan has a policy of positive cooperation with all its neighbors and the great powers, since its independence, its relations with the United States has generally been quite amicable but interspersed with brief periods of lukewarmity if not actually neutrality.⁸ In this context, Western observers have noted Kazakhstan's cold-shouldering of even Russia on occasions. But more on this would be seen in the section called Strategic Realm, coming later.

⁸ On these aspects, see The, Timely, Advertising Supplement. *Washington Times* ('Kazakhstan emerges as a Major World Player' 1999).

Table 1: U.S. – Kazakhstan Trade Value (in millions of U.S. dollars)

Year	Value	Exports	Imports	Balance
1992	35.5	14.9	20.6	-5.7
1993	109.2	68.0	41.2	26.8
1994	192.8	130.3	62.5	67.8
1995	203.8	80.9	122.9	-42.0
1996	259.4	138.3	121.1	17.2
1997	475.1	346.2	128.9	217.3
1998	271.8	103.1	168.7	-65.6
1999	408.8	179.6	229.2	-49.6
2000	553.2	124.2	429.0	-304.8
2001	512.3	160.3	352.0	-191.7
2002	939.4	604.8	334.6	270.2
2003	560.7	168.2	392.5	-224.2
2004	859.0	320.4	538.6	-218.2
2005	1,639.4	538.3	1,101.1	-562.9
2006	1,606.8	646.2	960.6	-314.5
2007	2,004.3	752.8	1,251.5	-498.7
2008	2,588.9	985.5	1,603.4	-617.9
2009	2,147.0	603.5	1,543.5	-940.0
2010	2,602.7	730.3	1,872.4	-1,142.1
2011	2,506.4	827.1	1,679.3	-852.2
2012	2,448.6	883.6	1,565.0	-681.4
2013	2,571.6	1,150.2	1,421.4	-271.2
2014*	2,418.7	1,007.9	1,410.8	-402.9
2015	1,326.6	510.5	816.1	-305.6
2016	1,853.4	1,111.1	742.3	368.8
Grand Total	31,095.4	12,186.2	18,909.2	-6,723

Notes: * - These updated data have been made to stand differentiated from those of the original research period (1991-2013); the grand total, of course, includes all the updates. All figures for the latest 2 to 3 years are liable to be subsequently revised and adjusted, as per usual practice, as fresh data become available. Cf. Figures given by EKUSA, however, are higher for Export and lower for Import, it must be noted (EKUSA 2016).

Sources: Adapted, calculated and presented by the researcher from the raw data-set given by the DOC (U.S. Dept. of Commerce) 2008, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, NTIS, Springfield; Census Bureau 2016, U.S. International Trade Data, Foreign Trade Division (FTD), Available online at: <<https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/>>.

With the Bushes back in power in Washington, Nazarbayev, perhaps a little unnerved by the regional impacts and ominous implication of the Sept. 11 attacks, rushed to Houston to pay sincere homage to one of his initial American friends, H.W. Bush and then onwards to Washington, to meet the son, President George W. Bush and his powerful team of advisers, on official business. The U.S. had been obviously pursuing a number of objectives in Afghanistan long before then. *Inter alia*, it apparently wanted to undermine the Taliban regime and put pressure on it to abandon the *Al-Qaida*; the Americans also wanted to raise Pakistan's dependence on them; they wanted to undermine the influence of Iran and its allies therein and thereabout; and obtain a reliable foothold in and secure a possible springboard thereby to move further into the emergent Central Asian region. Subsequent developments in the larger region show the pertinence of these objectives in themselves, if not also in their total realization.

Pakistan or important elements within it had a pre-eminent role in the transformation of the Taliban religio-social movement into a menacingly potent force capable of seizing and projecting its power right across Afghanistan and, debatably, beyond. Kazakhs discovered this disturbing capability more than a decade later when, responsively and responsibly, the Kazakhstan Senate reversed its earlier decision to commit Kazakh officers to the ISAF in Afghanistan in uninitiated disregard of Taliban sensitivity (Nichol 2013b, p.24). Though Pakistan was the main conduit for weapons and supplies reaching the Taliban from its rather few backers in the international community, yet very few would doubt that Pakistan could have sustained its deep involvements and backing of the Taliban that long, without the support in kind, if not just in cash, of America or some influential elements within it.

These facts are not lost on the Central Asians in general and the Kazakhs in particular. Thus, when Pakistan dramatically and painfully swung away from the Taliban in the aftermath of the tragedies of Sept. 11, 2001, Pakistan—a widely-acknowledged sponsor of the hostile, if not also retrograde, Taliban—could without much difficulty reconcile with and rebuild up its relations with Kazakhstan and the rest of the Central Asian states. As unlikely as it may seem, the Taliban, given their perceived political immaturity, unwittingly, served as the catalyst for development of closer Pakistan-Central Asia relations. An anxious *albeit* Indo-Israeli inspired U.S. showed its bewildered appreciation, for this clearly painful and hesitant Pakistani swing, nevertheless, as can readily be discerned from the American media.

Earlier on, it must be noted that, the U.S., clearly under similar lobbistic pressure, had supported another antagonist in the Central Asia/Caucasus periphery. From even before Central Asian independences, America has had sympathies for the Armenians rebelling in Nagorno Karabakh and agitating for uniting with an Armenia that was uncertainly poised for independence. American feelings, if not also strong support, for the Karabakh rebels,

obviously served to increase Central Asian doubts on American neutrality in and about their region.

Having cleared all the initial diplomatic formalities and early treaty and relational milestones, quite rapidly, if also cautiously, U.S. - Kazakhstan relations, despite having brief hiccups, have continuously galloped along with growing amity. However, since 2004, relations have noticeably changed for the better. With mutual confidence being somewhat at a higher level during G. W. Bush's first administration, Nazarbayev made fewer personal visits to the U.S. but this period saw a higher number of other elites from either side making visits, to take Kazakhstan-U.S. ties to another level. For starters, in the said year, there was a sudden parade of security-related elite visits from the U.S. to Kazakhstan. Key officials like Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Armitage and important generals like John Abizaid, Richard Myers and Lance Smith all went over, some repeatedly so.

Perhaps, this activism was merely linked to the bigger number of treaties signed between the U.S. and Kazakhstan the previous year, loosely reflecting the situation a decade before, when similarly a big number of treaties were signed between the U.S. and Kazakhstan, but were then more typical of nations establishing relations and freshly putting their initial ties on proper, if also strategic, tracks. Anyway, it must be noted, hopes of a rapid and sustained improvement in relations between the U.S. and Kazakhstan were somewhat dashed with the outbreak of the Iraq War. Though this caused some tension in government circles, it did not lead to anything even remotely resembling an estrangement between them, but this is not to say that the entire Kazakh heterogeneous society took this U.S. aggression on its stride. At the social level, there certainly was much palpable unease at seeing a fellow Muslim state being attacked by the very superpower that was making clear introductory and sustained overtures to their own hardly-settled government.

This is markedly different from their perception of the earlier American involvement in Afghanistan, especially so their record and behavior towards the Taliban regime there. U.S. intervention then and their involvements therein thereafter, in post-Taliban times, constitute one of America's costliest involvements ever in the erstwhile Third World, albeit in yet another Soviet-vacated theater. This represents, presumably, a positive case where American sponsorship of aggression helped upset and undo a local balance of power and imposed a rapid and decisive result in a Third World setting that was disturbingly poised to slip into a horrible Fourth World. In the eyes of outlet-seeking Central Asians, including the Kazakhs, though the U.S. did not deploy much ground forces there, they were anticipatively amazed at America's projection of its phenomenal air power and special forces and its ability to mobilize even the largely Muslim, if not also necessarily socialist, masses to drive out a patently retrogressive, albeit, questionably religious, Islamo-capitalistic regime. For these reasons, as the

United States began its Afghan operation; “Kazakhstan offered the U.S. overflight and basing, although the latter did not prove necessary, due in large part to Kazakhstan’s geographic location being less than ideal for U.S. needs. The end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan was certainly viewed as beneficial in Almaty(...)” (Oliker 2007, p. 67)

During G.W. Bush’s second administration, U.S. elites visiting Kazakhstan were more representatives of the politico-economic sector. With people like Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, Samuel W. Bodman, Richard Boucher and even the old-hawk Henry Kissinger swooping in, just to name a few. The U.S. was rather cold to Kazakhstan’s proposal and spirited efforts for the creation of the Eurasian Union. There was nothing surprising in this in the sense that the U.S., despite working cooperatively with Russia in the region, has always been quite uneasy with all schemes aimed at keeping the C.A. states tied too close to the Russian bosom. What is strange, however, is that the U.S. is also quite averse to Kazakhstan’s growing closeness, since at least 2006, even to the, clearly more Western-oriented and U.S.-led, OSCE too! U.S. aid to Kazakhstan was already rising even before G.W. Bush took over the White House. It rose significantly in 2004 as Bush entered his re-election year, but the highest aid during his entire tenure in office came when he went lame-duck in 2008 (Nichol 2013a, p. 65). Remarkably, bilateral trade during G.W. Bush’s tenure grew exponentially, and continually, with significant rises recorded in 2002, 2005 and in 2008. Other than in 2002 the U.S. trade deficit trend with Kazakhstan continued throughout both his administrations (again see Table 1, later).

To continue the Democratic Party’s own past engagement with Kazakhstan and wanting to exceed even Clinton in this respect, president-elect Barack Obama included Nazarbayev in his introductory calls to world leaders. But coming into office on a largely domestic-change agenda, he had to wait two years before he could receive Nazarbayev in Washington. In 2010 Nazarbayev got the, long overdue, reception he deserved as the model leader of a nation that had the courage to renounce even status-enhancing nuclear weapons. A brave undertaking in the interest of humanity, to be sure, but indeed an accomplishment in which the United States itself compares most miserably. Still, perhaps in exchange, the U.S. got the NDN, i.e. Northern Distribution Network (please see, Map 1), over-flight rights and a consulate general in Almaty. A month earlier, Washington had, of course, launched the Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC), the Democrat’s own initiative to take U.S. - Kazakhstan ties to a higher plane, politically. This trend continued when the 3rd ABC in 2012 upgraded itself significantly to a Strategic Partnership Commission (SPC), signaling thereby that ties are getting more mutually pro-active (EKUSA 2012; EKUSA 2013). With the conclusion of the Strategic Partnership (now a) Dialogue, later at New York on 20 Sept. 2016, their mutual commitments continue to deepen further.

Having seeded for the OSCE chairmanship in 2006 through the, strangely highly–reluctant, second G.W. Bush administration, Kazakhstan got the chairmanship later and hosted the OSCE summit in 2010, in its desire to not just work for regional conflict-resolution at the Central Asian level but to attempt to do so, at the all-European regional level too. Kazakhstan had mixed results in this ambitious endeavor however, but still the Europeans, in general, and Mrs. Hillary Clinton in particular, who, this time as the sixth visiting U.S. Secretary of State, leading the U.S. delegation to the summit, was full of praise for Kazakhstan’s achievements, notwithstanding the various shortcomings in its net outcome. Many leading Americans like Ray Mabus, Robert O. Blake, Jr. and Simon Limage besides others have later followed at the heels of, the rather Central Asian foot-loose, Mrs. Clinton to Kazakhstan.

While the trade growth achieved in G.W. Bush’s later tenure somewhat bled into Obama’s own first term, at the cost of, initially, a higher trade deficit, overall trade values maintained their rising high levels, as Obama settled into his term of office, but with the significant outcome of a steady reduction in their trade deficit with Kazakhstan, helped by gradually rising exports and declining imports, as Obama approached his re-election year (see Table 1). As far as aid is concern, Obama’s first administration, in keeping with its predominantly domestic priorities, oversaw a gradual decline in U.S. assistance to an otherwise increasingly prosperous and regionally, if not also nationally, stabilizing Kazakhstan (Nichol 2013b, p. 23; Nichol 2013a, pp. 64-65).

Kazakhs note America’s recent, more moderated, approach to the Muslim world and energy security issues, with a sense of relief (Shaikhutdinov 2009). During Nazarbayev’s 2010 visit to Washington, D.C. to attend the Nuclear Security Summit,⁹ he was also given an award by the East West Institute for “championing preventive diplomacy and promoting interfaith dialogue at the global level” (EKUSA 2010). But, still, Barack Obama’s keenness to drawdown from Afghanistan is viewed with some concern as to what this may actually augur for the Central Asian region generally in the future, though Kazakhstan, in the meanwhile, rakes in more than U.S. \$125 million per annum officially just from the U.S., for its role in permitting the “reverse transit” via NDN (a logistics arrangement originally begun in Jan. 2009 which subsequently has been operating in reverse mode since 2012) of “sustainment and total cargoes” exiting from Afghanistan (Mankoff 2013, p.4). Hemmed-in by an unfavorable, if not totally hostile U.S. Congress, the United States under Obama, in his second term, and Kazakhstan too, were somewhat constrained mid-2014 onwards, perhaps due to depressed oil prices, and could not both boost their increasing mutual ties, respectively, to the desired levels. Still, both

⁹ Perhaps eyeing, with adequate moral credentials, leadership in the global non-proliferation movement, Kazakhstan had participated in subsequent Nuclear Security Summits in Seoul (2012) and others too, beyond the present research period (1991-2013).

the U.S. and Kazakhstan marked their 25th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations by announcing reciprocal introduction of 10-year business and tourism visas to each other's citizens, thereby, showcasing the robust nature of their on-going relationship.

Having assured Nazarbayev of his desire to strengthen U.S.-Kazakhstan ties quite recently, as the president-elect, Donald Trump, a little later, as the 45th U.S. President, perplexingly, settles into an apparently anti-Muslim posture, as he, assiduously, pecks out his obviously conservative *albeit*, paranoidly, xenophobic, emergent Republican administration. Where exactly would this latest U.S. presidential bogie take U.S.- Kazakhstan relation to?; only time would reveal. Meanwhile, all worldly-wise cosmopolitans would have to join the debate and *energetically* surf the anxious currents leading towards Expo2017, not least via #USKZ and #KZUS!

Bilateral Developmental Assistance (BDA)

The U.S. enacted the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) in October 1992 to serve as the legislative cornerstone for its efforts to help the FSU in their political and economic transformations, as independent successor states of the collapsing Soviet Union. In this context, under the FSA the U.S. was committed to aiding Kazakhstan's transition to democracy and to its reconfiguration as an open market economy. In fact the US has assisted Kazakhstan right from its independence. By the end of 1992 it had extended a modest figure of 20.33 million, in this regard. The AEECA-linked FSA had formed a significant percent of the United States' total aid to Kazakhstan, over the years.

The U.S. government has been providing various bilateral development assistances to Kazakhstan not just principally through its various executive departments such as State, Defense and Energy but also through its other agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In keeping with America's neo-liberal agenda, the Agency's program in Kazakhstan emphasizes a number of themes such as: a) private sector-led economic growth that is sustainable, b) accountable governance that is also effective, c) promote market reforms including liberalization, d) establishing the base for an open, prosperous and democratic society in Kazakhstan, and e) security help. The U.S. had provided around US "\$1.205 billion in technical assistance and investment support" to Kazakhstan between the years 1992 to 2005 (DOS-BN 2009).

Since Kazakhstan's independence the total U.S. government aid, in grant form mostly, including those that the USAID had extended to it till 2012 is fully valued higher at about US \$ 2.09 billion. The peak year for aid thus far appears to be 2009 when Kazakhstan received U.S. \$ 220.28 million (Nichol 2013a, p.65). Aid has drastically fallen since then, but follows a trend which first appeared in 2002. U.S. government aid between 2013 and 2015 add up to US\$ 33,090,000. Though US\$ 9.1million was appropriated

for Kazakhstan in 2016, only a paltry US\$2.29million was actually disbursed. An aid of just 8,783,000 has been requested for FY2017 (DOS-FOA 2016). Though these in themselves appear to be negative, these merely indicate the fact that other than on human rights issues, Kazakhstan has progressed, achieved economic growth, is democratically better than Russia itself, has an increasing security strategic value and that U.S.-Kazakhstan relations have stabilized more substantively to embrace numerous other sectors and are no longer merely confined to a developmental aid dependency relationship (Tarnoff 2007, pp. 4, 7-10).

The U.S. Peace Corps, often touted worldwide as promoters of peace, friendship and understanding between the U.S. and other countries, also ran its program in Kazakhstan since 1993, as per the request of that government, following initial presentation by the Peace Corps staff. A bilateral agreement codifies and consolidates further the works of the Peace Corps in Kazakhstan. Since independence numerous PCV groups have successfully served in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan had about 140 volunteers in 2009 engaged in various activities including in imparting business education, teaching English, public health, HIV/AIDS prevention, life skills education, community development, developing environmental NGOs and youth development (DOS-BN 2009). As one of the most well developed states in the world to host a Peace Corps program, Kazakhstan cumulatively saw, depending on the source relied upon, anything between 1,120 and 1,176 volunteers serve on its territory, before suspending their program in 2011.

More generally, U.S. foreign assistance programs in the form of technical assistance and development co-operation supports democracy building and promotes long-term development in various sectors such as agriculture, health care, education and environmental protection. The U.S. is also known to contribute to international institutions' multi-lateral efforts to combat TIPs and even to private organizations working in Kazakhstan. Again, in a multi-lateral context, the U.S. commits to and supports the World Bank, IMF, EBRD, ADB and other such institutions' aid to Kazakhstan too. In this context, other than the official U.S. bi-lateral and multi-lateral agency donors of development assistance, there are also private donors and philanthropic foundations in the U.S. that are involved in the Kazakhstan development sector. Such U.S. foundations, constructively engaged in Kazakhstan, include the Bill and Melinda Gates, Eurasia, Ford, Shelby Cullom Davis, Rockefeller, Soros, John and Catherine MacArthur and Asia foundations. Furthermore, hundreds of United States-linked NGOs are involved in capacity-building, including through offering training, and exchanges with Kazakhstan.

American BDA on the Political Front - The main objective of their co-operation in the political sector is the consolidation of democracy and promotion of good governance via supporting sustainable economic, social and environmental development. USAID has long supported anti-corruption project and also runs leadership and professional training courses for Kazakh

mid-level elites. American help also goes to improving the skills of registered political parties and their officials. On Kazakhstan's part, one-third, about a thousand, of all Bolashak scholarships, holders of which may turn out to be future leadership material, it offers are slated for higher studies in the U.S. alone. In the area of legal reform, promotion of rule of law is an overriding objective. USAID funding has also been used on the judiciary, to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness and to upgrade their skills at adjudicating cases, especially commercial cases and also, more generally, on reforming commercial law. The U.S. provides such assistances that, it believes, would win the judiciary, greater trust in the eyes of the Kazakh public.

Kazakhstan civil society and media development is enabled by U.S. technical assistance, on legal and regulatory reforms, addressing those sectors. The U.S. encourages citizen participation in the Kazakh public arena through its support of local NGOs. Other NGOs dealing with development of "independent media, legal reform, woman's rights, civic education and legislative oversight" are also supported by the U.S. with generous grants. Specifically, through these engagements, the U.S. seeks to encourage the civil society in Kazakhstan "to influence national-level public policy decision-making" (DOS-FOA 2013). At the grassroots level, the U.S. helps in addressing local disputes, securing respect for human rights, promoting civic activism and facilitates coalition-building among local NGOs. Media institutions are funded to increase the public's access to objective news and information. Very broadly, American aid in the Kazakh politico-legal sector includes encouragement of democratic political development and imparting of political skills, promoting the public role of civil society and the mass media; and improving the functioning and independence of the Kazakhstan judiciary. For other American BDAs, but specifically, for those addressed to the Kazakh econo-environmental sector and the BDA for its defense and security sector, please see at the ends of the following Economic Sphere and Strategic Realm sections, respectively.

Economic Sphere

America's relationship with Kazakhstan is not limited to just the political but also has a consequent economic dimension. With the Soviet collapse, the successor states, including, Kazakhstan were enticed to the open-market way by the Western world. Kazakhstan's moves towards economic development also through regional cooperation quite easily harmonized with U.S. policy for that entire region. Economically, Kazakhstan is key to the U.S. in the region because of its location, its economic bravery and dynamism, its higher industrial capacity, its array of natural resources, including energy ones and its low-density territory. The post Soviet collapse's decline in demand, that reached its nadir in 1994, was overcome with bold economic reforms and more than reversed from 2000 on with the help of the rising energy sector, aid inflows, foreign investments and even improving harvests.

Utilizing the opportunity that came its way, as a consequence, the U.S. rapidly forged economic links with Kazakhstan that includes seizing investment opportunities, establishing and building trade ties, to gradually induct Kazakhstan towards the open market world trading system and promoting private-sector led business culture in Kazakhstan, by facilitating the presence and legally safeguarded growth of American and U.S. – linked businesses in the Kazakhstan market place. It is these economic sector moves and resultant ties that I would now discuss in greater depth.

Bilateral Trade

Kazakhstan and the U.S. are new but fast growing trade markets for one another. The trade value as represented by both the export value and import value of goods between them shows continual growth. As per the records of the U.S. Census Bureau, from the time when trade figures became available for Kazakhstan, i.e. from February 1992, just over a month after the US recognized it, US bilateral trade in goods with it had grown continually (FTD 2016). The export value of goods from the US to Kazakhstan grew continually from 68 million US dollars in 1993, the first full year of exports to be recorded, to US\$1,150.2 million in 2013. After sliding down in 2014, exports again began bouncing up in 2016 with the visually-pleasing value of US\$1,111.1 million, but well beyond the research period. The upward growth trend dipped only in the years 1995, 1998, 2003, 2009 and in the twin down years of 2014/5, in between.

Though the US is not among the top three of Kazakhstan's export markets, it did figure as the third leading import market of Kazakhstan after Russia and Ukraine. The import value of goods to the US from Kazakhstan also grew continually from about US\$ 41 million in the first full year of trade in 1993 to some 1,421 million dollars in 2013. The import value began growing exponentially from 2005 on continually, reaching a remarkable peak of sorts at US\$ 1,872.4 million in 2010. The upward trend dipped somewhat significantly only between the years 2001 to 2003. Thereafter it has again been tapering down since 2011. On average the peak months for US exports to Kazakhstan are Februarys, Septembers and Octobers and the persistent peak months for US imports from Kazakhstan is Aprils. Overall, in 1993 bilateral trade was valued at a meager 109 million US dollars but with a US surplus. Most US surpluses, however, continually ran out by 1998 when the US began its protracted deficit run, in its bilateral trade with Kazakhstan, breaking the duck, alas, only in 2016, i.e. well beyond the research period.¹⁰ Earlier, in 2002, against the trend, the US had registered a

¹⁰ This section is largely the author's own interpretation and narration of raw data, as also seen presented in Table 1, originally furnished by the U.S. Census Bureau, which in their unanalyzed raw form, may readily be verified online at <<https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/>>.

surprise surplus too, perhaps as an unanticipated positive outcome, of the tragic Sept. 11 episode.

Viewed in a 5-yearly perspective, bilateral trade so far was valued at US\$203.8 million in 1995; in 2000 it was 553.2 million; in 2005 bilateral trade was valued at US\$1.64 billion, a 91% increase from 2004. Under the Cold War vintage Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Sections 402 and 409 of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act, Kazakhstan, by extension, was expected and has always more than complied with its freedom of emigration¹¹ provisions and, accordingly, secured U.S. presidential certification to that effect, each time in the past. As a symbolic boost to the gradually rising U.S.-Kazakhstan trade relations, their 2006 agreement specifically excluded Kazakhstan henceforth from this amendment and its expectations, thus doing away with the need for a waiver to receive MFN treatment and actually graduating towards the WTO (EKUSA 2013). In 2010 trade was valued at more than 2.60 billion and in 2013 it slid a little to rest at about US\$2.57 billion. Beyond the research period, it hit a low of sorts at US\$1.33billion in 2015 before bouncing a little to be at US\$1.86billion in 2016 (FTD 2016). The general upward trend saw relatively small, if not slight, dips in the years 1998, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2011.

Though the growing trade figures are remarkable in themselves, these are still miniscule in comparison to the United States' trade figures with older and longer well-established states like those in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, not to mention with heftier partners elsewhere in the world, least of all with the emerging economic powerhouse, neighboring China. Thus, the prospects for US-Kazakhstan trade in the future looks certainly bright, especially given broadly the United States' keenness to diversify its various trades, encourage emergent economies and brace up the independences of the ex-Soviet states. When one looks at Kazakhstan's trade partners, Russia still figures as Kazakhstan's leading trade partner, overall. The E.U. and China follow Russia, in this respect, but with China fast aiming to out-strip both! The United States and its proxies Turkey, U.K., Germany and S. Korea also figure, as key import partners of Kazakhstan.

Without using the strict and comprehensive, if not also cumbersome, classification of trade products employed by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), one can generally say that trade between

¹¹ With Kazakh-linked Jews like Alexander Mashkevich (representing wealth at its entrepreneurial best) and Sasha Baron Cohen (representing artistic liberty at its perverted worst) being totally free to roam the globe representing or, as in the latter's case, misrepresenting Kazakhstan, it is absolutely absurd to consider the amendment as even remotely relevant to Kazakhstan (DOS-USRWK 2012). If it continues to be applied at all, then clearly it must be for some other reasons. At the last check, it still appears to hold. For sampling Sasha and his mischief, see his handiwork/s, a film and a book both, entitled *Borat* (Sagdiyev 2007). Kazakhs, in an American orbit, like Kazykhanov and Aisha Mukasheva have since, over the years, soften their reactions to the 2006 film, which is more a publicity-greedy smearmentary than an authentic documentary!

western countries, including the United States, and Kazakhstan are dominated by oil, ferrous & non-ferrous metals including uranium, machinery, minerals, industrial materials, gas, chemicals, electronics and transport vehicles. Specifically, in the case of the United States, the transportation vehicles deal, of General Motors and General Electric, respectively, comes to mind, in this context (EKUSA 2013). Somewhat lower down the rank, traditional agricultural products such as grains, including preeminently wheat, wool, meat, cotton, general food items and even coal also matter, in their products trade.

Business Presence

Since independence Kazakhstan has seen a gradual growth in the business activities of U.S. companies in also other areas of business than just pure trade on its territory. However, even these varied business investments are only a part of a much larger U.S. investment portfolio (on which, see the following section on Investments) in Kazakhstan encompassing not only, principally, the energy sector but also involve sectors such as mining, real estate, business services, chemicals, transport and communication, electric, gas and water production and distribution and also infrastructure, at a much lower level (Embassy of Kazakhstan in the USA (EKUSA) 2012).

In its more traditional sector, as hinted in the previous section, it is a major exporter of wheat. Kazakhstan envisions itself as a future agro-export power. It has boosted its productivity by adopting U.S. methods and machinery for harvesting and herding. In 2010, it airlifted more than 2,000 Angus and Hereford cattle from North Dakota as breeding stock. It plans to create feeding complexes for livestock under U.S. joint ventures to feed 5,000 heads of cattle (EKUSA 2013). Beyond the period of research, the figure has reached over 50,000 cattles per year. It wishes to adopt latest U.S. scientific methods for sheep and poultry breeding as well. Speaking of joint ventures, there were 374 U.S. joint ventures in Kazakhstan by 2009. Beyond the research period, this number has long moved past 400. Other than the many joint ventures in the energy sector like TengizChevroil, for more of which see the later section on energy dealings, the U.S. firm General Electric has a joint venture factory right in Astana (variously known in the past as Akmola and Tselinograd) itself, assembling railway locomotive kits manufactured and exported from Pennsylvania.

Anyway, in the newer business sectors generally, U.S. companies with large investments in Kazakhstan include Chevron, Kerr-McGee/Oryx, B.P., PFC Energy, IBM, AGCO Corporation, Boeings, Baker Hughes, Sikorsky Aircraft, Apache Corp., FedEx, Asia-Africa Projects Group, J.P. Morgan and Citibank (EKUSA 2012). For additional U.S. businesses and a brief sectoral representation of the same in the Kazakhstan economy, see Table 2.

Table 2: A selection of U.S. Corporations found to be active in various Kazakhstan Business Sectors

Business Sector	U.S. Corporation	Business Sector	U.S. Corporation
Agro Services	AGCO Corporation	ICT	Aurora
	CaseNewHolland, Inc.		Cisco
	Deere & Comp.		IBM
	Philip Morris		Microsoft
	RJR Nabisco		Baker Botts, L.L.P.
Banks	Citibank	Law Firms	Bracewell Giuliani
	Goldman, Sachs & Co.		Coudert Bros.
	J.P. Morgan		Dentons
	Simmons & Co.		Haynes and Boone
Business Services	Deloitte		Morgan Lewis
	Pricewaterhouse Coopers		White and Case
	Xerox		FedEx
Construction	Bechtel Corp.	Logistics	Globalink
	Fluor Corp.		M&M Air Cargo
	McKinsey		Travic
	Parsons Corp.		UPS
Consultative	Asia-Africa Projects Group	Oil & Gas	B.P.*
	APCO		ChevronTexaco
	Halliburton International		ConocoPhillips
	J.E. Austin Associates		ExxonMobil
	McLarty		Shell*
Health	Abbott	Oil Services	Baker Hughes
	AbbVie		Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR)
	Baxter		Noble Corp.
	Lilly		Parker Drilling Co.
	Merck		Schlumberger
Hotels	Hilton	Transportation	Bell Helicopter Inc.
	Inter Continental		Boeing Company, The
	Marriott		General Electric
	Radisson		General Motors
	Ritz-Carlton		Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.

Note: Corporations are listed alphabetically within each sector; some of the corporations are actually multi-sectoral but listed here only in the sector deemed most appropriate; Banks, generally also dabble in consultative business. Those in Information Communication Technologies (ICT) may also delve into defense electronics. Similarly, most firms listed in the transportation and construction sectors are also involved in defense-related dealings, that are not directly dealt with in this article.* - Though these are basically Anglo-firms, they do have significant American interest and, therefore, are included.

Sources: Embassy of Kazakhstan in U.S.A. (EKUSA 2012); U.S. – Kazakhstan Business Association (USKBA 2014); American Chamber of Commerce in Kazakhstan (AMCHAM 2016).

Kazakh sources state there were between 50-70 U.S. firms in Kazakhstan by mid-1994. In 2000 there were about 150 U.S. firms in Almaty. To deeply ingrain the business culture, in 2002 both state parties launched a Business Development Partnership, known also as the Houston Initiative. Further still, as if to give a fillip to these trends, the World Bank named Kazakhstan as the world's most reformed business economy in 2011. This, in turn, has served to attract even more U.S. firms to the Kazakh steppe, ever since. The hundreds of U.S. firms, now present in the various sectors, hold a leading position in the Kazakhstan market, excepting in sectors that remain as the sole preserve of Samruk-Kazyna and Baiterek.

Investments (FDIs)

In keeping with the American private sectors tendency to invest in various new and growth economies, and to when Kazakhstan begun welcoming foreign investments, particularly as Russia receded away in this respect, U.S. investment sources then gradually begun paying more interest to Kazakhstan, as a destination for their investments, especially after the conclusion of the OPIC agreement and the bilateral investment treaty (DOS 1992). First on the Kazakhstan investment scene were, of course, the U.S. energy corporations, since they already had an eye on Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon riches even from pre-independence times (CIA 1993). Thus, it is no surprise at all to find American companies getting a head start, heavily invested and actively involved, particularly in Kazakhstan's petroleum sector. On Kazakhstan's part, conscious of the positive impact of investments on economic growth and employment, Kazakhstan has often encouraged foreign direct investments (FDIs). Boosting Kazakhstan's reform efforts further, in this regard, were the endorsements of the "IMF, the World Bank, the EC and then-US secretary of state James Baker," who even backed it with a supply of American economists (Rashid 1993, p. 49). Kazakhstan has seen over \$122 billion in FDI inflow since its independence, with the last five years alone bringing in about \$70 billion.¹² Beyond the period of this research, total FDI in Kazakhstan was around \$148.1 billion in 2016 (*The World Factbook* 2016). A significant part, usually, over a quarter or at times, about just under one half, of these FDIs are directly from the United States.

Although Kazakhstan is not the largest recipient of the United States' foreign direct investments, the U.S. is a dominant FDI source for Kazakhstan. In 2006 American FDI in Kazakhstan was 27% of the total (Weitz 2008, p. 125). United States' FDI was 24.6 % of Kazakhstan's total FDI in the first half of 2007, says one of the last *Background Note: Kazakhstan* to be available online at the U.S. State Department's website

¹² Depending on the sources consulted, total FDI into Kazakhstan, during this period (1991-2012) ranges from \$122 billion to \$159.3 billion (DOS-BN, CIA., *World Factbook*, various years; Kazakhembus, 2009).

(DOS-BN 2009). The U.S. percentages have increased further since then. By 2009 American companies have invested some U.S. \$ 14.3 billion in Kazakhstan since 1993. This was despite the then obtaining less than favorable legal conditions and the, generally, poor investment climate, including the arbitrary enforcement of laws. Wanting to create a better investment and trade climate, the U.S. and Kazakhstan have had a Bilateral Investment Treaty and an Avoidance of Dual Taxation Treaty in place since 1994 and 1996 respectively, to cater to the needs of their investors and business peoples (DOS-BN 2009). To boost U.S. investments further, the first-ever Kazakhstan-U.S. Investment Forum was held in New York City in 2009, trumpeting afresh its desire to diversify, including through privatization, as per the Kazakh development plan and, generally, promoting its investor friendly climate ('Kazakhstan-U.S. Investment Forum 2009'). The legal investment framework had subsequently been improved further, as a result perhaps, but also by a new 2011 legislation passed by the Kazakh parliament.

Presumably, the cumulative effects of these and other legal and business reforms saw the volume of gross inflow of American direct investments to Kazakhstan growing to more than U.S. \$ 24.2 billion by mid 2012, i.e. within two decades of independence (EKUSA 2013). Still, the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) puts it at 17.9 billion and states that the "Netherlands" hold top spot at \$49 billion in early 2013 (Nichol 2013b, p. 14). Generally however, FDIs have shot up dramatically since the post-2001 period. As recently as 2011 alone Kazakhstan had raked in U.S. \$ 1.039 billion in American FDIs. Flowing beyond the research period, American FDI in Kazakhstan has reached and is passing the \$26billion mark in the period 2005-2017 and has even surpassed the Netherlands of late (Kazakhembus). Given that oil and gas is Kazakhstan's leading economic sector, the U.S. has, appropriately, made its heaviest investments in that sector. But as mentioned or tabulated (Table 2) elsewhere, the U.S. has also invested in other Kazakhstani sectors like in trade, business services, real estate, telecommunications, transport, mining, repair services, electrical energy, gas and water production and distribution sectors and in the banking sector too, mainly via Citibank.

American B.D.A. in the Economic Sphere - The U.S. focus in this sector is on economic, fiscal, financial and trade policy, including economic liberalization, fiscal reform, improving economic transparency including by introducing auditing standards, energy sector reform including improving its regulatory environment and investments in energy efficiency, shaping a national consensus for the mining sector, addressing and reducing climate-change related emissions, privatization of state enterprises in a number of business sectors. Building national consensus in the banking sector and, specifically, building Kazakhstan National Bank's institutional capacity

(DOS-FOAA 2009). Sustainable development of natural resources, including oil, gas, water and others too, remains a focus.

Besides working to improve its public sector governance and capacity, Kazakhstan also joined the United States' Economic Development Program which includes advancing the diversification of the economy, creation of small business support, promotion of economic competitiveness, regional integration, regulatory simplification and sustainable growth across economic sectors. Perhaps for this reason the Kazkommertsbank (Qazkom) has been allowed to specialize in the diversifying non-oil sectors. In these contexts too, "Kazakhstan became the first country" in 2006 "to share directly in the cost of a U.S. Government's foreign assistance program" (DOS-BN 2009; EKUSA 2013). This program was subsequently extended to 2012, considering the mutual benefits it offers to both the U.S. and Kazakhstan. Specifically, in the context of the diversification of the Kazakhstan economy, after more than two decade of exclusion, the 4th Kazakhstan-American Investment Forum in New York on 7th December 2011 addressed newly, the development of strategic industries, with a higher manufacturing role, in Kazakhstan (EKUSA 2013).

Indirectly, Kazakhstan's increasingly market-based economy and its capacity to trade globally has been increased by American investments in the development of key institutions and infra-structure that facilitate and enable regional integration and opened-up alternative outlets for Central Asian resources, in general, to reach the world market (see Maps 1 and, particularly 2, later). In these contexts and with an eye to push diversification of the Kazakhstan economy further, the U.S. had contributed over \$100 billion, in value, to various Kazakh entities by 2011. The U.S. commercial service runs business internships, it also offers various business services and exchanges across all economic sectors, including in the energy sector. In addition, it runs also matchmaker programs that link Kazakh firms with relevant U.S. businesses.

The U.S. has been running USAID assistance and activities in support of privatization, private entrepreneurs and helps in adopting commercial and regulatory laws; given Kazakhstan's gradual embrace of market reforms, the U.S. supports the transition to market economy in Kazakhstan and, thereby, works to integrate it into the world trade system fully (USAID 1997). In this regard, the U.S. had for long supported Kazakhstan's ultimate accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), expected at end 2015.¹³ Very broadly then, aid in the economic sector also includes that, specifically, geared to maintaining an open trade and investment environment. In other social and environmental sectors, the U.S. via the Global Health Initiative (GHI), supports and helps the Kazakh government to provide effective social

¹³ Alas, this objective was duly realized, after rather lengthy, accession negotiations, when Kazakhstan became a WTO member, finally, on 30 Nov. 2015.

services, including by combating HIV/AIDS, addressing multiple-drug-resistant TB and offering help in basic health care and environmental protection. The U.S. and E.U. worked with Kazakhstan to establish in 2001 a Regional Environmental Center (REC) at Almaty (DOS-BN 2009). American aid to Kazakhstan is not all confined to politico-legal, socio-economic and enviro-developmental sectors alone, however. Another important policy area of developmental assistance is the defense and security sector. For more on this matter, see at the end of the sub-section on Defense and Security Ties within the next domain, i.e. Strategic Realm.

Strategic Realm

In keeping with its long sustained objective of preserving its global pre-eminence, even in a post-Cold War world of presumed lower strategic competition, the U.S. characteristically went for the key states/players of the emerging ex-Soviet Central Asian region. Along with countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the similarly interesting entities of Afghanistan and Xinjiang too figured brightly in its strategic calculations if not also on its politico-economic radar. This, however, does not mean that the lesser endowed countries of the region, escaped its entrepreneurial, if not also strategic, attention, especially so when they manifestly possess other energy and mineral assets, to get the U.S. interested.¹⁴

Whether, the U.S. realizes this or not, states like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in Caucasus/Central Asia region do admire America's post-Shah, exemplary role in the Persian Gulf area. They are attracted to the business successes and developmental models of the U.S. energy companies and other MNCs in that region and wish the same could be adapted and emulated in their region too. On average, Central Asian states view America's good relations with Turkey, a key Muslim-Turkic state, as a model to aspire to, though America's idealistic push for an overnight democratic-credential down their throat is a bit difficult to ingest in the short term (Weitz 2008, pp. 129-130). Though America's attitudes in the Russo-Georgian and Ukrainian crises, before and after it, were and are not intended primarily as tools to impress the non-Russian NIS generally, the Central Asians, nevertheless, could not help but take astonished, if not also cautious, note of those too.

Still, in this context, Kazakhstan, a state with enduring fraternal Eurasian ties to Russia, kept its equi-distance intact between the U.S. and Russia. Kazakhstan works hard to equitably regulate its ties with both these key powers and constantly aspires to balance them. This Kazakhstan foreign policy ambivalence was noted in America much earlier even by the Library

¹⁴ For a more contextual and region-wide analysis of these, strategic and geopolitical, issues see my, recently submitted, Ph. D., thesis (Sahib 2016, chapters 2, 5, 6 and 7).

of Congress' *Country Study: Kazakhstan* (FRD 1997). With Russia's initial disinterest vividly in mind, it is, understandably, cautious too about Russia's continued reliability and viewing contrastingly, especially America's military-first approach in the greater Middle Eastern region with concern, it at times goes easy on U.S. overt impetus for deeper intercourse. As far as the Kazakhs are concern, they welcome and are happy if the U.S. confines its role to just "stock and hoe" and hazard not into "shock and awe" as they are habitually prone to, west and south of the Kazakhstan backyard. In these contexts, Kazakhstan also maintains its multi-vectored balance not only by being a member of the CSTO, ECO, OIC and SCO but also by having security dialogues with Asean and even initiating on its own, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building measures in Asia (CICA) to multi-laterally and institutionally underpin the same. Beyond this research period, it had been bidding for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council since 2014 and won the same for 2017-18 on 28 June 2016, presumably, with P5, including American, support for pursuing its peace-driven objectives.

However, mindful of the difficulties of its strategic neighborhood and the potential instabilities arising from the recent drawdowns and the then looming post-2014 American "exit" from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan was and is particularly anxious to keep all its neighboring powers and the United States equitably and positively engaged with it and to be relevant and available in its developmental immediate futures, particularly, towards the pursuit, in the short-term, of its visions 2030 (Nazarbayev 1998) and 2050, over the longer haul. As if to keep in step with these legitimate Kazakh anxieties, according to the DOS, the strategic aim of the United States "in Kazakhstan is to ensure and maintain the development of the country as a stable, secure, democratic, and prosperous partner that respects international standards and agreements, embraces free-market competition and the rule of law, and is a respected regional leader" (DOS-FOA 2013; Nichol 2013b, p.21). Anyway, the two key sectors through which those concerns and lofty objectives may fruitfully be realized in the future are now analyzed here. As you may care to notice, though energy issues are normally dealt with in the economic sector in most analyses, I have, however, chosen to deal with energy dealings within the strategic realm, in this article, because being the dominant economic sector and the real driver of the overall Kazakh economy, its impressive growth and given its strategic dimension, as it is constituted within the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship, this, I feel justifiably, should be its appropriate slot.

Energy Dealings

Having been kept out of Kazakhstan's territory during Soviet times, American energy corporations seized the opening to the region's resources offered by Kazakhstan's imminent independence. The U.S. administration of

the day, long plagued by the need to diversify its energy supply sources and well represented by the oil lobby, need not be invited to bandwagon. Thus, the Soviet monopolistic hold over Kazakh petroleum resources, in particular, came to a rapid end.

The U.S. Department of Energy estimates Kazakhstan's oil reserves as 9-40 billion barrels of proven reserves and an additional 92 billion barrels of possible reserves, thus giving Kazakhstan an oil reserves total of anything between 101 to 132 billion barrels. Kazakhstan's oil reserves have continued to grow gradually as relatively positive exploration results seep in, if only in fits. The CIA has quite regularly stuck to the 30 billion barrels of reserves figure (*The World Factbook* 2016). Over a hundred hydrocarbon fields have been discovered and more than 200 hydrocarbon concentrations have been identified. Its main offshore hydrocarbon fields are Kashagan and Kurmangazy and its onshore fields include Aktobe, Mangistau, Uzen, Tengiz and Karachaganak (Olcott 2007, pp. 62-66).

In 2001, Kazakhstan and the U.S. established an Energy Partnership. Perhaps as a consequence Kazakhstan is fast emerging as a key petroleum producer in the Central Asian region and it has become one of the world's major crude oil producers, especially after 1998. Kazakhstan's output stood at about 900,000 barrels per day in 2004. This fact alone is largely responsible for increasing Astana's state revenue. Kazakhstan's oil production is rapidly increasing. It nears to doubling every five years since 1995. However, it has not kept to this trend since 2005 when the output was 1,288,000 barrels per day and it rose to only 1,525,000 barrels per day in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau). In 2008 the production figure was 1,345,000 barrels per day.¹⁵ It was believed to be hovering at under 2,000,000 barrels per day in 2013 and was, beyond the research period, slated to reach 3,000,000 barrels in 2015.¹⁶ Kazakhstan exported an estimated 1.466 million barrels per day in 2013 (*The World Factbook* 2016). As a non-OPEC nation Kazakhstan is not bound by any fixed production quotas, however, in the interest of maintaining a healthy price level, it maintains voluntary constraints under various guises.¹⁷

¹⁵ The production figure the Census Bureau reported differed clearly from those given by the BP (*B.P. Statistical Review of World Energy* (BPSRWE) 2013), the CIA and the revised BP (BPSRWE 2016) figure, even for the same year (2008)! For example, BP's original figure was 1,526,000barrels per day but its revised figure is only 1,483,000barrels per day; significantly, the differentials are well over 100,000barrels, in each case (BPSRWE 2013, p.8; BPSRWE 2016, p.8).


¹⁶ For whatever reasons, if one is to believe the publicly available data then, these production levels were never reached in either 2013 or 2015, for according to BP the output was only 1,720,000 barrels and 1,669,000 barrels per day, respectively (BPSRWE 2016, p.8).

¹⁷ As a clear rentier state, Kazakhstan has for long been sensitive to commodity prices. For very recent evidence of this responsible tendency, see: ('KBR Hired as Consultant ...' 2017) and (Puchyk 2017). Specifically, in the oil sector, both its yearly production figures and associated behavior strongly point to such a propensity, official or otherwise (BPSRWE 2016, p.8). Despite the keenness and capability to boost output (2013), the glut-driven

There has been a high convergence of the private sectors of both the U.S. and Kazakhstan in energy partnerships. Through these energy co-operations U.S. majors hold leading positions in the Kazakh energy market. Unlike many countries in the Middle East, Kazakhstan exploits its oil resources via joint-ventures or PSA operations with international oil majors. Thus, it is no surprise to find many energy multi-national corporations, including American ones operating various energy projects in this key sector of the Kazakh economy. While Kazakhstan's oil may not be relatively cheap to produce, it is of sufficiently high quality to attract most oil majors to invest. In fact, the oil industry has been willing to spend 10s of billions of dollars annually in this sector.

Depending on Western, including American, oil corporations' good behavior, in terms of allowing adequate Kazakh equity stakes, in their energy consortia, tax settlement, Kazakhization, environmental responsibility and good social infrastructural help, the Kazakh government rewards them with additional contracts if not also concessions, such as cancelling fines and duties. The nature of Kazakhstan's dealings with Chevron and later with ExxonMobil (Schreiber and Tredinnick 2008, p.67) too, comes to mind in this regard. Very broadly, U.S. corporations are involved in both hydrocarbon field development projects and energy transit pipeline projects in Kazakhstan (please verify the general locations of these in Map 2).

Hydrocarbon field development projects - Some of the specific Kazakhstan-linked large energy projects, where American corporations' equities are inevitably involved, include hydrocarbon field development projects such as:



Map: 2 Key oil, gas and condensate fields and energy pipelines in and out of Kazakhstan

Legend

- Old and New oil fields.
- Old and New gas fields.
- Old and New oil pipelines.
- Old and New gas pipelines.
- Emerging kazakh gas pipeline.

STC — Initials identify lines/routes referred to and notated in the main text

Note: The different lines representing the various pipelines indicate only their simplified approximate routes; also sections or entire lines may involve multiple pipelines.

Map Source : Adapted from Magellan, SM Geographix - www.maps.com

Data Sources: U.S. Department of Energy, "Caspian Region, EIA Country Analysis Briefs, available on-line at: <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneuc/cas/caspian/Full.html>>; Jim Nichol 2013, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interest (97-1058), p. 18; and Sally N. Cummings 2012, Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations, Routledge, London and New York, p. 141

Tengiz – At 20% of production its operator TengizChevroil has been the largest producer of hydrocarbons so far in Kazakhstan. Between 1993 and 2009 about 177.9 million tons have been extracted from the Tengiz field and paying the Kazakh government some \$43 billion in taxes and royalties (EKUSA 2013). Beyond the research period, these have more than doubled by 2015 (PKAJ 2016). American equity holders in the TengizChevroil consortium are: Chevron 50 %, ExxonMobil 25% with 20% held by the Kazakh government via KazMunaigaz and the remaining 5% by LUKArco (DOS-BN 2009).

Karachaganak – The Karachaganak Consortium known also as the KIO is involved in exploiting this gas condensate field. About 70 % of the KPOC's oil exports exits via the CPC. The Kazakh government subsequently demanded a 10% stake in the consortium whose American equity holder was Texaco originally at 20%. Shell, Chevron and Lukoil have major stakes in KIO. Even with oil prices sluggish, 141.7 million barrels equivalent of condensate was produced from this field in 2015.

Kashagan – This giant discovery of the Caspian region was for long notching up delays and cost overruns. Finally in 2013 then again in 2016 it began producing in commercial quantities (Graeber 2016). Now operated by the NCOC, its American interests are held by ExxonMobil 16.81 %, Shell 16.81 % and, till mid-2013, ConocoPhillips at 8.4 %. In July 2013, Kazakhstan had ConocoPhillips' stake (9.26 %) therein sold to CNPC (Nichol 2013b, p.15).

The Shell Company represents American interests in some of the smaller hydrocarbon fields too in Kazakhstan, like holding 50 % in Arman and 55 % in Zhemchuzhiny (Olcott 2007, pp. 63-64). It holds concession licenses over vast exploratory areas in Kazakhstan's sector of the northern Caspian, including in offshore hydrocarbon fields such as Kairan, Aktote, Kalamkas, Auezov and Khazar and even in onshore upstream facilities like Bolashak and Bautino Base (*Shell Investor's Handbook 2011-2015*).

Given that Soviet Russia had enormous geo-political and geo-economic influence and control over Kazakhstan's and, generally, over Central Asian energy export routes, from even pre-independence times, a primary post-independence U.S. concern, in this context, has been to provide immediately non-Russian and non-Iranian and, over the longer haul, even non-Chinese alternative export outlets for Kazakhstan and other Central Asian hydrocarbons (Weitz 2008, p. 125). Central Asian independences have gradually led to the withering away of the Russian energy-transit monopoly, present earlier. Energy-hungry economies around the Central Asian periphery have broken into vicious competition over Kazakhstan's oil resources. China, E.U., Eastern Europe, India and Turkey have taken the plunge into C.A. hydrocarbons. While the U.S. is really not a neighbor of Kazakhstan, this has not prevented its internationally active oil majors from, strategically reaching out and, taking, exceedingly, liberal bites at the Caspian energy pie, particularly via large investments in energy transit infrastructure.

Energy transit pipeline projects - Some specific energy transit pipeline projects through which the U.S. has chosen to, concretely, manifest its interest in or express its reservations on Caspian hydrocarbons include:

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline - About 733 million barrels per year of Kazakh oil travels on this pipeline, having been supplied earlier via barges from Kazakh ports on eastern Caspian Sea (Map 2). The main American stake-holders in this pipeline are: Chevron, ConocoPhillips and

ExxonMobil. Anything between 70,000 to 500,000 bpd of Kazakh oil, depending on a host of external and internal factors, has regularly been barged by Kazmortransflot to Baku to exit via this pipeline. As part of EAOTC, options for replacing this barge traffic with fixed pipelines has long existed but petered out in 2008 only to be revived around 2016. Russia worries over U.S. protecting the pipeline with UAVs if not also troops.

Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) - Connects major Kazakh oil deposits to Novorossiysk, a Russian port on the eastern Black Sea coast. From there it may reach world market either through the Turkish Straits or the NSC route by first using Sovkomflot. The CPC pipeline is owned and operated by a multi-national consortium that includes the U.S. private-sector majors Chevron (15%), Mobil (7.5%) directly and also indirectly via Oryx, Arco (12.5%), Shell and even Rosneft. It must be noted, that BP was evicted from the CPC in Dec. 2009 to benefit LUKoil.

Uzen – Atyrau - Samara (UAS) pipeline - This pipeline connects Kazakh oil, presumably, after clearing the Orenburg refinery, to the extensive Russian Transneft distribution system up north, the Kazakhstan portion of which is 100% owned by KazTransOil (Olcott 2007, p. 67).

West Kazakhstan-West China (WKWC) pipeline - It carries Kazakh oil from Tengiz area to China proper via Xinjiang. It is a joint venture between KazMunaiGas and CNPC. China is slated to absorb 65% of Kazakhstan production via it come 2020.

Shymkent-Chardzhou (SC) pipeline – It is an oil pipeline from the Shymkent refinery to Chardzhou that transits via Uzbekistan. It is also believed to be linked to the Omsk-Shymkent pipeline.

Transneft (T) pipeline network - This extensive ex-Soviet and now Russian oil pipeline network enters Kazakhstan at various different places much like the CAC mentioned below (see, Map 2) but actually, in Transneft's case, both bringing oil into and out of Kazakhstan. The transport quota (of 44 mbd) that Russia applied in these pipelines was felt to be too restrictive, by both the Kazakhs and Americans (Kasenov 1995, p. 274).

Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline (TAGP) - Carries Turkmen gas to China proper via Xinjiang. Kazakh gas joins in too from 2015/6, via a new branch line (AS) constructed from the Aral Sea area. It is not clear if the AS branch line mentioned (Cummings 2012, p.141) is the same one as the recently completed Beineu-Aralsk-Shymkent line, which, interestingly, appears to run along the one which used to be a part of the old CAC system.

Bukhara-Tashkent-Bishkek-Almaty (BTBA) pipeline - This pipeline delivers Uzbek gas to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. A compressor station completed in 2016 connects the BTBA pipeline to the TAGP thereby help bring Tengiz, Karachaganak, Zhanazhol and Kashagan gas onward to China.

Central Asia-Center (CAC) system - This pipeline system carries Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Russia transiting both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (please see, Map 2 again). More so than on the previous six

pipelines, the U.S., except perhaps its energy majors, has scant positive interest on this system too.

Karachaganak-Atyrau (KA) pipeline - This oil pipeline links the Karachaganak condensate field to Atyrau. Given that Texaco has a significant stake in the Karachaganak field, we may safely presume that America has some interest in the pipeline that leads out from there.

Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CAOP) - Kazakh and Uzbek oil joins Turkmen oil in a southwardly direction towards Gwadar in Pakistan. The U.S. has long been keen on this project, as it tallies with its various objectives in the C.A. region, including in the goal of linking it to South Asia, as part of its Greater Central Asia project. The disinterest of I.R. Iran, an oil market competitor, makes this oil outlet attractive, particularly, to the U.S.

Regarding Kazakhstan's pipelines strategy its former foreign minister Kassymzhomart Tokaev said more than a decade ago: "in general, our strategy is to have as many pipelines as is possible. We have no political prejudices. We want to export as much oil as is possible, in order to produce as much oil as is possible. We have very ambitious plans to produce more than 100 million tonnes in the next five years. Now we produce 60 million tonnes." (*The Sunday Times* 2005, p. 27) Over and above petroleum resources Kazakhstan also possesses natural gas reserves amounting to some 45.7 (revised to 33.1) trillion cubic feet, both in its onshore and offshore gas and oil fields (*B.P. Statistical Review of World Energy (BPSRWE)* 2013, p.20; *BPSRWE* 2016, p.20). Gas production has seen continual growth in Kazakhstan reaching 19.7 (revised to 11.3) billion cubic meters in 2012 (*BPSRWE* 2013, p.22; *BPSRWE* 2016, p.22). Kazakhstan exported an estimated 11.54 billion cubic meters of gas in 2014 (*The World Factbook* 2016), presumably after producing 12.2 billion cubic meters of gas in 2014; it produced 12.4 billion cubic meters of gas in 2015 (*BPSRWE* 2016, p.22). There are indications from confidential sources, however, that they have produced more than double that amount in 2015. Anyway, the natural gas infrastructure is relatively less developed in comparison to those of both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. For this reason, some, if gradually decreasing, percentage of its associated gas are either flared off or are like at Karachaganak re-injected back into the ground to boost pressure for oil extraction. The gas sector hopes to reduce flaring in the future, particularly, as environmental concerns loom on and integrative infrastructures like the Beineu-Shymkent line expands.

In addition to the strategic mineral fuels of petroleum and natural gas, Kazakhstan also has abundant uranium reserves. Being aware of nuclear blasts and radiation fallouts in Kazakhstan that were more than 2,500 times worse than what Hiroshima experienced, Nazarbayev urges the world to adopt peaceful nuclear energy solutions. Kazakhstan owns anything between 21-67% of the world's natural uranium (EKUSA 2010; *NAC-KazAtomProm*

2016). Kazakhstan's production was 4,365 tonnes in 2005 and it intends to produce more well into the future. In fact in 2012 Kazatomprom produced over 18,000 tons of uranium (Aitken 2012, p. 85). Beyond the research period, as privatization creeps even into strategic industries, Kazatomprom produced only 12,851 tons in 2015 out of a Kazakhstan total production of 23,806 tons in the same year (*NAC-KazAtomProm* 2016). Curiously, despite producing via a drillhole *in situ* leaching process, Kazakhstan could not meet the planned 24,000 tons in 2015; could price considerations have played a part in this, one can only wonder? Apparently, impressed with Kazakhstan's peace-loving and non-proliferation credentials the multi-lateral IAEA has cooperatively established its international LEU fuel bank at Oskemen that could contribute to global nuclear security (Puchyk 2017). Japan, though a war-time victim of nuclear attacks itself, is even willing, via its Toshiba-controlled Westinghouse outfit, to help Kazakhstan build its first peaceful reactor for producing green nuclear power. With an eye on future power needs, Kazakhstan is considering Kurchatov, Ulken and Alatau as possible sites for new reactors. Also towards securing a diversified product line Kazatomprom signed a MOU with Centrus Energy Corp. of the U.S. in 2015 (*NAC-KazAtomProm* 2016).

Strategically too, the U.S. is, of course, in Kazakhstan as much to diversify its energy sources as it is to prevent Kazakhstan from becoming a U.S. hostile safe-haven for what it, erroneously and maliciously, labels as "Islamic radicalism",¹⁸ both of which remain, by the way, key U.S. national

¹⁸ If **Islam** is linked, adjectivally, to radicalism, extremism or fundamentalism, then the resultant phrasal term and its import can **never** *per se* be bad. But as for terrorism, because Islam being *a*, and in itself meaning *the*, Divine *religion of peace*, it is innately humanitarian in content, and any irresponsible terrorism, wrongly or rightly, attributed to it that could impossibly still be unaccountable to *Allah* (God) in the Day of Judgment, unlike in some other "civilization" which believes in irresponsible, disproportionate and illegitimate, nay, even jolly application of overwhelming power for its own, derring-do or demonstrative, sake, has **never** had any place in Islam, period! But if those same terms are, more appropriately, applied instead to culpable **Muslims**, i.e. as Muslim radicalism, terrorism, extremism or fundamentalism, thereby deliberately confounded in a negative sense, then it is tolerated, if not also readily accepted, by Muslims. Because, given a badly affected Muslim's own earlier painful sufferings, state-sponsored or associationally perceived otherwise, at the hands of his or her target, he or she may revengefully, perhaps even sinfully, become a **Muslim terrorist**, may be to sincerely repent later on, as is mostly the case of the average frustrated Palestinian. Conversely, an **Islamic extremist**, as per his **extreme** religious upbringing and choosing to devote his life to **fanatically** defend a Muslim or non-Muslim statesman or anyone for that matter, with his own life, **extremely** sincerely; one must admit, certainly cannot be **bad** despite his multiple **extremeness**, even if anyone wishes otherwise! In other words, one may justifiably be terrified of a **Muslim terrorist**, that is perfectly understandable, but to be "terrified" by **Islamic extremists**, that is purely a learned nonsense, if not also patent lunacy! Terrorism is and had been highly subjective: when Afghans bloodily overwhelmed by foreign invasions (via war machines), slipped into terrorism, out of frustration, to put up resistance or simply to drive home their objection to being ravaged, through similar **lower scale** violent means, they are subsequently, on that very ground, banned even from sitting in their Parliament for having

security priorities. In this and other contexts too, Kazakhstan has turned to the U.S. for military supplies to protect its energy and other assets not just in the Caspian.¹⁹ Anyway, we must note here that after the independence of Kazakhstan, America has been much opposed to Russian and Iranian moves to treat the Caspian Sea as a lake and, accordingly, gain thereby a mutual right to restrict free navigation thereon and/or therein, on the basis of a treaty-provisioned joint division of the Caspian surface-waters. Some Caspian littorals and Central Asian states like Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan too, it seem, loosely share America's perception on this matter. But less controversially, the Caspian sea-bed would, as agreed, be divided on a sectoral basis amongst all the Caspian littorals, thus somewhat acknowledging *de facto* that the Caspian has lake as well as sea features, legally too. These facts seem to attest to the new reality that Iran has a boundary with Kazakhstan even while not sharing a border with it.

Defense and Security Ties

The US-Kazakhstani security ties including in “non-proliferation has been a cornerstone of the relationship” says the US State Department, which again stressed that “Kazakhstan showed leadership when it renounced nuclear weapons in 1993” (DOS-BN 2009). In this area the US has helped Kazakhstan, under treaties signed on 13th December 1993 and multi-lateral ones committed to even earlier (DOS 1992, pp. 1-2), as noted below, to remove nuclear warheads, weapons-grade materials²⁰, and their supporting infrastructure. The US under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program spent U.S. \$ 240 million in assisting Kazakhstan eliminate WMD and their related infrastructure (DOS-USRWK 2012). As many as 1,410 nuclear warheads were removed from their weapons, including from about 104 SS-18 ICBMs (many of which were targeted at the U.S.) and either converted or sold (EKUSA 2010). Perhaps in anticipation of this the US Department of Defense signed a “Memorandum of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation in the field of Defense and Military Relations” with the Kazakh Ministry of Defense on February 14th, 1994. Later building upon the successes of their post-Sept. 11 security co-operation, the same parties

been warlords (perhaps U.S. blessed!) in the past; but when, even earlier in the past, the Israel-bent Jews turned and **terrorized**, or more probably “te-r-r-o-o-rized” (as per Jewish phonetics), even their British very ushers into Palestine, they not only made their way into their own Parliament as pioneering heroes, but sometimes got to be even Prime Minister (Menachem Begin) and, not to mention, bag a Nobel Prize too under full limelight with standing ovations to boot! This is not just double standard but, indeed, **troubled standards** that must be addressed, perhaps within the oversight-obsessed OSCE framework, despite its own blemishes on these scores and for want of any better institutional alternatives.

¹⁹ For example, to guard the western border in the Atyrau region, the U.S. committed to build and equip a \$3.8million anti-terrorist center for a Kazakh marine battalion based there (Legvold 2004, p.3).

²⁰ Including, 600kg of, previously, forgotten ones from the Ulba fuel fabrication plant at Ust-Kamenogorsk (today's Oskemen), in 1994 under Operation Sapphire.

consolidated their ties in this field further by signing the “Memorandum of Consent on Mutual Intent to Implement the Five-Year Military Cooperation Plan 2008-2012” on 1st February 2008. As the website of the Kazakh Embassy in the U.S. states: “(these) plans cover the area of strengthening the fighting and peacekeeping capacities of Kazbat, airmobile forces, naval forces, as well as the development of military infrastructure in the Caspian region” (EKUSA 2013). This memorandum continues and improves upon the security cooperation tradition established under the September 2003 five year military cooperation accord.

Kazakhstan’s armed forces participate not just in the American IMET, FMF and CT bilateral assistance programs but it also joins-in, multi-laterally, in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The US Central Command conducts numerous bilateral events of military cooperation with the Kazakh Defense Ministry and its other agencies. These events range from mere information exchanges to full military exercises. Quantitatively, these events are rising in numbers, continually over the years. As a non-NATO member Kazakhstan was yet further accommodated within Western security structures under NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). As mentioned before, in a multi-lateral context Kazakhstan has already signed on and stands committed to a number of long pre-existing security-related agreements, that have a strategic dimension, even from earlier on, including the START Treaty and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty both of 1992, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993 and the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 2001 (DOS-BN 2009; DOS-USRWK 2012). The on-going periodic launches of a range of pyrotechnics from the Baykonur Cosmodrome, near the Kazakh town of Tyuratam, should be seen in this context. Both Kazakhstan and the U.S. are concerned, nonetheless, but for mostly different reasons.

American BDA in the Strategic Realm - American aid to Kazakhstan, as mentioned elsewhere, is not all confined to politico-legal, socio-economic and developmental sectors alone. An important policy area of developmental assistance is the defense and security sector. Principally, the U.S. urged and supports Kazakhstan’s adherence to all previous arms control agreements and treaties. Kazakhstan has benefited from various security-related assistances too. In the realm of defense, almost from the beginning, the U.S. had been involved in defense reform in Kazakhstan. The U.S. Department of Defense launched the CTR program in 1992 to facilitate the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction across the former Soviet Union, including within Kazakhstan (Dec. 1993). It has helped in the conversion and management of at least four nuclear facilities. Being successful over the years, this program has been continuing also since its renewal in 2006. In this context, an amendment to the Nunn-Lugar program was signed on 13

December 2007, prolonging the same till 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan (MFARK) 2008). This program promoted denuclearization and demilitarization. Specifically, Kazakhstan has co-operated with, ironically, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) on matters such as nuclear materials safeguards and non-proliferation issues. With U.S. assistance, Kazakhstan closed 221 nuclear test tunnels²¹ at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS) by Nov.2012 (DOS-USRWK 2012). The world's only nuclear desalinization fast breeder reactor at Aktau had about 300 metric tons of enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel, in storage pools, to be properly secured (Nichol 2013a, p.63). The U.S. government's involvement in the handling, variously, of this radioactive material, of reactor BN-350 in the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Complex at Aktau, has continued beyond 2010 to the present.

Kazakhstan has since 1994 been having an active partnership with the Arizona National Guards, including by co-exercising in the recent Steppe Eagle 2016. Particularly, but not exclusively, after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 Kazakhstan had offered the U.S., intelligence sharing, opening of air corridors and even allowed the use of its airfields. Confidential sources say that a number of bases in eastern Kazakhstan were considered for this purpose. Specifically, the Kazakh defense ministry says the U.S. government requested the use of military bases at Taraz and Taldykorgan. The U.S. is involved in the reform of the Kazakh armed forces. The U.S. helped Kazakhstan's Defense Ministry in areas of military reform including in creating an adequate Kazakh force structure. The U.S. helps increase the professionalism of the Kazakhstani military, by providing the required training and equipment, so that they can better protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Remarkably, Kazakhstan has the only Humvee center in Central Asia. To strengthen Kazakhstan's Caspian shore defenses the U.S. had provided "\$20 million for radar and intercept boats" (Legvold 2004, p. 3). Joint exercises also aim to improve inter-operability of Kazakhstani forces with the U.S. military. The capacities of the Kazakh forces to participate in counter-terrorism and peacekeeping operations abroad, as per NATO Partnership, United Nations and Coalition goals, were enhanced (DOS-FOA 2013).

In this regard, Kazakh military personnel, including 27 (49 according to wikipedia) combat engineers and sappers, participated in coalition operations in Iraq in 2003, under OIF (2003-2008), and helped clear about 1.5 million mines per year there. Under the Partnership for Peace (Pfp) Trust Fund, Kazakhstan destroyed numerous conventional landmines/explosives,

²¹ Given that nearly 500, of the about 1,000, Soviet nuclear tests took place in test sites across Kazakhstan, one may cautiously assume that, there are **still** hundreds of vents, if not also tunnels, to be properly secured out there. At least 86 of those tests were aerial, 30 on ground, 340, variously, underground; 498 tests were conducted and, it is said, about 616 devices were detonated, so in short the sums, disturbingly, appear a little difficult to add up!

within its own territory and did similar activities in Iraq too. In fact, it destroyed about 4 million mines there, asserted the Kazakh Embassy (EKUSA 2013). Their experience there prepared them for later peacekeeping duties with both the United Nations and NATO. Kazbat (created in Jan. 2000) has involved itself, remarkably, in peacekeeping duties, under UN mandate, in Iraq. It had thus, multi-laterally, been “incorporated in UN Blue Helmets” and NATO inter-operability, a U.S. objective, was also gained by Kazakhstan, thereby (Centre of Foreign Policy and Analysis 2003, p.20). Even presently, Kazakhstan enjoys the best level of bilateral military and technical cooperation with the U.S., amongst all the CIS states. Russia’s legitimate concerns on NATO affairs, involving the FSU, had been moderated to an extent, through the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, which allows Russia some inter-face ability, without giving it veto power over any NATO moves. It is under this background, of lukewarm but tacit approval, that NATO, with strong U.S. backing, helped and helps restructure even the Kazakh military, as hinted to earlier. In this context, Kazbat which, actually evolved from the earlier CENTRASBAT had been transitioning to KAZBRIG at least since 2008, if not earlier. It would be an added peacekeeping asset to the lean 32 brigades-full Kazakhstan Army.

The U.S. Central Command organized various cooperative security-related events in Kazakhstan, in its AOR and elsewhere too. It also co-operates bilaterally and participates in bilateral military exercises. Kazakhstan and the United States have hosted joint exercises, including series named such as Balance, Cooperative Nugget, Combined Endeavor, Zhardem, and Regional Cooperation Exercises. The annual series called Steppe Eagle began in July 2003. Steppe Eagle 2011 was held from August 9-19, 2011 at the Iliy (Ilysk) range, focusing on peace-keeping interoperability. The two week long Steppe Eagle 2013 started on 10 Aug. and the drill involved assessing the operational capability of the long restructuring KAZBAT. With the KAZBRIG alas represented, at stage 2 of the Steppe Eagle 2016 held at Stanford, U.K., by at least 270 personnel, the series has quite successfully continued to the present times. In direct military to military cooperation, Kazakhstan participated and still participates in the American IMET and FMF programs. Kazakh military officers attend the George C. Marshall Centre programs. Security assistance includes English-language and military professionalism training, via IMET program. The U.S. seems to believe that military exchanges, visits and various other forms of engagements, with the Kazakhs, would be useful tools in exposing the Kazakhs to the military practices and values of the U.S. and in building goodwill and credibility, generally.

When it comes specifically to security, the U.S. helps the Government of Kazakhstan (GOK) to draft effective legislation and improve enforcement of existing laws, by providing relevant training to customs and other

enforcement officials, to tackle all manner of trafficking in of narcotics, persons and WMDs. It has helped procure detection equipment for border guards. In the area of security assistance, the U.S. helps Kazakhstan by providing training and equipment to combat transnational threats such as WMD technology and *materiel* proliferation, increase border security, counter-terrorism co-operation, especially after the advent of the so-called “war on terror”,²² and to address other seemingly “lesser” security related threats such as money laundering, terrorism financing, illegal drugs and trafficking in persons, illegally. “Specifically, the United States is supporting the GOK’s plans to build a WMD interdiction training facility, and providing regional enforcement training for Kazakhstan and its neighbors” (DOS-FOA 2013).

The U.S. supports the anti-terrorism Rapid reaction force and had helped in the refurbishment of security helicopters. Despite the broad range of its defense and security cooperation with the U.S., Kazakhstan has avoided having any U.S. bases on its territory and had since July 2005 demanded the U.S., interestingly, via the SCO²³ to set a timetable to quit even its existing bases elsewhere in Central Asia (NCAFP 2007, p. 6; Kukeyeva and Baizakova 2009, p.41). Simultaneously, however, in the context of the United States’ impending so-called “exit” from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan has earnestly extended its co-operation and support to the NDN,²⁴ an American-led logistics arrangement (as we saw earlier in Map 1), at uneconomically higher costs, that was intended to reduce supplies transiting Pakistan, by relying more on, the apparently more reliable, routes and ports²⁵ of northern Eurasia. In this regard, Kazakhstan advocated the


²² In this context, Kazakh natives who have been under extra judicial detention in the U.S. base in Guantanamo for alleged ties to the Taliban and/or Al-Qaeda include Yaqub Abahanov, Ilkham Turdgyavich Batayev, Abdallah Tohtasinovich Magrupov and Abdulrahim Kerimbakiev. On this, see: <<http://www.dod.mil/news/May2006/d20060515%20List.pdf>>. All these Kazakhs have subsequently been released. Like America’s other new friends in Eurasia, Kazakhstan too indulged a departure-poised Obama, by further accepting at least 5 Guantanamo non-Kazakhs transferees, such as the two Tunisians and three Yemenis that Kazakhstan accepted (‘US Resettles Five Guantanamo...’ 2014).

²³ For an authoritative, if not also official, American interpretation of the context of the Kazakh input in the request, see National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) 2007. See also Weitz 2008, p 125.

²⁴ Beyond this research period, the NDN is headed for closure, if Dmitry Medvedev could be believed. Medvedev, ostensibly, adhering strictly to UNSC resolution 2120, issued his own resolution to close the NDN on 15 May 2015 (Daly 2015). If this were to come to pass, then Kazakhstan stands to lose about U.S. \$ 500million per year in NDN transit fees. On the bright side, the U.S. wants the NDN under its New Silk Road Initiative to morph and work to integrate Afghanistan into not just the Central Asian region but also with China and Europe via Eastern Europe.

²⁵ The outer and extra regional ports utilized chiefly include Poti, Tallinn, Riga, Klaipeda and it is believed even Vladivostok. When President Obama met President Nazarbayev on 11 April 2010 he praised Kazakh assistance to Afghanistan and Nazarbayev, in turn, promised

increased use of Aktau, presumably for containers, that then brought in U.S. \$17,500 in transit fees each, and which transshipped via Poti (Mankoff 2013).



to facilitate a new trans-polar flight route (see Map 1) for the transiting U.S. military (Nichol 2013b, p 21). An air transit agreement was signed between both parties on 12 Nov. 2010.

Conclusions

Eyeing the obese soft underbelly of the Soviet Union, including the affairs of Soviet Kazakhstan, was a favorite American Cold War pastime. Yet a liposuctioned off independent Kazakhstan received, at best, a lukewarm reception from the United States in comparison to the NIS of the Baltic, Caucasia and even, Kazakhstan's step-mother, Russia itself, upon its independence. Despite the, paradoxically, euphoric slow start, over the past two decades and a half, U.S. - Kazakhstan relation shows a gradual upward trend, tri-lineally in strategic, economic and political terms, exactly in that order of relational strength. Remarkably, even the tragic September 11th episode had a positive impact on these relations too.

Despite that initial euphoria at Kazakhstan's independence and the early geo-strategic imperatives to be addressed, via the establishment of diplomatic and security relations with it, generally, relations between Kazakhstan and the United States only proceeded incrementally, between the years 1995 to 1999 and this pattern continued somewhat similarly thereafter between 2000 to 2003 but with a change of focus in policy, aimed later more on counter-terrorism. In this context, Central Asia, generally, and Kazakhstan particularly was already poised to gain positively, when the monstrously tragic Sept. 11, 2001 terroristic attacks took place, on iconic and strategic buildings in key U.S. cities. Sure enough, the U.S., instantly, realized the strategic importance of the Central Asian region to its national security, as a result. Accordingly, President Bush reoriented America's attention back to the Central Asian region from Clinton's, well-advised but rather premature, indulgence with India.

In these periods too, two general trends were discernible in Kazakhstan-U.S. interactions. Firstly, after the deflation of its initial high expectations in its relations with the U.S., Kazakhstan had been, understandably, quick to reinvigorate its lessening ties to Russia. This, in turn, served to dampen somewhat American keenness to deepen its relations with Kazakhstan. Second, as energy, particularly oil including its equities, facilities and discoveries expand and became available for foreign participation (as we saw in the section on Energy Dealings) in Kazakhstan and its environs, the U.S., as pushed by its well-entrenched oil lobby, began to appreciate even more, the need to develop greater ties with Kazakhstan (Legvold 2004, pp.1-2). Nevertheless, a number of issues did and do bug the relations between these two countries. These included the U.S. occupation of Iraq, uncertainty about American's real agenda for the Af-Pak hyphenation, American lukewarmity towards the Muslim Central Asian region, generally, and

America's attitude towards Islam and Muslims and, particularly so, the Western bracketing of terrorism²⁶ with Muslims (Nazarbayev 2003, p. 29).

Over the recent decades and varying through the various administrations, the U.S. has broadly kept to its strategic objectives in Kazakhstan. As the lone superpower desperately clutching to its fleeting unipolar moment, it has used the same to pursue its security, political, economic and strategic interests, as elsewhere, in Kazakhstan too. Similarly, Kazakhstan in keeping with the foreign policy dictum of its, then *de facto*, Father of the Nation has pursued the same by seeking to meet its economic, security, political and developmental needs, through its relations with the U.S., which, by the way, occupies the fifth circle in Kazakhstan's favorite foreign policy model.²⁷ Both these countries were, and still are, trying to compensate somewhat for the diminishing opportunities and rising challenges in their traditional domains, by gradually seizing the new and rising opportunities in different sectors, presented by each to the other. Kazakhstan sees in the U.S., a hedge against a potentially imperialist, reverting Russia and, the U.S., in turn, sees Kazakhstan as a key Eurasian foreground to transplant, if haltingly, sustainable freedoms in and around Eurasia. In thus pursuing their strategic intercourse, Kazakhstan sought to refrain from relapsing into international isolation and the U.S. seeks thereby, to refrain from courting Eurasian irrelevance.

On the political front, unlike Russia and China who found the status quo advantages, the U.S. has been, rightly and responsibly, concerned about the halting democratic development in Kazakhstan. It has long viewed corruption, clientelism, weak pluralism, lack of freedom of association and other human rights abuses with legitimate concern. As noted herein earlier and also as generally reflected in the larger literature, Americans have regularly raised these issues and America's developmental assistances, in the politico-legal and socio-environmental sectors, have largely been addressed to pursue these issues. While Kazakhstan's 1991, 1999, 2005, 2011 and subsequent presidential election records may not all measure up to European

²⁶ While in the West people may often confuse terms such as terrorism, *extremism*, separatism, *radicalism* and *fundamentalism* (with those italicized terms readily, but often misguidedly, being seen as threats), and at times irresponsibly use them loosely or interchangeably; in Kazakhstan, remarkably, their leaders are quite well-versed and do have a rather nuanced understanding of these distinct terms and the positive or negative implications they, to varying degrees, carry. Still, given the need to responsibly and clearly separate **Muslim** extremists, not to mention terrorists too, who, probably, operate at the behest of their sponsoring foreign Major Powers, from the **Islamic**, as distinct from the politically-focused **Islamist**, extremists, who merely function in pure devotion and conformity to the *Shari'ah* (Islamic law) alone; the Kazakh elites have recently taken to, quite rightly, differentiating and qualifying the former as not merely harmful extremists but as very dangerous **violent extremists**, if not also as clear **terrorists**.

²⁷ See Nazarbayev, N., A Strategy for the Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State. *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*. Dated 16 May 1992, for details of Kazakhstan's foreign policy model.

standards, the U.S. is right to acknowledge the democratic improvements, however haltingly, that has taken place over successive elections, including in the legislative ones, in Kazakhstan (EKUSA 2012). However, outside observers, including clear third parties, too are right in feeling that America's energy interests do override its, seeming, democratic concerns in Kazakhstan and that there is still much more to be desired, in this regard (Kessler 2006; Yazdani 2007).

Given how the year 2000 U.S. elections actually undermined American democracy, Kazakh leaders may be forgiven for looking up instead to Yeltsin's manner of nominating his successor, as a more practical, if not also worthy, model to emulate, in their own succession exercise when it inevitably arrives in the future, at least they would then not have to judicially short-circuit genuine democracy, which they, despite being recent democratic converts, truly value, when doing so. As we saw elsewhere, given America's certainly deeper democratic traditions, the U.S. was able to pursue its relationship institutionally, that despite changes in and of U.S. administrations and even internal turf wars, the U.S. did manage to continually build-up its ties with Kazakhstan. Whereas Kazakhstan, on the contrary, being new to the Western democratic philosophy, badly needed the comforting tutelage of its pioneering Leader (or its *de jure* Father since June 2010), not only to stabilize and strengthen its statehood, including by invoking the Astana Spirit, but also to anchor, smoothen and hopefully, secure its American relationship, at least in these formative decades. Therefore, in the interest of the emergence of a, genuinely, democratic future Kazakhstan, the U.S. must allow the Kazakh "*El Basy*" to run his, well-anointed and now legislatively-safeguarded, lifetime course fully, as per the apparent wishes of his peoples and the U.S. should just soberly jog along to reap the lasting benefits of a consequent stronger relationship. Recklessly, doing otherwise, even simply to please an immature opposition pack, would, I think, only be like unsaddling a George Washington in full gallop, and that too at mid-stream!²⁸

In the economic sphere, despite being an economic power, the U.S. lack of any direct border or boundary with Kazakhstan, truly showed its effect. While we saw their bilateral trade and other economic ties continually growing, these have not been as impressive as Kazakhstan's economic ties with either China or Russia, both of which amicably share borders with Kazakhstan and enjoy the consequent economic boon, thereby. As we saw too, the U.S. had invested rather heavily in the Kazakh energy sector, being

²⁸ The expectations of some, Kazakh and foreign, interlopers that the 2012 promulgation of a "Leaders Day" might result in a steady handover of power, remains yet unfulfilled, as Nursultan Nazarbayev healthily deliberates on political albeit constitutional reforms (Seisembayeva 2017) and contemplates on the prospective 2020 elections. Given this reality, rumors of a name change for the national capital Astana has to remain at just that: a rumor going cold!

acutely aware of the economic vulnerabilities of rent-seeking economies like Kazakhstan to the Dutch-disease, the U.S. was right in launching the Houston Initiative to nurture entrepreneurship and take Kazakhstan on the, hopefully sustainable, path to economic diversification, that may bring in greater socio-economic spin-offs. In these contexts and more, as we have seen, the U.S. had offered much technical assistance. Despite the challenges in the region, the U.S. – Kazakhstan relationship has been quite significant in strategic, investment, business presence, development assistance and trade terms. To be sure, the U.S. business presence in Kazakhstan has had a relatively positive import on the Kazakhstan economy. The increase in investments, except in the oil sub-sector perhaps, and business involvement of U.S. corporations and their joint-ventures have, inevitably, boosted demand for the U.S. dollars and this would depreciate the Kazakhstan tenge and tiyn, thereby hopefully, creating spin-offs for the Kazakh economy.

Being from a society that had willy-nilly become heterogeneous over time, Kazakh leaders have been keen to interact and gain insights from other similar societies, where immigrants have overwhelmed the natives in most, if not in every sphere, often resulting in latent native bitterness. In this regard, not just mighty indifferent America but even affected Asian “Tigers” such as Singapore and Malaysia served and serve as case studies from which Kazakhstan can, did and do learn on how this disturbing phenomenon was and is variously managed and the bitterness tactfully addressed, sometimes still to the natives’ continuing silent dissatisfaction. Hopefully, the Kazakh leaders would draw the right lessons, also from the bottoms of these afflicted societies, so as not to repeat the follies, arising usually at their insulated tops.

Given that the U.S. sought and seeks energy security through energy diversification, its strategic reach and deep involvement in the Kazakhstan energy sector, is totally understandable. Besides turning in tidy profits, especially for the U.S. and Kazakh private sectors, perhaps even indirectly via the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Bermuda and their likes, this involvement helps Kazakhstan gradually reduce its dependence on Russia for its oil trade and thereby provided Kazakhstan with viable alternatives and also boosted its politico-economic leverage. However, the U.S. can better serve these objectives if it also enables Kazakhstan to export its hydrocarbons also via, their competitor, Iran to the world markets. Doing so may also encourage Iran to gradually tread a less hostile nuclear path and work with the U.S. towards bringing positive regional development.²⁹ Furthermore, it is also easier, in this regard, for the U.S. to prevail on Russia to withhold nuclear weapons technology from states with questionable intentions, especially given their mutual allergy for, if nothing else, “Islamic” extremism. The oily

²⁹ Beyond the present research period, this had somewhat come to pass. I.R. Iran’s deal with the powers came into force in Jan. 2016; under this deal, it is believed, Iran is allowed to run about 5,000 “IR-1” centrifuges, test advanced models and, perfectly, legally import yellow cake, but all under the strict watch of the IAEA.

(pun intended) involvements and technical assistances the U.S. gives Kazakhstan in the energy sector should similarly also advance reforms that would, in the future, prevent any recurrences of Zhanaozen-type of violence, given that that incident arose in an energy production-linked region (see details in Nichol 2013b, pp. 4-5).

In alluding to the occurrence of violence and its consequent sense of insecurity in parts of Kazakhstan, one can easily appreciate America's increasing involvement in Kazakhstan's defense and security spheres. Their involvement in the denuclearization issue has been appreciated even by the Kazakhstanis themselves, unlike in Ukraine where some bitterly view their case as tripartite nailing. Anyway, the U.S. has also been involved in Kazakhstan's force restructuring and is providing security related assistances, as we have noted earlier. Some words of caution need to be added in these regards, though. As the U.S. drawsdown from Afghanistan also via Kazakhstan, it should be careful that the consequent financial windfall, not to mention too the deadly defense items via the EDA, it leaves behind *enroute* and the lethal trainings it imparted and imparts to the various Kazakhstani Special Forces, are all never abused and expanded upon innocent ordinary Kazakhs who may only be attempting to recover the basic socio-economic privileges that they have recently lost through the Soviet collapse, and similarly ensure that the religio-cultural rights that the Kazakhs have regained, thereby only recently, are not beastly trampled upon, therewith.

Both the U.S. and Kazakhstan have worked hard towards integrating Kazakhstan with the world economy. While these efforts are indeed laudable, the U.S., in particular, must cobble up the necessary facilitating arrangements regionally, and in the outer Central Asian region too, to ease the integration process, so that both the U.S. and Kazakhstan can derive the maximum benefit from their economic intercourse. Their ongoing mutual involvement in Afghan affairs, in these contexts, must be welcomed too. Being remote, land-locked and lacking direct borders with the United States, Kazakhstan's sovereignty, independence and strategic survival could not be easily safe-guarded and promoted, without taking a regional approach in the pursuance and exercise of its emergent integration with the, larger, free world. With this in mind, Kazakhstan and the United States have consistently adopted a regional approach, if not also, as yet, within a viable regional framework, and worked for gradual regional integration in all respects, save the political.

Nevertheless, in a regional context, it was Uzbekistan that enjoyed primacy of American attention during these periods and preeminently so in the years following Sept. 11, 2001 (Legvold 2004, p.1). Despite Kazakhstan having more real estate and greater economic dynamics, it was and is Uzbekistan that boasts of a higher population in the region; it is again Uzbekistan that has *centrality* within a reconfiguring Central Asia, i.e. it

borders most of the countries constituting the region, as academically defined, and Uzbeks are found, in significant numbers, across it; and it is Uzbekistan yet again that, by virtue of its centrality and its logistical connectivity, was more relevant in America's earlier penetrative campaigns and subsequent on-going missions in an instability-ridden Afghanistan. In these contexts, while Kazakhstan was doubtless of greater strategic importance, Uzbekistan has a higher immediate critical value and is, in fact, the logistical key to dynamically lock the region together as a coherent whole for ensuring future regional development, which in itself is a crucial U.S. objective ('Hanging separately' 2003).

Politically, as we have seen, the region had and has a number of burning issues, especially pertaining to natural resources, to mutual tensions and rivalries, which all need to be benignly tackled, before any dream in this regard can be brought to fruition. When and if that happens, Kazakhstan, the region and even the facilitating U.S. may begin cutting much more ice globally, so to speak. Meanwhile, generally, multi-track dialog must be strengthened and regionally-minded, multi-faceted intercourses and exchanges, at every level, must be further deepened. As a parting shot, if I were to take the professed strategic objectives of the U.S. in Kazakhstan, as quoted earlier, seriously and tally America's actual relational record, thus far, with Kazakhstan, in its doubtless lofty light, then I must conclude, as per my present scrutiny, that the U.S. had reasonably addressed those objectives, may be not as much as it ought to have, but still it had, as we saw nonetheless, taken the right steps, it had indeed walked the talk and is in step in the steppe, up to a point!

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SALIENCE OF QAWM, *ETHNICITY*, IN AFGHANISTAN: AN OVERVIEW

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Abstract

It has been assumed that qawm (a flexible term, referring to kin, clan, village, tribe, ethnic/vocational/confessional group, profession, and/or nation) used to be the primary identity in Afghanistan. However, after 1979, ethnicity and sect (confession) became the primary identities, as a consequence of war and funding by the West and neighboring/regional states. More than three decades of violence and instability in a multi-ethnic state, Afghanistan, not only destroyed political, social and economic infrastructure, but also inflamed ethnic, sectarian, and regional divisions. More than fifty ethnic groups reside Afghanistan including: four major groups; the Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and the Hazara; constituting 90% of Afghan population. The Pashtun, ruled the country throughout its history, barring two brief spans (1929 and 1992-94) when Tajiks ruled Afghanistan. The promulgation of 1964 Constitution in Afghanistan stirred political struggle between various ethnic groups, the Pashtun and non-Pashtun, for power. The Soviet invasion, in 1979, stimulated and further politicised ethnicity. Conversely, the Mujahideen (1992-96) and the Taliban (1996-2001), ethnicised politics that led to severe infighting between major ethnic groups and resulted into ethnic violence, cleansing and/or conflict. Ethnicity became salient further during the post-Taliban governments due to power sharing arrangements. Examining the salience of qawm, in Afghanistan, the article argues that ethnicity was politicized following the Soviet intervention, however, Western and neighbouring states' support to particular ethnic groups, during Mujahideen and Taliban periods, ethnicized politics. In turn that led to ethnic cleansing and conflict resulting into further salience of qawm, ethnicity, in Afghanistan.

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Key Words: Qawm, Tribe, Ethnicity, Ethnic groups, Ethnic Cleansing, Sect, Constructivist, Soviet Invasion, Saliency, Ascendancy, Mujahideen, Taliban, Bonn Accord.

Introduction

Afghanistan lacks official, scientific Population Census, though contested and disputed surveys and estimations are available. In 1979, Afghan government (the *Khalqis*) tried to conduct the first ever official scientific Census but the task remained incomplete: only 56 percent of the population was enumerated due to mounting resistance in the countryside,¹ and estimated the total Afghan population as 14.6 million.² Organizations, such as, *Wak Foundation*, *Asia Foundation*, *CIA World Fact Book* and some broad casting companies have been conducting private surveys to determine *ethnic* composition in Afghanistan with varying results. Population figures by region, let alone by *ethnic* group, have been politically sensitive subject in Afghanistan; Census conductors have generally been forbidden to ask questions about group membership.³ The World Fact Book, in 2015, estimates size of *ethnic* groups in Afghanistan as; *Pashtuns* 42%, *Tajiks* 27%, *Hazara* 09%, *Uzbeks* 09%, *Aimaq* 4%, *Turkmen* 3%, *Baluch* 2% and others 4%.⁴ The first four constitute around 90% of the total population of Afghanistan.

Louis Dupree, an Afghanologist, estimated the population of Afghanistan, 13.82 million,⁵ in 1980, Goodson 22 million⁶, in 2001 and Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 25.5 million (25,493,500)⁷, in 2009-2010. The population of Afghanistan, in 2015, was around 26 million (26,700,277).⁸ Comparing ratio of residents and registered voters, in Iran and Turkey, and applying it to Afghanistan may be another way to determine the estimated population of Afghanistan. In 2015, the population and registered voters in Iran have been 77.45 million and 50.48 million,⁹ in Turkey 76.6 million and 52.89 million,¹⁰ respectively. The average registered voters in both countries

¹ Retrieved from <http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/36.htm>, accessed on 21-05-2016.

² *Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2009-2010*. Retrieved from <http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/0-1.pdf>, accessed on 27-05-2016.

³ *Ibid.*, pp 23-24.

⁴ Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.../af.htm>, accessed on 12-3-2016.

⁵ Dupree, L., *Afghanistan*. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1980, pp. 58-65.

⁶ Goodson, P.L., *Afghanistan' Endless War: State failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban*. University of Washington Press, London 2001, p14.

⁷ *Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook, 2009-2010*.

⁸ Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_Afghanistan, accessed on 17-06-2016.

⁹ Retrieved from <http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>, accessed on 17-06-2016.

¹⁰ Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Turkey, accessed on 10-04-2016.

have been 67 % of the population. In 2015, registered voters in Afghanistan had been 17.16 million¹¹, applying formula devised in case of Turkey and Iran, of 67 % on Afghanistan; total Afghan population may be estimated, 25.61 million, though there might be under registration of women votes in Afghanistan. Still, the estimated population of Afghanistan between 25-26 million seems more plausible. Though regarding total population, some guesstimates can be offered. However, *qawm*, *ethnicity*, is a fluid term, in Afghanistan, therefore, determining size of an *ethnic* group, in Afghanistan, becomes almost an impossible, gigantic task.

Qawm in Afghanistan

T[he] term *tribe* may be used loosely for a localized group, having kinship as the dominant idiom of organization, whose members consider themselves distinct in terms of culture, customs, dialect and origin; *tribes* are usually politically unified, though not necessarily under a central leader”.¹² In Afghanistan, one of the outstanding social features of life is local *tribal* or *ethnic* divisions; peoples’ primary loyalty is, respectively, to their own kin, village, *tribe*, or *ethnic* group, generally glossed as *qawm*.¹³ Essentially the *qawm* is a community of interests, local and traditional, cemented by kinship, *tribal* or other ties, or it is a solidarity group encompassing family lineages, clans, *tribes* or *sectarian*, linguistic or *ethnic* group.¹⁴ The population of Afghanistan is divided into a myriad of groups at the local level; therefore, the term *qawm* is flexible, expandable and contextual. It, therefore, applies not only to these smallest units but by extension to the country’s major *ethnic* groups, and Afghan nation too.

Tribalism is a desire to retain group identity and more important, sets of rights and obligations within the group¹⁵, or it is a system of identity and solidarity based on kinship and locality involving *tribal* institution, ideology, customs and common law.¹⁶ In Afghanistan, *tribalism* is a segmentary system organizing various levels of social groupings predominant only amongst *Pashtun* and some nomadic segments of non-*Pashtun* groups such as *Turkmen*, *Uzbek*, *Baluch* and the sedentary *Nuristani*. The *Pashtun* inhabit primarily east, south, and south-western parts of the country, though there exist colonies in parts of northern Afghanistan

¹¹ Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan.i.ec.org.af/2012-05-31-16-45-49/voter-registration,accessed on 12-05-2016.

¹² Tapper, R.,(Ed.), *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*. Croom Helm, London 1983, p 9.

¹³ Barfield, 2010, p18.

¹⁴ Rasanayagum, A., *Afghanistan: A Modern History; Monarchy, Despotism or Democracy? The Problems of Governance in Muslim Tradition*. I. B. Taurus & Co, Ltd, London 2005, p 201.

¹⁵ Dupree, 1980, p 659.

¹⁶ Roy, O., Afghanistan: Back to Tribalism or on to Lebanon? *Third World Quarterly*, 11(4), 1989, p 72. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992331>,accessed on 30-03-2016.

established during the last hundred years. For Nazif Shahrani, agnatic descent principles play a significant role in organizing socio-economic ties among the *Tajik*, *Farsiban*, *Hazara*, *Uzbek*, and *Baluch* and *Turkmen* sedentary; these groups are not tribally organized in the same way as the *Pashtun*. The existence of *tribal* ideology among the *Pashai* and *Nuristani*, and its role in the political processes is considerably different, even among the *Pashtun*, the role of *tribe* as a unit of military and political mobilization is often assumed than substantiated.¹⁷

Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan

“*Ethnic groups*”, for Fredrik Barth (1928-2016),¹⁸ “are most commonly defined as social groups that meet four criterions: they are biologically replicating, share fundamental cultural values, constitute a field of communication and interaction, and are defined through self-definition and definition by others”.¹⁹ Barth sought to signify *ethnic* boundaries rather than the cultural content of *ethnic* collectivities by arguing that “the focus must shift to *ethnic* boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.”²⁰ To Eller, an American anthropologist, “*ethnicity* is the process or phenomenon that underlies or gives rise to *ethnic* groups; it relates to the process of attachment, identity, cohesion, solidarity, and belonging. *Ethnicity* represents a “consciousness of difference” and a ‘mobilization around difference.’”²¹ Beginning in the United States, the notion of *ethnicity* did not emerge into widespread anthropological use until the 1960s.²² Thomas Hylland also confirms that *ethnicity* has been a main preoccupation since late 1960s in the field of social and cultural anthropology.²³ The terms such as, *ethnicity*, *ethnic*, and *ethnic group*, have steadily grown from the late 1960s until the 1990s, and have widely been used since then, for two

¹⁷ Shahrani, N. M., L. Canfield., (Eds.). *Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives*. Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley 1984, p 7.

¹⁸ Fredrik Barth, a Norwegian social anthropologist published several ethnographic works with a clear formalist view. He was well-known among anthropologists for his transactional analysis of political processes in the Swat Valley of northern Pakistan, and his study of micro-economic processes and entrepreneurship in the area of Darfur in Sudan. Barth edited *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969), and outlines an approach to the study of ethnicity that focuses on the ongoing negotiations of boundaries between groups of people. Such groups are not discontinuous cultural isolates, or logical a prioris to which people naturally belong, Barth viewed.

¹⁹ Barth, F., (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*. George Allen & Unwin, London 1969, pp 10-11.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p 15.

²¹ Eller, J. D., *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict. An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict*. The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 2002, p 8-9.

²² *Ibid.*, p 18.

²³ Erikson, H. T., *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*. Pluto Press, New York 2010, p 1.

main reasons; firstly, owing to the changes in the world, secondly, changes in the dominant way of thinking in anthropology.²⁴ Therefore, *ethnicity* is a flexible aspect of relationship between the social groups, having cultural identification and categorization (Us and Them).

Ethnicity has been found Constructivist in Afghanistan. For Nazif Shahrani, an Afghan-American anthropologist, *ethnicity* is, “a means of adaptation for individuals and collectivities within the changing socio-ecological conditions of their environment, *ethnicity* is a dynamic phenomenon, subject to temporal redefinition and reorganization, with potential for defining structural integrity, distinctiveness and effectiveness for people so organized”.²⁵ According to Thomas Barfield, *ethnic* groups in Afghanistan assert that *ethnicity* is primordial, however, in practice, it has been found flexible rather constructivist.²⁶ Within a *tribal* group, a significant ancestor may be changed in an oral genealogy to reflect social distance. Groups in conflict cut back ties to make their lineages appear more distant and hence less worthy of cooperation. In order to justify cooperation, the *Pashtuns* incorporated a neighboring group by grafting their genealogy onto one’s own at a higher level.²⁷

Discussing *ethnic* composition of Afghanistan, Erwin Orywal and collaborators list 55 *ethnic* groups,²⁸ for Orywal, these groups and identities, as local categories, are relative, varied and dynamic.²⁹ His *ethnic* groups include: *Arab* (Arabic speakers), *Arab* (Persian speakers), *Aimaq*, *Baluch*, *Baluch* (Jat *Baluch*), *Brahui*, *Eshkashimi*, *Farsiwan*, *Firuzkuhi*, *Gavarbati*, *Gharbat*, *Gujar*, *Hazara*, *Hazara-Sunni*, *Hindu*, *Jalali*, *Jamshedi*, *Jat*, *Jogi*, *Kirghiz*, *Kutana*, *Maliki*, *Mawri*, *Mishmast*, *Moghol*, *Mountain-Tajik*, *Munjani*, *Nuristani*, *Ormuri*, *Parachi*, *Pashai*, *Pashtun*, *Pikraj*, *Qarliq*, *Qazak*, *Qipchak*, *Qizilbash*, *Rushani*, *Sanglichi*, *Shadibaz*, *Sheghrani*, *SheykhMuhammadi*, *Sikh*, *Taheri*, *Tajik*, *Tatar*, *Taymani*, *Taymuri*, *Tirahi*, *Turkmen*, *Uzbek*, *Wakhi*, *Wangawala*, *Yahudi*, and *Zuri*.³⁰ It is evident that he has taken into account kin, clan, village, *tribe*, *ethnic*/vocational/confessional group, profession and nationality.

²⁴ Ibid., pp 11-12.

²⁵ Shahrani, N., *Ethnic Relations and Access to Resources in Northeast Badakhshan*. In *Ethnic Processes and Intergroup Relations in Contemporary Afghanistan*: Papers presented at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association at New York City, Nov, 10, 1977, p 15. Retrieved from, http://www.afghandata.org.8080/xmlui/bitstream/haret_ds354_5_a53_1928_w.pdf?Sequence+1&isAllowed=y, accessed on 15-10-2014.

²⁶ Barfield, 2010, p 21.

²⁷ Ibid., pp 21-22.

²⁸ 1986, (Hg.) Die ethnischen Gruppen Afghanistans. Fallstudien zu Gruppenidentität und Intergruppenbeziehungen. Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients (TAVO), Reihe B, Nr. 70, Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag.

²⁹ Ibid., pp 9-18.

³⁰ Ibid., pp 18-19.

H. B. Bellow has mentioned six *ethnic* groups in his *Races of Afghanistan*, viz. the Afghans (*Pashtun*), *Tajik*, *Hazara*, *Aimaq*, *Uzbek* and *Kafir*.³¹ Louis Dupree cited 21 such groups, including: *Pashtun*, *Tajik*, *Farsiwan*, *Qizilbash*, *Hazara*, *Aimaq*, *Moghol*, *Uzbek*, *Turkmen*, *Kirghiz*, *Pamiri*, *Baluch*, *Brahui*, *Nuristani*, *Kohistani*, *Gujar*, *Jat Guji* (called *Gujar* in North), *Arab*, *Hindu*, *Sikh* and *Jew*.³² Abdul Ghani mentioned 11 *ethnic* groups and divided them into Afghans (*Pashtun*) and non-Afghans (*Tajik*, *Turk*, *Hazara*, *Uzbek*, *Turkmen*, *Hindki*, *Arab*, *Qizilbash*, *Hindu* and *Jew*).³³ Thomas Barfield has described 17 groups including: *Pashtun*, *Tajik*, *Hazara*, *Uzbek*, *Turkmen*, *Aimaq*, *Nuristani*, *Pashai*, *Qizilbash*, *Baluch*, *Arab*, *Pamiris*, *Jugis*, *Jats*, *Kirghiz*, *Hindu*, *Sikh*.³⁴ The Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004 has recognised 14 *ethnic* groups including: *Pashtun*, *Tajik*, *Hazara*, *Uzbek*, *Turkmen*, *Baluch*, *Pashai*, *Nuristani*, *Aimaq*, *Arab*, *Kirghiz*, *Qizilbash*, *Gujar*, and *Brahui*.³⁵ The four major groups constitute 90% of the Afghan population,³⁶ are considered to be prominent players in the social and political milieu of Afghanistan. It is evident from the above discussion that Afghanistan is a multi-*ethnic* and multi-cultural state.

All major *ethnic* groups of Afghanistan except the *Hazara*, have overlapping international borders into neighbouring countries. In the south-east, *Pashtun* overlap with *Pashtun* in Pakistan; specifically with *Tribal Areas* (FATA), *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*³⁷ and *Baluchistan*.³⁸ The *Baluch* residing in the south and southeast of Afghanistan (*Nimroz*, *Helmand*, *Kandahar*), overlap with *Baluchistan* (Pakistan) and *Iran* (*Siestan*) in the southeast.³⁹ In the north, *Tajik*, *Uzbek* and *Turkmen* have their own co-*ethnics* residing in independent states of *Tajikistan*, *Uzbekistan* and *Turkmenistan*. The *Hazara*, though Mongols, have Shia- confessional ties with *Iran*. In the west, *Herat*, mainly *Pashtun* and *Tajik* dominated, have cultural ties with *Iran*. In the north-east, *Wakhi* overlap into *Pakistan* (*Wakhan*, *Kalash*) and *Chinese Uighur* (*Sinkiang*), while *Brahui* overlap into the south-east with *Baluchistan*, *Pakistan*. The neighbouring countries have in-built mechanism and incentives to meddle into the internal affairs of Afghanistan (see details below).⁴⁰ Situation has been further complicated by

³¹ Bellow, B. H., *Races of Afghanistan*. Thacker, Spink And Co, Calcutta 1880, p 13.

³² Dupree, 1980, pp 55-65.

³³ Ghani, A., A.J.Najfi. (ed.), *A Brief Political History of Afghanistan*. Najaf Publishers, Lahore N.Y, p 31.

³⁴ Barfield, 2010, pp 24-31.

³⁵ Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. *The Constitution of Afghanistan*, Article 4, 2004.

³⁶ Wafayezada, Q. M., *Ethnic Politics, Ethnic Political Parties and the Future of Democratic Peace building in Afghanistan*, p 69. Retrieved from <http://hdl.hsndle.net/2297/32790>, accessed on 12-05-2016.

³⁷ Dupree, 1980, pp 55-65.

³⁸ Goodson, 2001, p 14.

³⁹ Dupree, 1980, p 5.

⁴⁰ Goodson, 2001, p 17.

meddling of regional (Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, China) and extra-regional (West, NATO) states by fueling or undermining *ethnicity*.

Forced Displacement and Ethnic Cleansing

Amir Abdur Rehman, (r. 1880-1901) colonized the north of Afghanistan by forcibly displacing the *Pashtun* population to settle in areas dominated by the non-*Pashtun* ethnic groups. For the Amir, these forced resettlements carried political and economic objectives; securing and defending the northern frontiers against possible Russian incursions, and promoting nation's prosperity by ploughing unused but fertile land to procure crops and generate revenues for the state.⁴¹ Establishment of a settled trustworthy *Pashtun* population to defend the border regions⁴² carried an *ethnic* dimension since the Amir has been an *ethnic Pashtun*. The colonization occurred in two directions: First the Ghilzais (related to Hotaki, Tokhi),⁴³ mostly farmers, were deported in large numbers to settle and farm. Secondly, several thousand families of Durrani tribe (Ishaqzai, Nurzai, Achakzai) from *Kandahar* and the southwest (Farah, *Herat*) were resettled in the northwest (Badghiz, Maimana, Sar-i Pul, Murghab) to guard the frontier. They were granted land rights at favoured spots and encouraged to settle and cultivate.⁴⁴ In 1907, 11000 Durrani families of which 1100 Alizai were settled in Maimana, of 9900 Ishaqzai, 2000, settled in Badghiz, 900, in Maimana and 7000, in Sar-I Pul. Of another 9200 Ghilzai families, 3400 settled in Maimana and Andkhoy regions and 5800, in the vicinity of Sar-iPul and Shiberghan.

The first large- scale ethnic cleansing occurred in Afghanistan during 1891-93. The Hazara were forcibly conquered by the Pashtun-dominated government,⁴⁵ consequently, fled and scattered in three different directions: Czarist Russia, Iran, and British Baluchistan (Quetta).⁴⁶ After a century, Afghanistan faced ethnic cleansing during the 1990s. Control over the capital *Kabul* between the four major ethnic groups during 1992-1996, became the principal military and political objective of the warring *ethnic* factions.⁴⁷ The Hazara evicted *Pashtuns* from 3rd and 4th districts of *Kabul*, the *Uzbek* militia too looted homes in the predominantly *Pashtun* districts of *Kabul*. More than 500,000 people of the major ethnicities fled *Kabul* to the

⁴¹ Tapper, 1983, p 233.

⁴² Ibid., p 240.

⁴³ Tapper, 1983, p 233.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p 235.

⁴⁵ Mousavi, A, S., *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study*. Curzon Press, Surrey 1998, p 131.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p 137.

⁴⁷ Dorronsoro, G., *Kabul at War (1992-96): State, Ethnicity and Social Clashes*. Retrieved from <http://samaj.revues.org.212>, accessed on 30-05-2015.

neighbouring countries, leaving 19000 wounded,⁴⁸ and 25000 killed.⁴⁹

During the *Taliban* period (1996-2001), *ethnic* cleansing campaigns began in the north (Mazar Sharif, Hazarajat, Badghiz, Charikar) of Afghanistan.⁵⁰ In 1996, in Badghiz, a population of 50,000 comprising both *Pashtun* and *Uzbek* ethnicities was displaced in the wake of war between the *Taliban* and *Uzbek* forces.⁵¹ The *Taliban* began an organized offensive in January 1997 against militias led by Masood (*Tajik*) and Dostam (*Uzbek*), captured Charikar, displacing some 50,000 people from Charikar to *Kabul*.⁵² On sectarian basis, *ethnic* cleansing occurred in *Mazar Sharif*, in 1997, and in the *Hazarajat* between 1998 and 2001.⁵³ *The New York Times*, in 1997, reported that some 100,000 refugees in the north fled Afghanistan to the northern border entering Tajikistan.⁵⁴ In 2002, some 20,000 refugees, mainly *Pashtun*, fled the north as a result of harassment by their non-*Pashtun* neighbours.⁵⁵ Suffice to say that deportation, displacement and *ethnic* cleansing of major *ethnic* groups have occurred in Afghanistan.

Ascendency of *Ethnicity* in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, in the early 1960s, four clandestine left-wing 'study circles' of committed intellectuals and activists emerged: one led by Noor Muhammad Taraki (a Ghilzai *Pashtun*); second led by Babrak Karmal (a Ghilzai *Pashtun*) and Mir Akbar Khyber included *Tajik* and *Hazara* members; third led by Karmal and Taher Badakhshi (*Tajik*) mostly comprised students from Badakhshan; fourth led by Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri (*Tajik*) included *Tajik* and *Uzbek* recruits. It is evident, these small groups, divided along *tribal* and *ethnic* lines, remained inconsequential minority on the political scene of Afghanistan.⁵⁶

The Constitution of Afghanistan, 1964 provided the freedom of press, and formation of political parties, however, the special legislation, required by the Constitution to legitimize the founding of political parties, was never

⁴⁸ Nojumi, N., *The Rise of The Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and The Future of the Region*. Palgrave, New York 2002, p 114.

⁴⁹ Dorronsoro, G., *Kabul at War (1992-96): State, Ethnicity and Social Clashed*.

⁵⁰ Stanizai, Z., *From Identity Crisis to Identity in Crisis in Afghanistan*. The Middle East Institute Policy Brief, 2009. Retrieved from <http://www.mei.edu/content/identity-crisis-identity-crisis-afghanistan>, accessed on 30-03-2016.

⁵¹ Nojumi, 2002, p 159.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p 157.

⁵³ Rippenburg, C.J., Electoral Systems in a Divided Society: The Case of Afghanistan. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 34(1), 2007, pp. 1-21. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20455479>, accessed on 11-10-2014.

⁵⁴ *The New York Times*, May 4, 1997, p 13.

⁵⁵ Rippenburg, C. J., Electoral Systems in a Divided Society: The Case of Afghanistan. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 34(1), 2007, pp. 1-21. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20455479>, accessed on 11-10-2014.

⁵⁶ Rasanayagam, 2005, pp 47-48.

passed.⁵⁷ Two multi-ethnic political parties, Marxist, Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and Islamist, *Jamiat-e-Islami* (JI) appeared. *Khalq* (People) was organ of the former, PDPA that split in 1967 into two factions; the *Khalq* and the *Parcham*, due to more personal than ideological differences, reflecting different social origins and approaches to revolution.⁵⁸ The rural *Pashtun* numbered the *Khalq*, while the educated urban *Pashtun* and the Persian speakers joined the *Parcham*.⁵⁹ The latter began publishing an organ *Parcham*. *Jamiat-e Islami* too split into two factions in 1976-77: *Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan* (JIA) and *Hizb-e Islami Afghanistan* (HIA). Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of *Jamiat-e Islami*, a *Tajik*, and Gulbadin Hikmatyar, leader of *Hizb-e Islami*, was a *Pashtun*. The split occurred due to personal, not ideological reasons, too. Hikmatyar was radical advocated revolutionary changes in the government, while Rabbani was moderate and preferred evolutionary path. It is remarkable that in both cases, beneath the surface, lay *ethnic* connotations, as the major causes of the divisions.

First significant non-*Pashtun* political party, *Sazman-e Azad-e Bakhshi-e Zehmat Kashan-e Afghanistan* (SAZA), a splinter of the PDPA, was renamed *Sitm-i-Milli* (The Oppressed Nation), in 1968. It was organized and led by Taher Badakhshi (*Tajik*), a former member of the Central Committee of the PDPA and the brother-in-law of Sultani Ali Keshtmand (Keshtmand's sister married to Badakhshi), the Prime Minister during Babrak Karmal and Najibullah regimes. *Sitm-i-Milli*, had been Maoist Communist Party, supported the Chinese Communist line. During the division of the PDPA, many considered Tahir Badakhshi an opponent of *Pashtuns*.⁶⁰ Badakhshi's anti-*Pashtun* party had rooted particularly in Qataghan and Badakhshan vilayats. The party propounded that *Tajik*, *Uzbek*, *Turkmen*, and *Hazara* oppressed nations and were deprived of national and civic rights by the dominant *Pashtun*.⁶¹ These views were also expressed by Abdul Majid Kalkani, nephew of Bacha Saqao, in Parwan. Stressing *ethnic* oppression, *Sitm-i-Milli* openly pointed towards ascendancy of *ethnicity* in Afghanistan. In 1989, the SAZA had provincial committees at *Faizabad*, *Mazar Sharif*, *Shiberghan*, *Maimana*, *Herat*, and *Pul-e Khumri*. The agreement of alliance between the PDPA and SAZA in October 1987 confirmed its name, and announced three *Tajik* members of SAZA (*Sitm-i-Milli*) as ministers: Mehboobullah Kashani was appointed Deputy Prime Minister; Muhammad Ishaq 'Kawa' Minister of Mines and Industries and Muhammad Bashir Baghlani, Minister of Justice.⁶²

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 45-46.

⁵⁸ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 49.

⁵⁹ Sufi, K. J., *Faraib-e-Natamam: Yadai Aur Yadashtai*. Pak Book Empire, Lahore 2015, p 331.

⁶⁰ Tanwir, M. H., *Afghanistan: History, Diplomacy and Journalism*, Vol. 1. Xlibris Corporation, 2013, p 186.

⁶¹ Younas, F. S., Afghanistan's Minority Nationalities. *Central Asia Journal*, 40. Area Study Centre (Central Asia), University of Peshawar, 1997, p 183.

⁶² Younas, 1997, pp 183-186.

Shula-e Javid, another Maoist Political Party, founded by Mehmudi Brothers, out of PDPA, in 1966, condemned the 'social imperialism' of the Soviet Union and their native allies. It had a populist strategy⁶³ and enlisted support amongst university students, professionals, and Shia Muslims, particularly the Shia *Hazara*. The party had a following in industrial workers in *Kabul*, mostly the Shiite *Hazara*, looked down upon by the rest of the population, a kind of underclass, a lumpen proletariat. The Mehmudis organized them on *ethnic* and religious basis, and led most of the workers' strikes in late sixties and early seventies of the previous century.⁶⁴ The popularity of this party grew rapidly but was declared illegal by the government in 1969, since it criticized King Zahir Shah. Ahmad Shah Masood (*Tajik*) is believed to be the member of *Shula-e Javid*.⁶⁵ The Centre of activities of this party had been *Herat* and *Nimroz*. Abdullah Rastakhez and Usman Landai acted as mobilisers and organizers of the communist forces, believing the combat would march from urban to rural areas. The party collaborated with *Sitm-i- Milli* and other *Mujahideen* groups against PDPA factions. More influencing groups even gained membership of *Jamiat-e Islami* led by Rabbani. Members of *Shula-e Javid* were considered reliable and remained loyal to Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood.⁶⁶ Splinter groups of *Sitm-i- Milli* and *Shula-e Javid*, merged into the PDPA in late 1980s.⁶⁷ It has to be kept in mind that apart from Maoism and enmity towards pro Soviet PDPA, significant gluing factor between them has been their affiliation to other than *Pashtun ethnicity*. Following the Promulgation of Constitution, 1964, the 216 members of *Wolasi Jirga* (Lower House of Parliament), included the representative; anti-royalist, supporter of King, Pashtun nationalists of both right and left of political spectrum, entrepreneurs-industrialists, political liberals, a small leftist group, and conservative Muslim leaders. The first open criticism of non-*Pashtun* ethnicities was heard during the proceedings of the 12th Term of Afghanistan Parliament.⁶⁸ It is evident that non-*Pashtun ethnic* groups in 1960s carried grievances against dominant *Pashtun* and separated from the *Pashtun* political parties in the early stages of political development in Afghanistan.

The *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions of the PDPA united in 1977 only to carry the so-called *Saur Revolution* out, in 1978, in Afghanistan, though, for

⁶³ Populism is a political position which holds that the virtuous citizens are being mistreated by a small circle of elites, who can be overthrown if the people recognize the danger and work together. The elites are depicted as trampling in illegitimate fashion upon the rights, values, and voice of the legitimate people. Populist movements are found in many democratic nations.

⁶⁴ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 49.

⁶⁵ Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/shalleh-ye_Javiyed, accessed on 12-10-2014.

⁶⁶ Tanwir, 2013, p 188.

⁶⁷ Younas, 1997, pp 185-88.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p 183.

Juma Khan Sufi,⁶⁹ it has been a revolution of the *Pashtuns* from the beginning till the end.⁷⁰ The *Soviets* might have had no role in preparing the Saur Revolution. It seemed an indigenous reaction of the Afghan people to the exploitation and deprivations by the ruling elites. As J. Blaut ably elaborates in *The National Question*, arguing, all national struggles are class struggles, not Eurocentric diffusions.⁷¹ Moreover, rivalry between the leaders of *Khalq* and the *Parcham* factions re-emerged soon after the establishment of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), in 1978.

Prior to Najibullah's government, the thrust of Soviet's state building strategy was to transform Afghan society through *Sovietization* (export of Soviet institutions, political models, and ideology), however, when Najibullah became President, the Soviet realized to change its policy to increase the regime's social base. Najibullah announced policy of National Reconciliation in 1987, to reduce military confrontation and negotiate a political compromise.⁷²

The *Soviets* used *ethnicity* to enlist support for its intervention offering concessions to smaller *ethnic* groups and *tribes* in return for their support or neutrality in the war. Rights to smaller nations, *ethnic* and racial groups including language and cultural rights were essential part of *Soviet* ideology too. Additionally, they encouraged formation of rural militias to protect their areas from the opposing *Mujahideen* fighters. They used *Juwzjani* militia led by Rashid Dostam (*Uzbek*) comprising *Uzbeks* in non-*Uzbek* areas that brutally attacked other *ethnic* groups where needed. The strategy of using *ethnic* groups against each other, did not succeed in defeating the *Mujahedin*, however, it did encourage growth of *ethnic*-based, regional armed factions, further straining relations amongst *ethnic* groups.⁷³

The PDPA government treated minority *ethnicities* judiciously, since the 1987 Constitution rejected all discriminations and classification on the basis of *tribe*, language and religion,⁷⁴ thus, stipulates:

⁶⁹ Juma Khan Sufi is the famous Afghanologist, and first-hand observer of Afghan political affairs from 1967 till 1992. He went to *Kabul* in 1970s as a political exile, and worked in the closed circles of Afghan government. He worked with the Afghan presidents such as, Noor Muhammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal and Najibullah. Therefore, he saw the political events and changes in Afghanistan with his own eyes, and noted them in his diaries, which he published in 2015. He observed the important events such as the Saur Revolution, the affairs of the *Parcham* and *Khalqis* factions of PDPA, the presence of *Soviets* in *Kabul* and their involvement in Afghan's affairs etc.

⁷⁰ Sufi, K. J., *Faraib-e-Natamam: Yadai Aur Yadashtai*. Pak Book Empire, Lahore 2015, p 337.

⁷¹ Blaut, M. J., *The National Question: Decolonising the Theory of Nationalism*. Zed Books, USA 1987, pp. 172-211.

⁷² Minkov, A., *Counterinsurgency and Ethnic/Sectarian Rivalry in Comparative Perspective: Soviet Afghanistan and Contemporary Iraq*. Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, Defence Research and Development, Canada. Retrieved from smallwarsjournal.com/documents/aminkov.pdf, accessed on 03-5-2016.

⁷³ Khalilzad, Z., Anarchy in Afghanistan. *Journal of International Affairs*, 51(1), 1997, pp. 37-56. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357465>, accessed: 15-06-2016.

⁷⁴ Rasanayagam, 2005, pp 176-177.

“All citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan, man and woman, regardless of nationality, race, language, tribe, religion, political ideology, education, occupation, ancestry, wealth, social status or place of residence, are viewed as equals, and entitled to equal legal rights according to the law.”

During the PDPA's government, the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural character of Afghanistan was officially recognized that opened new avenues for cultural expression in the form of daily newspapers in vernacular, *ethnic* languages, the formation of folk songs, dance troupes, wider publicity of *ethnic* poets and their works.⁷⁶ The official recognition of the multi-ethnic character of the country was unprecedented in Afghanistan.

One of the most widely publicized aspects of the Soviet nationality policy has been the emphasis on cultural autonomy; this 'autonomy' consisted chiefly in the use of the national language in schools, government administration, and courts, and in the flood of books, magazines, pamphlets, and newspapers which began to flow from the printing houses.⁷⁷ The PDPA's government promoted the nationality policy similar to the one in the Soviet Union, for example, Radio Afghanistan began airing programs in *Uzbeki* and some other minority languages.⁷⁸ Likewise, the Afghanistan's minorities' languages such as *Uzbeki*, *Turkmen*, *Baluchi*, and *Nuristani* were elevated to the status of national languages.⁷⁹

Besides, during the PDPA's government of *Parcham*, the situation of *Hazara* changed significantly for the better; Sultan Ali Keshtmand (*Hazara*) was appointed the Prime Minister, another *Hazara*, a Deputy Minister of Afghanistan. *Hazara* got minor government posts,⁸⁰ and engaged in lucrative transport business and the government in *Kabul* armed them against the *Mujahideen*.⁸¹ Before 1987, the *Pashtun* alone were allowed to form a national *jirga*, but the *Hazara* became able to form the first ever *Jirga-ye-Sarasari-e- Milliyyat-e- Hazara* (the Central Council of the *Hazara* People) too in Afghanistan.

Impact of War (1979-89) on Ethnicity

In the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979, massive influx of arms and cash penetrated Afghanistan fueling and mobilizing *ethnic*

⁷⁵ *The Constitution of Afghanistan*, Clause 36, 1987.

⁷⁶ Rais, B.R., *Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity, and State in Afghanistan*. Lexington Press, UK 2008, pp 38-39.

⁷⁷ Bacon, E., Soviet Policy in Turkestan. *Middle East Journal*, 1(4), 1947 p 396. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321918>, accessed on 03-06-2016.

⁷⁸ Khalilzad, 1997, pp. 37-56.

⁷⁹ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 99.

⁸⁰ Mousavi, 1998, p 176.

⁸¹ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 132.

polarization and *sectarianism*. The United States, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia matched a dollar for a dollar and bullet for a bullet to counter any development sponsored by the USSR. In order to keep it covert, the American CIA through Pak ISI, initially, delivered weaponry, AK47, Klashnikov rifles, heavy machine guns (Dashaka), pistols (Makarov) manufactured in Warsaw Pact countries, to the Afghan *Mujahideen*.⁸² Later upon rising stakes, stinger missiles were also provided to the Mujahidden. By 1981-85 annual US military aid to the *Mujahideen*, channeled through ISI, allegedly grew from \$30 million to \$280 million, making it the biggest single CIA covert operation anywhere in the world.⁸³ Further \$470 million were pledged in 1986, which increased to \$630 in 1987, \$600 million in 1989, and \$280 million in 1990.⁸⁴ Besides, the Saudi Arabia funneled more than half a billion dollars to CIA accounts in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands; this was in addition to its direct contributions in cash and arms to its favorite Mujahedin parties. Kuwait and UAE also funded this war. The Soviets stationed around 85000 troops inside Afghanistan, comprising 60000 motorized force, 25000 made up of artillery, engineering, signals, borders and security units, and air force personnel. Thus, pumping of arms and cash in Afghanistan by the foreign states, sanctioned the rival feuding *ethnic* parties, to intensify further factional and fratricidal fighting.⁸⁵

Prior to 1979, *qawm*, remained the primary identity in Afghanistan, however, following Soviet invasion and ensuing war of attrition, *ethnicity* became the primary identity, flourishing in the 1990s. During the war in Afghanistan (1979-89), *sect* also appeared as prominent identity when the *Sunni* and *Shia* party alliances appeared with dominant political pressures. This shift in identity was unprecedented in Afghanistan. The internal strife among various factions, organized along *tribal*, *ethnic*, religious, and ideological lines, demonstrated one of the most destructive dimensions of war in Afghanistan.⁸⁶ Oliver Roy argues that the *ethnic* awareness in Afghanistan is not as pristine as often claimed; it is a consequence, of war, of strategic alignments, with foreign countries.⁸⁷ The war made the various *ethnic* and social forces of Afghanistan more conscious of their separate identities.⁸⁸ Shah M. Tarzi has argued that the politics of Afghan resistance, shaped by traditional ethno-linguistic and *tribal* cleavages internal to Afghan

⁸² Ibid., p 105.

⁸³ Ibid., p 105.

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp 136-137.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p 136.

⁸⁶ Rais, 2008, p 2.

⁸⁷ Roy, O., Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan? In Willium Maley (ed.). *Afghanistan and the Taliban, The Rebirth of Fundamentalism?* Penguin Books, 2001, p 205.

⁸⁸ Rais, 2008, p 17.

society, was added and abated further by differences in the *ethnic* composition of the resistance leadership.⁸⁹

Sunni Resistance

Sect and *ethnic* based alliances were established, in Pakistan and Iran, during the war in Afghanistan (1979-89). Seven Sunni parties Alliance emerged in Peshawar, Pakistan, while eight Shia party Alliance established in Iran, to counter the former alliance, from gaining political leverage in Afghanistan. Though sect and ethnicity are two different social facts, Hazara was a sect as well as ethnicity in Afghanistan. *Pashtun* and *Tajik* have sects too but ethnic ties are more important for them. Pakistan and Iran fueled *sect* and *ethnicity* in order to put a favourable client regime in Afghanistan. Besides, it is the salience of *ethnicity* over *sect* in the *Hazara: ethnicity* played active role in their unity, and emergence to political power.

The Seven Sunni parties' Alliance, based in Peshawar, emerged in early 1980s. Earlier the *tribal* insurrections in south-eastern provinces of Afghanistan in summer 1979, with the *Kabul* government counter-attacks and repressions, and the *Soviet* invasion, brought influx of refugees into Pakistan, initially 400,000 in 1980. The Pakistani authorities asked the exiled Afghan leaders in Peshawar to manage the situation. These exiled Afghan leaders had set up headquarter in Peshawar after failed uprising against Daud, in 1974. The refugees in Pakistan needed to be recommended by one of the parties in order to be eligible for food ration; that enabled these small unrepresentative parties become mass organizations. Pakistan encouraged, armed and directed the spread of insurrections in Afghanistan.⁹⁰ Pakistan's ISI ensured that every commander in the field belongs to one of the Seven Party Alliance that included:

1. The *Jamiat-e-Islami*, headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, an *ethnic Tajik* from Badakhshan.
2. *Hizbi-Islami Afghanistan (Hikmatyar)*, headed by Gulbadin Hikmatyar, an *ethnic Pashtun* from Kunduz.
3. *Hizbi-Islami Afghanistan (Khalis)*, headed by Molana Younis Khalis, an *ethnic Pashtun* from Paktya.
4. *Ittehad-e-Islami Baraye Azadi-e Afghanistan*, headed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an *ethnic Pashtun* from Paghman.
5. *Harkat-e-Inqilab-i-Islami* headed by Molana Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, an *ethnic Pashtun* from Logar.

⁸⁹ Tarzi, S., Politics of the Afghan Resistance Movement: Cleavages, Disunity, and Fragmentation. *Asian Survey*, 31(6), 1991, pp 479-495. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645078>, accessed: 16-05-2016.

⁹⁰ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 104.

6. *Mahaz-i-Milli Islami ye Afghanistan* (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan), headed by Pir Syed Ahmad Gillani, an *ethnic Pashtun* from Nangarhar.
7. *Jubbah-e-Nijat-e Milli Afghanistan* (Afghan National Liberation Front), headed by Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, an *ethnic Pashtun* from Kabul.⁹¹

Except *Jamiat-e Islami*, mainly comprising *Tajik* elements, the remainder of six major resistance parties, were *Pashtun* dominated.⁹² The rivalry between Rabbani and Hikmatyar was initially strategic, later turned to *ethnic*; Rabbani stressed flexibility in actions against Daud Khan after crackdown in 1974-75, while Hikmatyar stressed armed struggle, a shortcut to establishing an Islamic government in Afghanistan. Later, in the wake of split between JIA (Rabbani) and HIA (Hikmatyar), in 1976-7, political differences had wheeled more around *ethnic* factor. Most non-*Pashtun* joined Rabbani, and educated but religious *Pashtun* rallied around Hikmatyar that further strengthened the *ethnic* dimension in Afghan politics in early 1980s.⁹³ Moreover, *ethnic* and sectarian rivalry existed even between the *Mujahideen* Commanders in Afghanistan;

“Different commanders from the same area would join different Parties, thus widening existing gaps between them. A commander considered himself king in his area, felt entitled to the support of the villages and to local taxes. He wanted the loot from attacking any nearby government post, and he wanted the heavy weapons to do it with, as they increased his chances of success and prestige, which in turn facilitated his recruiting a larger force. Such men often reacted violently to other commanders entering, passing through or ‘poaching’ on their territory. No party had a monopoly of power within specific areas or provinces in Afghanistan.”⁹⁴

Shia Resistance

For, Syed Askar Mousavi,⁹⁵ the Shia resistance movement, led by *Hazara* against the *Soviet* and the *Kabul* regime had two distinct phases: in phase-one (1978-83), barring the Centre of Bamiyan province, the entire

⁹¹ Alam, T. M., M. Y. Effendi, (Ed.), *The Betrayal of Afghanistan: An Analysis of the Afghan Resistance Against Soviet Union*. Area Study Centre (Russia, China & Central Asia), University of Peshawar, 2005, pp 128-150.

⁹² Ibid., p 191.

⁹³ Alam, 2005, p 189.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p 111.

⁹⁵ Syed Askar Mousavi (born 1956) is an *ethnic Hazara* and the author of *The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study* published in 2009. He remained a prominent figure in the "cultural struggle" of the Afghan *Mujahideen* in Iran during the *Soviet* occupation of Afghanistan. He was the main writer and editor of a few publications, including *Saaf*, and *Jawali*.

Hazarajat were liberated and brought under organized control of *Shura-ye Ittifaq*⁹⁶, an organization led by Syed Ali Behishti; Phase-two later in 1983-89 was marred by intense internal fighting in *Hazarajat*, since the *Hazara* groups backed by Iran emerged resulting into killing and migration of thousands of *Hazara*.⁹⁷

Some 50 Shia/*Hazara* minor/major groups backed by Iran were formed: such as the *Sazman-e-Nasr*, *Sazman-e-Mujahideen-e Mostaz'afin*. Eight Shia/non *Pashtun* groups, including *Hazara*, united in a coalition, in 1987, as a result of pressure from Iran, as they camped in Iran. The coalition, named, *Shura-ye-I'telaf-e Islami-ye Afghanistan*, professed that it is opposed to the destructive infighting between the different groups inside *Hazarajat*. The coalition included; *Sazman-e Nasr*, *Pasdarane Jihad-e Islami*, *Nahzat-e Islami*, *Jabha-ye Mottahid-e Ingelab-e Islami*, *Harakat-e Islami*, *Hizb-e Da'war-e Islami*, *Hizbullah* and *Sazman-e Niroo-ye Islami*.⁹⁸ Later, in 1989, the *Hazara*/Shia political and religious leaders in *Hazarajat*, officially formed *Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami* (an alliance of eight Shia/*Hazara* political parties), in Bamiyan, this time under the control of *Hazara* of Afghanistan. *Hizb-e Wahdat* stressed *Hazara* ethnic identity more than Islamic solidarity and its relations with Iran deteriorated after 1996. The Alliance gave voice to the rights and demands of the *Hazara*. The term *Hazaristan* also appeared in some publications of the party. Later, former *Hazara* nationalists also joined the party, who never supported the idea of an Islamic state. The ethnic polarization remained the main predicament of the Islamist parties.⁹⁹

Revolution, invasion, ensuing war and intervention of foreign material resources in terms of weapons and currency transformed hitherto traditional immobile *Hazara* society in 1980s. New terms such as *Hizb* (party), *rahbari-e siyasi* (political leadership), *sazman* (organization), *goroh* (group), *tabaqah* (class), *milliyat* (nationality), *markaziyat* (centralism), *jang-e mosallahanah* (armed struggle) entered into *Hazara* lexicon gradually but steadily replacing traditional *tribal* terms and structure. The *Hizb-e Wahdat*: opened avenues for the development of *Hazara* in Afghanistan; participated in international gatherings, on Afghanistan; Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, in Istanbul; Four partite Conference in Islamabad and Tehran; the Sixth Conference of the OIC in Senegal; the UN Annual Meetings and held official talks with the UN General Secretary in New York. It also took part in discussions alongside the seven group *Mujahideen* alliance backed in

⁹⁶ *Shura-i Engalab-i Ettifaq-i Islami Afghanistan*, often called simply *Shura*, was a *Hazara* political movement, led by Syed Ali Beheshti, appeared in Afghanistan in 1979, in opposition to the increasingly leftist *Kabul* government. The *Shura* had both political and militant arms, and removed many *Kabul*-backed authorities within the *Hazarajat*, replacing them with their own functionaries. By the end of 1983 the *Shura* controlled 60% of the population of the *Hazarajat*.

⁹⁷ Mousavi, 1998, p xv.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp 179-185.

⁹⁹ Roy., 2001, pp 206-207.

Peshawar.¹⁰⁰ The increased political awareness, strength and role of *Hazara*, began to cause *ethnic* tensions with *Pashtun* and other *ethnicities*.¹⁰¹

The anti-Soviet insurgents divided along *sectarian* lines: the *Shiite* political parties, supported by *Hazara*, relied on Iran for financial and political support; while the *Sunni* parties were supported, politically, militarily, financially by United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The ISI distributed foreign aid exclusively to these Sunni Islamic parties.¹⁰² Instead of unity, differences and disunity, based on *ethnic/sect/clan* lines, had been the chief characteristics of the Afghan resistance against *Soviet/Afghan* forces. Effective links between the *Shiite* and *Sunni* groups lacked,¹⁰³ rather, contest and hostility, could be witnessed.¹⁰⁴

Militarization of Ethnicity

Militancy also played a prominent role in ascendancy of ethnicity in Afghanistan. Militias on ethnic and sectarian basis established in Afghanistan in 1980s: the Uzbek militias of Rashid Dostam (*Juwzjani*), the Tajik militia of Ahmad Shah Masood (*Shura-e Nazar*), and Pashtun-Tajik militia of Ismail Khan (*Hamza Division*) were ethnic based, while that of Syed Mansur Naderi's Ismailia militia (*Wakhis*), was sect-based. The co-ethnics followed their own militia group. The *Juwzjani* and the *Ismailia* militias were pro-government, while that of Ismail Khan and Ahmad Shah Masood, anti-government.¹⁰⁵ The *Juwzjani* militia, an effective and equipped force, numbered 40,000 men by 1991. Its task has been to replace the *Soviet* troops protecting the gas fields and the supply routes from the *Soviet* border and southward through *Mazar Sharif*. Units of this militia were dispatched to *Kandahar* and Jalalabad to fight the Mujahideen in 1989 and 1990, respectively.¹⁰⁶ The militia was also used against other *ethnic* groups in many parts of the country.¹⁰⁷

Naderi's *Ismailia* militia was established to arm and defend his community when most of the *Tajiks* and *Pashtuns* in the north aligned themselves either with the *Jamiat* or with the *Hizb-e Wahdat*. Najibullah patronized *Ismailis*, Naderi was made a general, the governor of Baghlan province, and member of Revolutionary Council. This was a great social advance for a highly stigmatized group. Naderi's forces, reaching 13,000 in 1989, acted as intermediary in distributing *Soviet* aid to *Kabul*.¹⁰⁸ The

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p 186, 193.

¹⁰¹ Katzman, 201, p 24.

¹⁰² Rippenburg, 2007, pp 10-11.

¹⁰³ Saikal, 2002, p 30.

¹⁰⁴ Alam, 2005, p 189.

¹⁰⁵ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 130.

¹⁰⁶ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 130.

¹⁰⁷ Nojumi, 2002, p 82.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p 130.

obvious reason for patronizing *Ismailis* by the Afghan government, in the north, has been guarding Soviet supply line from the north to *Kabul*.

The anti-Soviet militias of Ismail Khan and Masood fought the communist government in *Kabul*. Ismail Khan, erected his power-base *Herat*, in 1988, a conventional type of military organization called *Hamza Division*, which sustained five regiments, each with six to nine battalions of about 200 men, made up of combat units of 25 men. He convened a Shura of commanders in Ghor from nine western provinces that led to improved military cooperation among resistance groups in the west of Afghanistan. Besides, in the north-east of the country, many *Tajik* and *Uzbek Ulama* and Commanders, nominally allied to the NIFA,¹⁰⁹ switched their allegiance to the *Jamiat* and to its most effective commander, Ahmad Shah Masood, fighting the Soviet-Afghan forces from his autonomous Punjshir valley. His organization expanded into a regional cooperative of *Jamiat* commanders, called the *Supervisory Council of the North* (SCN).¹¹⁰ The unprecedented flourishing of militias based on ethnicity occurred in Afghanistan. These ethnic militias were fueled directly/indirectly by Afghan government of the time.

Efforts to Reconcile Ethnicization

After becoming president in April 1986, Najibullah announced on January 1, 1987, his program of national reconciliation, comprising three key elements; six month unilateral ceasefire, the formation of national unity, and the return of the over 5 million refugees from Pakistan and Iran.¹¹¹ The ceasefire extended further for six months. Besides, *peace jirgas* were established at village, counties, districts, and provinces level, followed by convocation of a national peace '*Jirga*'. These *jirgas* asked for the cessation of war, and creation of an atmosphere of understanding among the people. Representatives of all *ethnic* groups, *tribes*, and nationalities took part in the *Jirga*.¹¹² A Draft Constitution was published in July that year, with opposition invited to suggest changes. Najibullah appealed to the Peshawar based Seven Party Alliance, in October, to join a coalition government, declaring they would be allowed to open offices in *Kabul*, publish newspapers etc., if ended

¹⁰⁹ *Mahaz-e Milli-ye Afghanistan*, or The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), was founded in 1979 in Peshawar as an armed resistance movement by Syed Ahmad Gillani. It is a liberal, nationalist, Islamic party and, according to its manifesto, advocated both the protection of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, and the establishment of an interim government that would draft a national and Islamic constitution with the separation of executive, legislature, and judicial powers. It demaded an elected government. It remained part of a loose coalition of traditional, or moderate, *Mujahideen* groups. NIFA participated in the presidential elections of Afghanistan in 2004 and 2009.

¹¹⁰ Rasayanagam, pp 132-33.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p 119.

¹¹² *Kabul New Times*. January 22, 1987.

armed resistance.¹¹³ The New Constitution was formally adopted by Afghan *Loya Jirga* on December 1, 1987,¹¹⁴ establishing Islam as state religion, and converting Afghanistan in theory into a parliamentary democracy. Article 38 of the Constitution stipulated equal rights of the citizens of Afghanistan irrespective of *ethnicity*, race, *tribal*, and political affiliation.¹¹⁵ After election, as President, Najibullah delivered a presidential address at the *Loya Jirga*, forwarding his vision of Afghan multi *ethnic*/nation/culture state: called various *ethnicities* by name such as, the *Pashtun*, *Tajik*, *Uzbek*, *Turkmen*, *Char-Aimaq*, *Baluchi*, *Nuristani*, *Kirghiz*, *Pashai*, *Arab*, and *Hindus*, and resolved that he will “firmly and consistently consolidate friendship among all nationalities, *tribes*, and *ethnic* groups, decisively exterminate every manifestation of chauvinism and nationalist selfishness, *tribal* differences and distrust between one people and the other. We must preserve our multi-national garden from the hot winds of war and drought”.¹¹⁶ Najibullah or the PDPA’s government recognized *ethnicity*, while the Geneva Accords, the *Mujahideen* government and the *Taliban* regime did not. Besides, in the *Bonn Accords*, *ethnicity* was recognized with constitutional guarantees. The non-recognition of *ethnicity* by Afghan governments, paved the way for *ethnic* strife and warfare.

The Geneva Accords, saying nothing about *ethnicity*, was signed on April 14, 1988 by the foreign ministers of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the *Soviet* Union and the United States in Geneva, called for; the withdrawal of *Soviet* troops within nine months, non-interference in each other’s affairs by Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees. The United States and the *Soviet* Union pledged to guarantee the settlement in a separate document.¹¹⁷ The entire dimension of Geneva Accords was external: it did not address the internal Afghan situations; the Afghan resistance was not a party to the negotiations,¹¹⁸ which showed how *ethnicity* was not recognized in Afghanistan, and how it led to civil war in the 1990s.

The Mujahideen and Ethnicity (1992-1994)

During the fratricidal war in *Mujahideen* government, *ethnicity* became more prominent in Afghanistan. The *qawm*, a flexible term, diffused and took *ethnic* connotation. Though the PDPA’s government in Afghanistan had recognized *ethnicity*, the *Mujahideen* government did not. The non-recognition of *ethnicity*, and the quest for political power, led the country into political chaos. The major *ethnic* groups fought each other for gaining

¹¹³ Rasayanagam, 2005, pp 120-121.

¹¹⁴ *Kabul New Times*. December 10, 1987.

¹¹⁵ *Kabul New Times*. December 1, 1987.

¹¹⁶ *Kabul New Times*. December 3, 1987.

¹¹⁷ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 121.

¹¹⁸ Alam, 2005, p 287.

the prize of *Buzkashi*. The non-*Pashtun* ethnic groups, who tasted a degree of autonomy, and self-rule during the Communist period (1979-89) enabled by *ethnic* militia, had refused to accept traditional *Pashtun* domination, enabling relations troubled between the *Pashtun* and non-*Pashtun*.¹¹⁹

The suspension of Soviet aid to Afghan government, in late 1991, had forced Najibullah to limit payments to the pro-government forces and militias.¹²⁰ In the north, the swelling ranks of non-*Pashtun* militias such as of the *Uzbek*, *Tajik*, and *Ismailia*, demanded extra payment from Najibullah's government, in a time of financial crisis. Najibullah replaced the *Tajik* commander with the *Pashtun*, a flash point for which the warlords waited. This implied *ethnic* discrimination by *Pashtun* in politics. However, weeks before Najibullah's stepping down in March 1992, an anti-*Pashtun* alliance had formed in *Mazar Sharif*. Two *Tajik*-dominated *Mujahideen* groups, *Jamiat-e Islami* and *Shura-e Nazar*, joined hands with the Communist *Uzbek* (Dostam) and *Ismaili* militia, the Shia's *Hizb-e Wahdat*. Their political aims were *ethnic*-chauvinistic, overthrowing the communist government first, and then ending *Pashtun* domination.¹²¹ The establishment of anti-*Pashtun* alliance appeared as the second block of non-*Pashtun* ethnicities against the *Pashtun* in Afghanistan. Prior to it, the first block was appeared in 1960-70s when the novice political parties such as; *Sitm-e Milli*, *Shula-e Javid*, and *Jamiat-e Islami* had established unity of cooperative groups against the *Pashtun*. Subsequently, two further alliances of non-*Pashtun* groups established against the *Pashtun*-dominated regime of *Taliban* in 1996 and 1997. During these times, the shifting and drifting of alliances remained based on *ethnicity*.

Sect played its role too. After the fall of Najibullah, the Seven Sunni Parties based in Peshawar, were brought in a conference in Peshawar to form an interim government in Afghanistan. *Hizb-e Wahdat*, the Shia/Hazara Eight parties Alliance, were not invited to the conference owing to Shia *Sect* and *Hazara ethnicity*. The ministries, distributed exclusively amongst the Sunni parties. The avoidance of *Hizb-e Wahdat* in the interim government exposed *ethnic* and *sectarian* discrimination in Afghanistan. According to Amin Saikal,¹²² the Peshawar Agreement of 24 April, 1992, became inoperative due to the intransigence of Hikmatyar (*Pashtun*) who refused to

¹¹⁹ Rais, 2008, p 42.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p163.

¹²¹ Misdaq, 2006, p 171.

¹²² Professor Amin Saikal (born in 1950 in *Kabul*), is the Director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (The Middle East & Central Asia) and Professor of Political Science at the Australian National University. Professor Saikal has specialized in the politics, history, political economy and international relations of the Middle East and Central Asia. He has been a visiting fellow at Princeton University, Cambridge University and the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, as well as a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow in International Relations (1983-1988). He is a member of many national and international academic organizations.

sign it.¹²³ Hikmatyar insisted that the position of Prime Minister reserved for his party, should not be subordinate to the President (Rabbani), and the position of Defense Minister (Masood), should be subordinate to Prime Minister (Hikmatyar). He also objected Rashid Dostam's (*Uzbek*) inclusion into the coalition government, who previously remained associated with the Communist government. Hikmatyar not allowing Rabbani's government to succeed,¹²⁴ launched a barrage of rockets against *Kabul* killing thousands civilians. The rejection of Rabbani's rule in Afghanistan by Hikmatyar, had a particular motive behind it; *Pashtun* have not accepted rule of other *ethnicity* in Afghanistan. This substantiated further *ethnic* discrimination and polarization in Afghanistan.

Rabbani continued to consider his rule legitimate in Afghanistan, and the countries like Iran, Russia, and India recognized his government.¹²⁵ For Carol Riphenburg,¹²⁶ fundamentalist leaders like Hikmatyar, have played both pan-Islamic and *ethnic* cards, as needed, in Afghanistan.¹²⁷ The effective practices, constituencies and strategies of *Hizb-e Islami* and *Jamiat-e Islami*, enhanced *ethnic* polarization and sheer political rivalries between their leaders, than with ideology.¹²⁸

The *ethnic* activists, joined their own *ethnic Mujahideen* and militia groups, after the fall of Afghan Communists in 1992; some *Khalqi* (such as, Shahnawaz Tanai) ended up in *Hizb-e Islami*, Hikmatyar, the *Parchami* joined *Jamiat-e Islami*, Rabbani and *Shura-e Nazar*, Ahmad Shah Masood, while the *Hazara* and *Uzbek* defected to their own warlords in *Hizb-e Wahdat* and *Jumbish Milli* respectively. These groupings on *ethnic* lines set the scene for the most vicious *ethnic* conflict in Afghanistan.¹²⁹ Hundreds of *Hazara* were massacred by forces of *Tajik*-dominated government in February 1993. This brought together *Hizb-e Wahdat* (*Hazara*) and *Hizb-e Islami* (*Pashtun*) against the ruling *Tajiks*. Dostam (*Uzbek*), Mujaddadi (*Pashtun*), Hikmatyar (*Pashtun*), and Khalili (*Hazara*) made an alliance against *Tajik*, known to be *Shura-ye Ali-ye Hamahangi*, which remained effective till mid-1996.¹³⁰ Besides, Sayyaf's *Ittihad-e Islami* (*Pashtun*) fought the *Hizb-e Wahdat* (*Hazara*), *Tajik* forces attacked *Uzbek* forces of Dostam, and *Hizb-e Islami* (*Pashtun*) rocketed the *Kabul* city to oust *Tajik*

¹²³ Saikal, A., *The Rabbani Government (1992-1996)*, In, *Afghanistan and the Taliban: The rebirth of Fundamentalism* (Edited). Penguin Books, India 2001, p 33.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p 142.

¹²⁵ Khalilzad, 1997, pp 37-56.

¹²⁶ Carol J. Riphenburg, an American Professor of Political Science at the College of DuPage in Glen Ellyn, IL. She has published various articles on *ethnicity*, economics, the constitution, and role of women in Afghanistan.

¹²⁷ Riphenburg, C., *Ethnicity and Civil Society in Contemporary Afghanistan*. *Middle East Journal*, 59(1), 2005, pp 31-51. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4330095>, accessed 12-3-2016.

¹²⁸ Roy, 2001, p 207.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p 203.

¹³⁰ Mousavi, 1998, pp. 198-199.

government from *Kabul*.¹³¹ Rabbani (*Tajik*) used power against *Hizb-e Wahdat (Hazara)* and *Jumbesh-I Milli (Uzbek)* in order to oust them from *Kabul*.¹³² The *ethnic* infightings between various major *ethnic* groups in *Kabul* were for the political power. The metaphor of Afghan *Buzkashi*,¹³³ may be used, for the *ethnic* groups, pursuing *ethnic* warfare for political power, in Afghanistan, during 1992-94. Whitney Azoy, an American expert on Afghan culture and politics, has used the metaphor of *Buzkashi* for Afghan leaders; as the players in the game seize control of the goat by fair or foul, so did the political leaders to fight off their rivals.¹³⁴

Neighbouring States and Ethnicity in Afghanistan

Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, the neighbouring states, Saudi Arabia and India as regional powers, Russia and USA, the super powers, of the times, had/have in-built incentives in meddling into the affairs of Afghanistan. Policies of these states are affected not only by developments in Afghanistan, but also by one another's actions in Afghanistan or against each other. The *Taliban's* takeover of *Kabul* increased competition between these states.¹³⁵ The role of these states, in ascendancy of *ethnicity* in Afghanistan cannot be overlooked; they fueled the *ethnic* groups in Afghanistan. During the war (1979-89) in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, important neighbouring states, deeply plunged into the affairs of Afghanistan. Both turned into headquarters of the political leaders of Afghan Mujahedeen groups, Sunni and Shia, respectively as well as the host to Afghan refugees.¹³⁶

In Afghanistan, Pakistan has aspired to gain a strategic depth against India, not only to subdue aspirations of its own *Pashtun* and *Baluch* ethnic populations but also sought to gain access to the Central Asian republics.¹³⁷ Pakistan became active in Afghanistan in early 1980s, when it trained the

¹³¹ Rais, 2008, p 43.

¹³² Ibid., p 183.

¹³³ *Buzkashi*, literally goat dragging in Persian, is the national sport and a passion in Afghanistan, in which horse-mounted players attempt to place a goat or calf carcass in a goal. It is often played on Fridays and matches draw thousands of fans. *Buzkashi* may have begun with the nomadic Turkic-Mongol peoples who have come from farther north and east spreading westward from China and Mongolia between the 10th and 15th centuries in a centuries-long series of migrations that ended only in the 1930s. From Scythian times until recent decades, *Buzkashi* remains as a legacy of that bygone era. Whitney Azoy, (involved with Afghanistan since 1971 in different capacities) an American expert of Afghan culture and politics, notes in his book *Buzkashi: Game and Power in Afghanistan*: " ... (that) leaders are men who can seize control by means foul and fair and then fight off their rivals. The *Buzkashi* rider does the same"

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Khalilzad, 1997, p 48.

¹³⁶ Nojumi, 2002, pp 98-99.

¹³⁷ Khalilzad, 1997, pp 37-56.

Afghan *Mujahideen*, and supported militarily, financially, and logistically the Seven Sunni parties, based in Peshawar. The influx of Afghan refugees in Pakistan reached 3.272 million in 1990. After disintegration of the USSR in 1991, Pakistan changed its Afghan policy from armed struggle to its market-oriented needs; focusing upon the economic market of Central Asia. For that purpose, a friendly and trustworthy government in Afghanistan became the most crucial task for Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan supported and invested enormously in *Hizb-e Islami* of Hikmatyar (*Pashtun*) in order to have a greater role for him in the newly established Afghan government.¹³⁸ Pakistan kept shifting its support from one *Pashtun* group to another in order to put pressure on Rabbani to honour the Peshawar Accord and to stop his transitional government from tilting towards India and other regional powers. The Rabbani government, unhappy from Pakistan, used the lever of Iran-Russia-India to contest Pakistan's influence in Afghan politics.¹³⁹

Iran became active in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion, and a home for around 2.94 million¹⁴⁰ (the 1990 figures) Afghan refugees and a support base for the Afghan *Mujahideen*, particularly the Shia groups. It provided the Shia-Hazara groups with limited military and financial aid. While the penetration of western and Middle Eastern aid, did not follow into the Shia *Mujahideen* due to the hostile relations between Iran and the USA, and Saudi Arabia.¹⁴¹ Though Iran became active in Afghan affairs in late 1980s in the affairs of Shia-Hazara *Mujahideen*, the Iranian government agencies such as, *The Iranian Revolutionary Guard*, *Etelaat*, *Bunad*, and *Wazarat-e Keshwar* (Ministry of Interior), had become active in attempting to push their agenda in Afghanistan. After Soviet withdrawal, Iran united the Hazara factions into *Hizb-e Wahdat*, and tried to normalize relations with Najibullah. The reason behind policy shift was Iran's desire to protest the US and Saudi's influence in the upcoming *Mujahideen* government. Iran supported the Rabbani (*Tajik*) government, and its support intensified after *Taliban* captured *Herat* in 1995.¹⁴²

Iran cultivated relations with the non-*Pashtun* parties such as *Jamiat* (*Tajik*), the *Wahdat* (*Hazara*), *Jumbish* (*Uzbeks*) and Ismail Khan (*Tajik*) to counter the Peshawar-based *Pashtun* parties. It established five training camps near Mashad for 5000 fighters led by Ismail Khan.¹⁴³ The non-*Pashtun* government in Afghanistan represented a major diplomatic triumph for Iran. Iran provided substantial material support to the *Kabul* coalition to counter Pakistani and Saudi support for Hikmatyar (*Pashtun*). After the coalition fragmented in 1993-94, Iran began supporting Shiite-*Wahdat* to counter Saudi

¹³⁸ Ibid., p 184.

¹³⁹ Rais, 2008, p 185.

¹⁴⁰ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 111.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p 186.

¹⁴² Ibid., p 187.

¹⁴³ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 169.

financial support to the Rabbani-Masood regime.¹⁴⁴ Iran poured arms, cash, fuel, and logistical support to the *Northern Alliance*; the Iranian air craft flew military supporters of the *Northern Alliance* based in Iran to *Mazar Sharif*. It even cooperated with Russia to provide joint support for the anti-*Taliban* forces, discouraging international recognition of the *Taliban* government, to gain diplomatic support for the *Northern Alliance*.¹⁴⁵ Thus Iran has been supporting the non-*Pashtun* ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

The two important states in the north, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, entertained two apprehensions about Afghanistan; *first* the creation of Islamic state in Afghanistan may destabilize their societies, inciting similar elements across their border, *second*, they echoed the concerns of their *ethnic* cousins in Afghanistan against *Pashtun* domination. Since the ousting of *Tajik* government in Afghanistan, *Tajikistan* and *Uzbekistan* increased their political and material support to the forces of *Northern Alliance*; *Tajikistan* offered sanctuaries to the anti-*Taliban* forces, allowed their aircraft from Afghanistan to its own airfields and operations from there.¹⁴⁶ *Turkmenistan* has *ethnic* ties with *Turkmens* in Afghanistan, however, on one hand it has pursued neutral policy towards its neighbours, and on the other, it wanted its oil and gas to be exported.

Russia aspired to secure its borders from extremism and terrorism. It did not support religious elements in Afghanistan, rather discouraged them. *Taliban* takeover threatened Russia. In cooperation with Iran, Russia provided arms to the *Northern Alliance*. Saudi Arabia had a greater influence on developments in Afghanistan in the 1980s; however, this influence dwindled later. They have supported *Taliban* with limited financial assistance. Besides, the Indian policy in Afghanistan is Pakistan-centered. India wants to limit Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan; therefore, it supported the *Northern Alliance* against the *Taliban*.¹⁴⁷ Thus various *ethnic* groups in Afghanistan have been fueled/supported by various neighbouring/regional/extra-regional states in 1980s and 1990s.

The *Taliban* and Ethnicity (1996-2001)

The *Taliban* rose to the political scene in Afghanistan as a military force in the summer of 1994.¹⁴⁸ They captured *Kabul* in September 1996,¹⁴⁹ Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, the only states in the world, recognized the *Taliban* government.¹⁵⁰ Iran, India, Russia, Turkey

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p 169.

¹⁴⁵ Khalilzad, 1997, p 48.

¹⁴⁶ Rais, 2008, pp 198-199.

¹⁴⁷ Khalilzad, 1997, p 52.

¹⁴⁸ Saikal, 2001, p 43.

¹⁴⁹ Rashid, 2001, p 48.

¹⁵⁰ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 151.

and four of the five Central Asia republics such as, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan backed the anti-*Taliban Northern Alliance* with arms and cash to try and halt the *Taliban*'s advance.¹⁵¹ Particularly Iran and the CARs shared a deep suspicion of Afghan-*Pashtun* fundamentalism due to support of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.¹⁵²

Apparently, the central tenet of the *Taliban* creed was to free Afghanistan from the control of *Mujahideen* parties, to establish an Islamic state based on Sharia law,¹⁵³ however, the endorsement of the system of *jirga* by the *Taliban*,¹⁵⁴ implied the embodiment of *Pashtun* culture and ethnicity. In other words, the *Taliban* movement embodied resurgence of *Pashtun* under a religious and charismatic leadership,¹⁵⁵ and despite a religious movement, driven by Islamic fundamentalism; the *ethnic Pashtun* undertone of the *Taliban* movement cannot be dismissed.¹⁵⁶ *Ethnicity* and *sect* played an active part during the *Taliban* regime. Some Afghan, and foreign observers described the *Taliban* as *Pashtun* nationalists, willing to revive a centralized *Pashtun*-dominated state in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁷ For non-*Pashtun*, *Taliban* characterized as a symbol of Islamic conservatism and *Pashtun* chauvinism, aimed at recapturing political power and reasserting its dominance.¹⁵⁸ *Taliban* suffered too, like the Islamists, from *ethnic* bias, polarization, however, they discarded any *ethnic* claim, pretended to represent the Afghan Muslim *millat* (nation).¹⁵⁹ The non-*Pashtun* criticized the *Taliban*'s social decrees, such as;

“in the areas under the *Taliban* government, every kind of wickedness and immorality, cruelty, murder, robbery, songs, and music, TV, VCR, satellite dish, immodesty (*be purdagi*), travelling (women) without a *mehram* (immediate blood related person), shaving of or trimming the beard, pictures and photographs, have all been totally banned”.¹⁶⁰

Ethnic politics and violence pursued in the *Taliban* regime. The *Taliban* did not share alliances with the non-*Pashtun* factions in power sharing arrangements; they mis-treated the Shiite in *Kabul*, in the *Hazarajat*, and in *Mazar Sharif*.¹⁶¹ In *Mazar Sharif*, in May 1997, the *Hazara* and *Uzbek*

¹⁵¹ Rashid, 2001, p 5.

¹⁵² Roy, 2001, p 200.

¹⁵³ Marsden, 2002, p 62.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p 66.

¹⁵⁵ Roy, 2001, pp 208-209.

¹⁵⁶ Rais, 2008, pp 2-3.

¹⁵⁷ Siddique, A., *Afghanistan's Ethnic Divides*. CIDOB, Barcelona, 2012. Retrieved from www.cidob.org/en/content/download/35203/.../OK_ABUBAKAR+SIDDIQUE.pdf, accessed on 12-4-2016.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p 3.

¹⁵⁹ Roy, 2001, p 208.

¹⁶⁰ Nojumi, 2002, p 154.

¹⁶¹ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 152.

forces collectively massacred some 600 *Taliban* in the north; hundreds of *Taliban* were shot dead, buried in mass graves by Masood's forces.¹⁶² The *Taliban*, in revenge, in 1998, treated the *Hazara* in *Mazar Sharif* most viciously; the *Hazara* men, women, children were massacred; even goats and donkeys were killed. The *Taliban* were ordered to kill for two hours, but they killed for two days. *Taliban*'s mullah, proclaiming from mosques, put three choices to Shia-*Hazara*: convert to Sunni Islam, leave for Iran, or face death.¹⁶³ *Taliban*'s policies accentuated the process of polarization of Afghanistan, already nascent along *ethnic*-linguistic lines.

Taliban replaced all senior *Hazara*, *Tajik* and *Uzbek* bureaucrats with inexperienced *Pashtun*. Governor, mayors, and police chiefs in *Kabul*, *Herat* and *Mazar Sharif* were appointed as *Pashtun*, who only spoke Pashto, not Dari, the *lingua franca* of the country.¹⁶⁴ After a month of capturing *Kabul* by *Taliban* in October 1996, the non-*Pashtun*, such as Masood (*Tajik*), Dostam (*Uzbek*), Karim Khalili (*Hazara*) had formed a Supreme Council for the Defense of the Motherland, declaring *Mazar Sharif* as capital. Within a month, Masood recaptured key positions along Salang Highway (Jabul Seraj, Bagram, and Chrikar), bringing fight within 20 kilometers of *Kabul*, forcing 50000 people to seek safety in *Kabul*. While tens of thousands of *Kabulis*, mostly *Tajik* and *Hazara*, fled for *Mazar Sharif* or Pakistan to escape *Taliban*'s arrests and reprisals,¹⁶⁵ leading to large scale ethnic cleansing. After defeating *Taliban* in *Mazar Sharif*, again the leaders of three major non-*Pashtun* ethnic groups such as, Masood (*Tajik*), Khalili (*Hazara*), and Maalik (*Uzbek*), formed a new alliance on June 13, 1997 called the *United National and Islamic Front for the Salvation of the Homeland*. Rabbani was reelected as President, with Masood as Defense Minister, declaring *Mazar Sharif* (North of Afghanistan) as capital.¹⁶⁶ Iran declared to support anti-*Taliban* Alliance and appealed to Russia, India and the Central Asia states to help them too. *Taliban* blamed Iran and Russia for support of the opposition.¹⁶⁷ Afghanistan remained divided between the *Taliban* (*Pashtun*) and the *Northern Alliance* (*Tajik*, *Uzbek*, *Hazara*) during the *Taliban* period. Severe *ethnic* and *sectarian* violence and conflicts occurred. The non-*Pashtun* alliances (1996, 1997) in the north were necessarily against the *Pashtun*-dominated *Taliban*.

For Conrad Schetter,¹⁶⁸ *ethnicity* remained a dominant argument in the war in Afghanistan, therefore the peace process initiated, after the fall of the

¹⁶² Rashid, 2001, pp 58-59.

¹⁶³ Rasanayagam, 2005, p 157.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p 191.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p 152.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p 155.

¹⁶⁷ Rashid, 2001, p 61.

¹⁶⁸ Acting Director, since 2002 at Center for Development Research (ZEF), Department 'Political and Cultural Change', Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn. Conrad started his academic career with studies on the impact of *ethnicity* on violent conflicts. He

Taliban regime, at the Bonn peace conference in 2001, was based on an *ethnic* representative government.¹⁶⁹

Post 9/11 Afghan Ethnicities

After the event of 9/11, the United States began to seek out allies in the region to destroy al-Qaeda, and crushing the *Taliban*. The Bush administration, choosing the *Northern Alliance* against bin Laden and the *Taliban*¹⁷⁰ attacked Afghanistan. Within a brief time span of two months, the *Taliban* regime was toppled. They fled *Kabul* and the major cities, the vacuum created, were filled by the forces of the *Northern Alliance*. After capturing *Kabul*, the *Northern Alliance*, dominated by *Tajik*, reincarnated the pre-*Taliban* bureaucracy dominated by *Shura-e Nazar Tajik*. The monopolization of power precluded the emergence of an *ethnically* balanced post-*Taliban* government. The dominance of military considerations within the U.S.-led coalition affected political developments, after the demise of the *Taliban*. The negotiations, on the structure of the new government, between the four major *ethnic* groups, at the UN sponsored conference in Bonn, were strongly influenced by the military situation on the ground. At Bonn, the hallmark of developments in Afghanistan was to restore *ethnic* balance to the government through a political process.¹⁷¹

Representatives of the key Afghan political, *ethnic*, and military factions, signed Bonn accord in December 2001, sponsored by UN, to establish a framework for the political reconstruction of Afghanistan.¹⁷² These were anti-*Taliban* delegates, or simply the *Northern Alliance*, occupying most of the space in the deliberations.¹⁷³ *Ethnicity* became the dominant theme in the Bonn conference due to the violent episodes of *ethnic* cleansing and ethnocide, in the 1990s: *ethnic* violence in *Kabul* during 1992-94; in the Shomali plains to its north during 1996-2001; in the Hazarajat

has published widely on local politics, *ethnicity*, and intervention policy in Afghanistan. His PhD Dissertation include *Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Afghanistan* (1997-2001).

¹⁶⁹ Schetter, C., *Ethnicity and the Political Reconstruction in Afghanistan*. Centre for Development Studies (ZEF), University of Bonn, Germany, accessed from eprints.lse.ac.uk/28376/1/Schetter_LSERO_version.pdf.

¹⁷⁰ Grossman, P., *Afghanistan in The Balance*. Source: Middle East Report, No. 221 (Winter, 2001), pp 8-15, accessed on 15-06-2016 from Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559333>.

¹⁷¹ Jalali, A. A., Afghanistan in 2002: The Struggle to Win the Peace. *Asian Survey*, 43(1), (January/February 2003), pp 174-185. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2003.43.1.174>, accessed on 15-6-2016.

¹⁷² Lyon, D.S. P., *A Solution for Ethnic Conflict: Democratic Governance in Afghanistan, A Case Study*, (Unpublished Masters. Thesis), University of Manitoba, 2006, p 191. Retrieved from www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/MWU/TC-MWU-298.pdf

¹⁷³ Rais, 2008, pp 125-126.

during 1998-2001; and in *Mazar Sharif* during 1997-1998.¹⁷⁴ Patterns of political affiliation by family, clan, *tribe*, village, *ethnicity*, and region often superseded relationships based on ideology or religion/*sect*. These patterns have been evident in every Afghan election since the fall of the *Taliban* regime.¹⁷⁵ The prominent members of *Northern Alliance* in the *Bonn Accords*, most notably, the *Punjsheri Tajik*¹⁷⁶ occupied key positions in the interim government in 2001: Younis Qanuni was selected as Interior Minister, General Fahim as Defense Minister, while Dr. Abdullah Abdullah as Foreign Minister. However, Hamid Karzai (*Pashtun*), though politically weak, was selected as the President of Afghanistan. The Cabinet included 11 *Pashtun*, 8 *Tajiks*, 5 *Hazaras*, and 3 *Uzbeks*, the remaining 3 were drawn from other minority *ethnic* groups.¹⁷⁷ This political change was unprecedented. The *Pashtun* political power was weakened again by the *Tajik* in Afghanistan. The *Tajik* have been the only *ethnic* group in Afghanistan who have defied *Pashtun* thrice (1929, 1992-94, 2001) in politics of the country. *Pashtuns* were unhappy with this *ethnic* imbalance in the government, hence, Hamid Karzai, later included 5 more *Pashtun* ministers.¹⁷⁸

The political power of non-*Pashtun* increased, while that of the *Pashtun* decreased after the fall of *Taliban*. *Ethnicity* emerged as a salient force due to *ethnic* violence perpetuated by the major *ethnic* groups in the 1990s. The post-*Taliban* government needed broad-based ethnically balanced parliament, to save the country from descending into *ethnic* war and chaos again. Thus, the Constitution of 2004 of Afghanistan recognized *ethnicity* as a dominant theme in the politics of Afghanistan. The rights of *ethnic* groups were recognized: articles 16, 35, and 135 of the Constitution (2004), guaranteed peace amongst the *ethnic* groups, safeguarding their relations. Recognizing the status of non-*Pashtun ethnic* languages, article 16 stipulates, thus,

“From amongst *Pashto*, *Dari*, *Uzbeki*, *Turkmani*, *Baluchi*, *Pashai*, *Nuristani*, *Pamiri* and other current languages in the country, *Pashto* and *Dari* shall be the official languages of the state. In areas where the majority of the people speak in any one of *Uzbeki*, *Turkmani*, *Pashai*, *Nuristani*, *Baluchi* or *Pamiri* languages,

¹⁷⁴ Siddique, A., *Afghanistan's Ethnic Divides*. CIDOB, Barcelone, 2012. Retrieved from www.cidob.org/en/content/download/35203/.../OK_ABUBAKAR+SIDDIQUE.pdf, accessed on 12-4-2016.

¹⁷⁵ Katzman, K., *Afghanistan: Politics, Elections and Government Performance*. Congressional Research Service. CRS Report for Congress. 2011, p 24. Retrieved from www.crs.gov, accessed on 12-03-2016.

¹⁷⁶ Rais, 2008, pp 126-127.

¹⁷⁷ Schetter, C., *Ethnicity and the Political Reconstruction in Afghanistan*. Centre for Development Studies (ZEF), University of Bonn, Germany. Retrieved from eprints.lse.ac.uk/28376/1/Schetter_LSERO_version.pdf.

¹⁷⁸ Rais, 2008, p 129.

*any of the aforementioned language, in addition to Pashto and Dari, shall be the third official language, the usage of which shall be regulated bylaw. The state shall design and apply effective programs to foster and develop all languages of Afghanistan. Usage of all current languages in the country shall be free in press publications and mass media. Academic and national administrative terminology and usage in the country shall be preserved.*¹⁷⁹

In cultivating democratic culture among the various *ethnic* groups, article 35 of the Constitution 2004, provides for the formation of political parties;

“To attain moral and material goals, the citizens of Afghanistan shall have the right to form associations in accordance with provisions of the law. The people of Afghanistan shall have the right, in accordance with provisions of the law, to form political parties, provided that:

1. Their manifesto and charter shall not contravene the Holy religion of Islam and principles and values enshrined in this constitution;
 2. Their organizations and financial resources shall be transparent;
 3. They shall not have military or quasi-military aims and organizations; and
 4. They shall not be affiliated with foreign political parties or other sources.
- Formation and operation of a party on the basis of *tribalism*, *parochialism*, language, as well as religious *sectarianism* shall not be permitted.

A party or association formed according to provisions of the law shall not be dissolved without legal causes and the order of an authoritative court.¹⁸⁰

Article 135 provides for assigning of translator in mother tongue in court’s cases to the various *ethnic* groups when they need it,

“If a party in lawsuit does not know the language, the right to know the materials and documents of the case as well as conversation in the court, shall be provided in the party’s mother tongue through a translator appointed by the court.”¹⁸¹

Thus, the Constitution (2004) of Afghanistan recognized *ethnicity* constitutionally and officially and proclaims equity.

Conclusion

Due to changes in the state and society in Afghanistan; the Constitution of 1964, the Soviet invasion, the ensuing war, and the foreign states’

¹⁷⁹ *The Constitution of Afghanistan*, Clause 16, 2004.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 35.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Article 135.

involvement, ethnicity, not only emerged, but became more salient in that specific socio-political Afghan milieu. The stirrings of politicization of ethnicity, initiated by *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions of *PDPA* in 1960s; aggravated further on ethnic and sectarian lines by the Afghan Resistance alliances, buttressed by foreign powers, Pakistan and Iran, in 1980s. The politicization and militarization of politicized ethnicities, during the 1980s, and the sudden flight of the Soviet Union and the United States from Afghanistan, in 1989, left the risen major ethnicities: *Pashtun*, *Tajik*, *Hazara*, *Uzbek*; to fight each other. This, not only, led to the most vicious ethnic war ever seen in Afghan history in 1990s, but led to ethnicisation of politics too. The fueling of ethnicity and sect by neighbouring-regional states, such as Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, India and Saudi Arabia further aggravated ethnic issues. The *Mujahiddeen* and *Taliban* were ostensibly religious regimes, professing not to recognize ethnicity, directed, ferocious fratricidal infightings, ethnic, cleansing and killings. The ethnic politics subdued, in the name of religion, qawm and sect, nevertheless an inherent ethnic undertone existed. Various ethnic based alliances, mainly non-Pashtun, to gain political power, in the 1990s emerged: such as, *Shura-ye Ali-ye Hamahangi* (1993), *Northern Alliance* (1996), and *United National and Islamic Front for the Salvation of the Homeland* (1997). These ethnic groups tried to weaken rivals to strengthen their own political power. However, the Communist regime under Najibullah (1987) and the Karzai government (2004), both made ethnicity constitutionally documented. The Constitution (1987) rejected all classifications on the basis of language, tribe, religion, race, and political ideology, and entitled every citizen to equal legal rights according to the law. The minorities' languages such as *Uzbeki*, *Turkmen*, *Baluchi*, and *Nuristani* were elevated to the status of national languages (*Dari*, *Pashto*), and the character of Afghanistan as the multi-ethnic state was recognized, these moves were unprecedented. Najibullah began even reconciliation efforts to bring ethnic groups at peace, and recognizing their role for national development. In the wake of two decades of ethnic warfare, the Constitution of Afghanistan (2004), recognized ethnicity, and the rights of various ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The present Constitution (2004) of Afghanistan, recognizes 14 ethnic groups such as; Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani, Aimaq, Arab, Kirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujar, and Brahui. Though ethnicity has become salient, recognized, officially and constitutionally, but still unresolved. Presently, the major ethnic groups are struggling hard to attain political power and influence in the state and society. Although, a National Unity Government of President Ashraf Ghani (Pashtun) and Chief Executive, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah* along with leaders of other ethnicities as vice

* Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, a Pashtun, is leading non-Pashtun of the north in Afghan politics.

Presidents, etc., have been formed, however, contest based on ethnic politics continues, if not mounting.

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RENTIER STATEHOOD, GROWTH OF CAPITAL AND STATE MAKING IN AFGHANISTAN

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Abstract

Taking the theoretical framework of rentier states, this paper attempts to understand the making and unmaking of the Afghan state in the light of growth of capital and statehood. In Europe, where the modern statehood concept first took shape, state making and growth of capital based on domestic resource extraction, coercion and legitimacy went hand in hand. Afghanistan's historical brush with state making suggests that unlike the European state making experience, the Afghan elite's failure to mobilize effectively domestic economic resources for financing state building needs led resultantly to a continuous dependence since its early days of inception on foreign sources of income, including tributes from outlying provinces and subsidies as well as development aid from regional and international power players. Economic problems compounded by harsh geographical terrain, low infrastructural growth, inept economic policies and persistent conflict provided a very low extractable base to the economy and gave a rentier character to the state income. Dependence on rentier income in turn, stunted bureaucratization and institutionalization, removed compulsion from rulers to develop effective state institutions and destabilized regimes when-ever rentier sources of income dried up. This paper argues that such rentier status of Afghan economy and polity continues unabated in the post 2001 period. With around 90% of the state budget contributed by foreign sources, the historical pattern of Afghanistan relapsing into conflict in the case of withdrawal of such rentier income presents a stark challenge to the current Afghan state builders.

Key Words: capital, rentier statehood, Afghan state making, state building, economy.

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Introduction

The introduction focuses on the question of how a rentier state is theorized in literature and what pathological disorders are associated with such a state. A rentier state's unearned income comes from either natural resources (oil rents as royalties, taxes, surpluses from state corporations), or from rents received for strategic purposes and in the form of military or development aid. The rentier statehood theory argues that rentier states fail to develop strong and stable bureaucracies and accountable, representative governments and suffer from a number of negative political and economic pathologies that increase their propensity to violent conflicts and wars.¹

Rentier income, it is argued, turns a state from extractive (extracts its operating revenue from the society) to distributive one (decides on rent distribution among groups), prohibits bureaucratic growth and discourages public participation in policy making and accountability mechanisms. Among rentier varieties, oil dependent regimes become more undemocratic and unaccountable because revenue comes from concentrated sources like few oil companies or public mining enterprises, making it difficult to ensure transparency in revenue and expenditure accounts. Jobs under such regimes, it is highlighted are distributed on patronage basis and concentrated in coercive apparatus including the police and army. These security forces are relied on by such regimes for arresting unrest, thereby prolonging the reign of authoritarian regimes. It is also argued that regimes in rentier states act in predatory ways and buy security by investing in patron client networks rather than through a social contract based on the exchange of public goods financed through domestic taxation. Since the major world powers interests are focused on strategic gains and oil, therefore such authoritarian regimes face less external pressures to liberalize. However, such regimes are vulnerable to instability, because their inability to patronize groups (especially dissident ones) during bust periods, when strategic interest diminishes or when oil revenues fall, bring their legitimacy into question. Resulting reduced coercive strength, unequal distribution of rent revenues in oil and development aid rents as spoils, may cause rebels to indulge in violent resistance against the regime.²

¹ Moore, M., "State Formation and Quality of Governance in Developing Countries" *International Political Science Review*, 25(3), July 2004, pp 304-308; Smith, B., "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999," *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(2), April 2004, pp 234-36; John, Jonathan di., "Oil Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A Critical Assessment." *Journal of Development Studies*, 43(6), 2007, pp 141-70; Wantchekon, L., "Why do Revenue Abundant Countries have Authoritarian Governments?": October 15, 2002. Retrieved from <http://www.afes-jad.com/2002/wantchekon3.pdf> accessed on March 17, 2009, and Woods, D., "Predatory Elites, Rents and Cocoa: A Comparative Analysis of Ghana and Ivory Coast," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 42(2), July 2002, pp 224-39.

² Ibid.

Economically, such states are afflicted by ‘Dutch disease’-oil raises a country’s value of currency, increases the prices of agricultural and manufacturing exports at the international level and discourages the viability of non oil economic sectors. This results in economy suffering even during boom periods. Non-transparency in oil transactions results in corrupt practices, negatively affecting resource allocation and investment and slowing economic growth. And dependence on single resource makes the economy vulnerable to price volatility at the international level.³

There are some scholars who raise limitations in the rentier state theory’s argument of oil dependent authoritarian regimes being less stable. Several state failure/fragility indexes place autocracies at a higher order of possessing stable state structures.⁴ Smith’s study, find longer durability for oil regimes and their stability, unaffected even during bust periods.⁵ Di John, criticizes the rentier theory’s assumption that natural resources may be managed, or owned individually. To him this ignores the aspect of collective actors imposing domestic conditionality over ruler’s power and authority. He cites figures to stress that low growth rates and corruption are not synonym to rentier states. For example in the period 1965-80, the average annual GDP growth of oil exporting economies was 6.7 % faster than the average figures for all developing countries except East Asia and the Pacific.⁶ More than natural resource rents, dependence on strategic rents in the form of foreign aid and development makes state’s stability dependent on major power’s interest in their strategic position. Withdrawal or absence

³ Ibid.

⁴ An interesting finding in the failed/ fragility indices is that entrenched autocracies are less vulnerable to instability than partial democracies (anocracies) and in some cases, full democracies. See Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) which brings out the Peace and Conflict Instability, Ledger. J., Joseph, H.J., Wilkenfeld, Ted R. Gurr, and B. Heldt, *Peace and Conflict 2012: Executive Summary*. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, Maryland, 2012, pp 7-12. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/executivesummary/exec_sum_2012.pdf, accessed March 15, 2013; and Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CFIP), which brings out the State Fragility Index. See David Carment, and Samy Yiagadeesen, *Assesing State Fragility: A Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Report*, CIFP, Carleton University, Ottawa (June 15, 2012), accessed March 12 2013, www.carleton.ca/cfip; CFIP, “Failed and Fragile States 2006: A Briefing Note for the Canadian Government” (November 2006); and CIFP, “Failed and Fragile States: A Concept Paper for the Canadian Government” (January 2006), Retrieved from <http://www.carleton.ca/cfip>, accessed on September 12, 2010.

⁵ When oil prices collapsed in 1986, patronage rents dried off by more than two-thirds, but regime stability was not affected in oil exporting countries, suggesting an investment not just in coercive apparatus but also other state building institutions. See Smith, “*Oil Wealth*,” pp 232-46.

⁶ Subjective corruption rates were also similar in mineral resource abundant and mineral resource scarce economies. See di John, “*Oil Abundance*,” pp 970-75.

of such interest is marked by rapid pulling out of rentier income, leading to destabilization in host states.

Rentier Statehood and Afghanistan

Though Afghanistan was born in 1747 to fill out the regional vacuum of power created by the decline of the Mughal (Indian) and Safavid (Persian) dynasties, under whose control it lingered for more than two hundred years before independence,⁷ its dependence on unearned external income has been perpetual. The socio-political milieu of the areas which constituted later day Afghanistan were impacted by successive and varied migrations, invasions and incorporations by empires, giving it religious heterogeneity and political and economic volatility.⁸ Greater political unity, cultural richness and trade growth accompanied the Arab conquest of Balkh and Herat in 650, but, absence of prolonged central government, wars and invasions and discovery of maritime routes between Europe and East, undermined its commercial position, declined its urban centres and resulted in power shifts to landed aristocracy and tribal chieftains.

Even before the 18th Century, administration of the areas that were to constitute later day Afghanistan were financed by the Mughal rulers of India (of which it constituted a part) from either the central treasury or from Punjab's finances. How the Afghan state attained a rentier status is not very complex to understand. The economic woes of the Afghan state can be traced to several centuries of war, repeated collapse of central governments, absence of uniform trade regulations and discovery of maritime routes between Europe and the East.⁹ It was created in 1747 with a very weak extractable base, which made the Popalzai- Durrani Kings to extort tributes from the outlying provinces to finance their governance needs. Over three fourths of the state's income around this time was extracted from the territories of Punjab and Kashmir.¹⁰ This state of affairs changed for the worse with the rise of Sikh and British power in Punjab and Peshawar, loosening Afghan Amir's control over outlying territories and its finances.

⁷ In the 17th and first half of 18th Centuries, regions lying South of Hindu Kush were under the Mughal control, whereas, Herat and Farah were largely held by the Safavids of Persia. See *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 1, (15th Ed.). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1979, p 174.

⁸ Some of the pre-Islamic invading empires included the Persian Achaemenid and Graeco Bactrian Kingdoms (6th to 2th Centuries B.C) and the Kushan Empire (1st Century B.C to 3rd Century A.D). See Gregorian, V., *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, p 13.

⁹ For a pre 1747 assessment of economic and social position of Afghan towns, such as Kandahar, Kabul, Jalalabad and Kunduz, see Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, pp 52-73.

¹⁰ Rubin, B.R., *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and collapse in the International System*. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1995, p 46.

The loss of finances was commensurate with weakening of patronage power of the king and resultant withdrawal of support by tribal chieftains destabilized regimes.

Capital and State Growth: The Sadozai/Popalzai and Muhammadzai/Barakzai Period

The Afghan state emerged in the wake of power vacuum created as a result of the Persian king Nadir Shah's assassination in October 1747. Ahmad Shah Abdali, one of Nadir's Afghan generals, was elected as the leader of the new Afghan tribal polity in a *Jirgah* (assemblage of tribal elders) meeting attended by Abdali chieftains.¹¹ A rudimentary structure of government was created in the very *Jirgah* meeting that selected Ahmad Shah as the emperor.¹² Despite lacking initial control over outlying territories and the relative autonomy exercised by the tribes, Ahmad Shah's polity is termed as an empire state, whose fluid boundaries kept on changing with new conquests.¹³ The legitimacy of the new state was traditional and charismatic, based on tribal support and religious ideology of divine rule. From the very beginning tribal interests were accommodated through granting of higher services in the state and other economic concessions, such as *jagir's* (non-revenue paying lands) exemption from taxes¹⁴, and distribution of war booty as spoils and patronage resources.¹⁵ This was supplemented with dependence on the religion for legitimizing Shah's rulership.

¹¹ For details on the *Jirgah* proceedings, see Misdaq, N., *Afghanistan: Political Frailty and Foreign Interference*. London : Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006, pp 40-45; Malleon, G.B., *History of Afghanistan: From the Earliest Period to the Outbreak of the War of 1878*. Peshawar: Saeed Book Bank, 1984, pp 272-275; and Singh, G., *Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of Modern Afghanistan*. Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1959, pp 24-28.

¹² The central government inspired by Persian model gave the Shah powers over civil and military matters, but these were exercised with consultation of *Majlis* (council), comprised of leading tribal chiefs. See, Malleon, *History of Afghanistan*, pp 276-277; and Singh, *Ahmad Shah*, pp 32-33 and pp 347-348.

¹³ In 1762, the Afghan empire included Kashmir, Sind, Baluchistan, and parts of Khurasan, which was next to Ottoman Empire, the largest state in the Middle East. See Noelle, C., *State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan 1826-1863*. Richmond Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997, p 2.

¹⁴ The non-Durrani tribes received insignificant amount of land, although, they had to provide 50-60% more soldiers than the Durrani. See Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, pp. 46-47.

¹⁵ *Jagirs* and tolls were paid to the frontier tribes of Afridis, Shinwaris, Yusufzais, Mohmands and others too, in return for allegiance and safe passage for Shah's army (into India). See Caroe, O., *The Pathans*. Karachi: Oxford University Press 1958, p 258.

The Afghan state under Sadozai/ Popalzai rulers failed to develop urban trading centers properly to serve extractable revenues to the centre. Its finance department headed by *Dewan Begi* (finance minister) handled direct and indirect finances from agriculture, irrigation, royal estates and others.¹⁶ The Shah's revenue powers were curtailed by tribal defiance in payment of land taxes; taxes collected by *Maliks* (village headmen) reached the state through tribal chieftains.¹⁷ Inability to extract taxes domestically made the *Durrani* Kings depend on extraction of tributes from outlying provinces; over three fourths of the state's income came from Indian territories of Punjab and Kashmir. Such dependence would change in the wake of rise of Sikh power in Punjab and Peshawar; loss of territory entailed loss of tributes, coupled with monarch's inability to raise domestic taxes on tribal land and trade income, weakened the patronizing power of the king and precipitated revolts in outlying districts. The loss of outlying provinces especially hid hard at the patronizing power of the ruling elite by narrowing of room for outward expansion and simultaneously of the resources to keep loyalties within king's person.

The Muhammadzai/Barakzai reign is characterized by a continuous dependence on tribal support for legitimacy, attempts by different Amirs at centralization and modernization, major power rivalry and a dependence on rentier income.¹⁸ Political legitimacy through tribal support was garnered by the distribution of state offices, tax exemptions and matrimonial alliances. After the first half of the 19th Century, Afghan rulers desperately felt the need to centralize the state, develop its coercive apparatus and initiate limited modernization reforms. Limited centralization and bureaucratization steps were initiated as a result. Such centralization needs were fulfilled from British subsidy. Afghan dependence on British subsidies was substantial in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. British practice of subsidizing Afghan rulers began as early as Shah Shujah's rule around the first quarter of 19th Century. Abdur Rehman's efforts at centralization, as well as building of his military might depended on an uninterrupted supply of British subsidy. The initial subsidy of 3,615,009 Indian rupees (1880-1881)¹⁹ was raised to 1.8 million after the formal demarcation of the Durand line in 1893. It jumped to 1.85 million in 1897, when the British and Russians forced the Amir to under-take the administration of Wakhan Corridor along the North-West

¹⁶ See Singh, *Ahmad Shah Durrani*, pp 348-49.

¹⁷ Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, p 48.

¹⁸ Dost Muhammad Khan initiated Muhammadzai/Barakzai dynasty in 1826, and ruled upto 1863, with a brief interregnum of three years 1839-1842, when the British support helped Shah Shuja (Sadozai/Popalzai) to regain his lost throne, which was again returned after the First Anglo Afghan War (1842) to Dost Muhammad (1843). On Dost Muhammad Khan's first reign and the first Anglo-Afghan War, see, Noelle, *State and Tribe*, 1-59; and, Iqbal, A., *Circumstances Leading to the First Afghan War*. Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1975.

¹⁹ Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, p 131.

border.²⁰ Subsidies from major powers eased modernization pains, but resulted in loss of independence and arbitrary boundary demarcation.

The Muhammadzai Amirs, including both Abdur Rehman and Habibullah subsidized centralization reforms through British subsidy. These centralization attempts included the development of standing army, centralized administration, a unified legal system, introduction of Kabuli rupee as a single monetary unit, construction of roads, encouragement of small scale industries, uniformity of customs duty and (limited) reforms in health and education.²¹ Abdur Rehman's success in centralizing the Afghan state came from taking subsidy for modernization attempts from foreign powers, but keeping ownership of domestic modernization efforts in his own person and authority. Habibullah's attempts to increase trade by standardizing custom duties and increasing trade with India and Russian Central Asia were frustrated by low levels of infrastructural growth, travel and trade restrictions.

A radical departure from the practice of dependence outside subsidy came in the period of Habibullah's son Amanullah. His regime sought legitimacy in Afghan nationalistic fervor for independence (from British control over Afghan foreign policy) and radical transformation of political, administrative and social milieu. He used the religious decree of Jihad against British (calling them infidels) for securing clerical and popular support in realizing the nationalistic dream of independence.²² However, independence was achieved at the price of British subsidy and acceptance by Afghan leadership of the Durand line border with India.

Amanullah's economic reforms included diversification of foreign trade, rationalization of commerce, development of small industries, and growth of hydro-electricity, telegraph, telephone, postal services and civil aviation. His rather radical social reforms saw establishment of primary and secondary schools, the first school for girls and female emancipation in encouraging women to appear in public without veils.²³ The success of such radical

²⁰ Rasanayagam, Angelo., *Afghanistan: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003, p 11. In 1883, a personal subsidy of 1.2 million Indian Rupees was granted to the Amir by the Government of India for initiating payments to troops and other measures for the defense of his North-West frontier border. See *Imperial Gazetteer of India, Afghanistan and Nepal*. Lahore, Sang-E-Meel Publications, 1979, p18.

²¹ For reform details, see Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, pp 134-57.

²² His successes in the Third Anglo-Afghan War (May to June 1919) made him a nationalist leader and gave him the confidence to initiate reforms on a wider scale than his predecessors. For Third Anglo Afghan war, see Adamec, L.W., *Afghanistan, 1900-1923 A Diplomatic History*. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969, pp 109-66.

²³ Saikal, A., *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival*. London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2006, p 74; and Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, pp 239-54.

reforms needed a steady supply of revenue to maintain tribal patronage and support by the locals, which had been sacrificed for the sake of independence. Amanullah laid emphasis on infrastructural development and rationalized tax and fiscal system. Through instituting property rights in arable land and pasture, a comprehensive cadastral survey of all lands, monetizing land taxes and selling state lands at cheap prices, he is credited with creating a new class of peasant proprietors.²⁴ However, these attempts at raising domestic heads of taxation and the simultaneous reduction in subsidies and privileges of tribal chiefs destabilized the polity. Military expenditure had been reduced and armed opposition supported by the clergy (upset over radical social reforms) could not be effectively subdued by a grossly reduced military, ultimately bringing down his regime. Amanullah's attempts at reducing their salaries and withdrawing other amenities created a demoralized army hardly suited to quell tribal rebellions.²⁵

The major source of state revenue under Muhammadzai Amirs was therefore British subsidy, followed by custom duty on imports, exports and goods in transit, taxes from non-Durrani tribes and indirect taxes on the Durrani tribes. Despite some tax reforms, the exemption of Pakhtuns, mostly Durrani tribes from taxation made the tax base fragile and limited.²⁶ A steady flow of British subsidy and limited domestic economic revival relieved the Afghan rulers from undertaking reformation of the taxation system on modern lines. However, a substantial decline in subsidies in Amanullah's time, without substantial domestic revenue mobilization hurt reform attempts and brought the downfall of the Sadozai/ Muhammadzai dynasty.

The unique geographical position as a buffer between Russia and British India was played upon shrewdly by Afghan Amirs to extract resources for centralization and administrative growth and for keeping loyalties of renegade tribes. On a positive note, these subsidies were utilized to strengthen coercive arm of the state, but ready supply of subsidy also relieved the Afghan rulers from the need to develop domestic sources of revenues. The vulnerability of Afghan state's dependence on these subsidies was put to test under Amanullah, who sacrificed British subsidy for the price of independence, but devoid of an alternative funding source, he had to impose new taxes, reduce tribal privileges and curtail military expenditure. These moves were highly destabilizing- resentment among tribal chiefs resulted in armed challenges to the central government, which could not be effectively subdued by a grossly neglected and reduced military. The geographical position of Afghanistan as a colonial periphery also affected

²⁴ Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, p 55; and Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan*, p 75.

²⁵ For military reforms, see Poullada, Leon B., *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan*, 1919-1929. London: Cornell University Press, 1973, pp 111-30.

²⁶ Taxes were collected in cash; foreign trade and handicrafts industry was encouraged and a new currency was instituted. See Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, pp 180-85.

the mindset of Afghan rulers. It made them highly suspicious of any attempts at outside intervention in modernization and reformation of the polity and society. Any external help in this regard was construed as an attempt to physically subjugate the Afghan people.²⁷

Capital and State Making 1933-2001

Limited modernization of the Afghan economy kick started in 1930's with the setting up of the first bank in Afghanistan,²⁸ expansion of small and medium industrial units, hydro-electric generation and construction of a motorable road through the Hindu Kush.²⁹ A small industrial capacity was created in 1930s and 1940s because of government's policy of allowing monopolies to industrialists and the banning of caravan trade.³⁰ Correspondingly, bureaucratic sector grew, reaching a figure of 40,000 by 1950.³¹ Lack of political will among the ruling elite to devise clear policies for capital accumulation and prioritization of infrastructural growth over industrial and agricultural growth led to stagnation in agricultural sector during 1957-1973. Shortages in bureaucratic capacity (no fiscal system and no statistical service in 1950) constrained growth; it reached a figure of 100,000 in 1970s, but the statistical office had only 250 employees.³² Mining and quarrying sectors were hampered by a lack of resources, inadequate transportation and production facilities and technical manpower. Daoud's dislike of industrial bourgeoisie led to nationalizations in the banking sector, decreasing capital accumulation and employment generation capacity of the industrial sector. His regime's failure to introduce

²⁷ One of the reasons why British offers of building a railway track across the Indian frontier into Afghanistan was resisted and turned down by Amir Abdur Rehman.

²⁸ The 1939, state owned, 'Da Afghanistan Bank' acted as the fiscal agent of the Ministry of Finance, controlled the Afghan currency and supervised foreign exchange transactions. Bank-i-Milli under Hashim's rule, invested private capital in 50 trading and industrial holding companies, including, cotton textile mills, ceramic, cement plants, rugs etc. See Dupree, L., *Afghanistan*. Karachi: Oxford University, 2002, First published in 1970, pp 471-474; and Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, pp 367-70.

²⁹ Improvement in communications led to modest rise in domestic and international trade of karakul, fruits, grain, cotton and wool. See Gregorian, *Emergence of Modern Afghanistan*, pp 367-70.

³⁰ Industrial sector stimulated 40,000 new jobs (1930-1950). See Antonio, G., "Afghanistan: Transition Without End An Analytical Narrative on State-Making," Working Paper 40, Development as State Making-Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, Crisis States Research Centre, November 2008, 8, accessed September 9, 2011, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/Publications/phase2papers.aspx>.

³¹ Giustozzi, *Afghanistan*, p 17.

³² *Ibid.*, pp 17-19.

meaningful land reforms and issues of corruption in Rural Development Board (landlords transferred excess lands to dependents and relatives) brought stagnation in agricultural sector growth rates. There were repeated famines and food emergencies.³³ The only sector that witnessed some growth after 1960 was the trading sector. This resulted from improved infrastructure especially roads. But the prospects of substantial revenues from trading sector were constrained by low growth in communications, stagnant agriculture and high costs of domestic caravan trade.

Lack of domestic revenue mobilization led to dependence (1958-1968, and in the 1970) on foreign aid and sale of natural gas to the Soviet Union.³⁴ Soviet help was substantial in financing the five year development plans during Daoud and Zahir Shah's regime.³⁵ Such a rentier income stunted bureaucratization and institutionalization, as the ruling elite felt little obligation to respond to society's needs. In 1967-68 and 1970-71, foreign loans and grants fell by over 50 percent, from roughly \$62 million a year to about \$ 27.5 million.³⁶

The PDPA regime under Karmal was highly dependent on Soviet aid, not only for developmental, but also coercive build up expenditure. Under PDPA, taxes were mostly indirect and financed only a quarter of government expenditure. Land taxes from the rural areas had decreased sharply because of a loss of control over the countryside. After 1988, there was deepening of financial crisis due to loss of control over some custom check posts to resistance groups, suspension of natural gas exports to the Soviet Union and subsidy provision to commanders defecting from resistance groups. This led Najibullah's government to borrow from the Central Bank, increasing debt-financed expenditure and fuelling inflation by 30-40 %.³⁷ The increase in value of banknotes in circulation up to 45 % every year resulted in inflationary pressures on prices, especially of food items.³⁸ War gave extensive physical damage to Afghanistan- killings (876,825), disability (1.5 million), displacement (6 million) and destruction of infrastructure and roads.³⁹ The drying up of external financing for

³³ Emadi, H., *State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan*. Praeger: Publishers, 1990, pp 67-68.

³⁴ Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, p 65.

³⁵ The Soviet Union provided \$ 126.9 million during the First Five Year Plan (1957-61), \$ 258.3 million during the Second Five Year Plan (1963-1967), and \$ 126.3 million during the Third Five Year Plan (1968-72). See Emadi, *State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan*, p 56.

³⁶ Arnold, Anthony *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism Parcham and Khalq*. Stanford University: Hoover Press Publications, 1983, p 27.

³⁷ Rubin, *Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, pp 163-164.

³⁸ Rubin, "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan", *World Development* 28, no. 10 (2000), pp 1792-1793.

³⁹ 60 % of Afghan schools by 1990 had no building, agricultural production fell by 50%, trade deficit in 1990 rose to \$ 649 million, foreign debt to \$ 5.1 billion and inflation pushed up

resistance after 1992 made control over external trade and state lands a prized possession. Lack of central authority led to the growth of shadow economy that developed a network of contacts across neighboring countries. War, displacement and destruction of assets intensified socio-economic conflicts, especially crisis in property relations at the local level.⁴⁰ Land disputes were heightened in the wake of refugee repatriation after 2001 and served to increase social disruption and conflict among groups and families.

Geographical and infrastructural constraints limited Afghan Amir's attempts at extracting revenue from domestic economy. The land locked status of the Afghan state was also constraining efforts by the Afghan Amirs for developing a self sufficient economy. The land of Afghanistan lacked the requisite productivity for developing a self reliant economy due to relative deficiencies of water resources and lack of navigable rivers—a feature of its landlocked status. Its topography (rocky mountains, difficult passes) complicated the task of bringing the tribes under one central government; all the pre-modern dynasties faced problems in subduing Afghan people and retaining their areas for long. In post 1747 period, its harsh terrain has created structural problems in the way of keeping communications and contact open and fluid between groups and regions by raising costs of laying infrastructural overheads, such as roads, etc. This in turn, depressed state's extraction of resources from domestic economy, complicated industrial and trade growth and increased dependence on agriculture. More than 50 % of Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in pre-war period (before 1978) was contributed by agriculture and around 80 % of its population depended on it, directly or indirectly as a source of income. Afghanistan's geography made it a landlocked country, dependent on its neighbours for successful passage of its imports and exports, a weakness that Pakistan has too often exploited to its advantage and Afghanistan's disadvantage. Its location has made it a centre of struggle between competing major powers, between Britain and Russia the 19th and early 20th Centuries. The demarcation of Afghanistan's boundaries under major power influence divided its ethnicities across multiple neighboring states, created problems in elite's attempts at promoting national integration and encouraged cross border interference by neighbouring states in its domestic politics, becoming pervasive in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and reaching its peak in the civil war following the 1992 fall of the PDPA

prices by 980 percent. See Maley, W., *The Afghanistan Wars*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp 154-157.

⁴⁰ For example, Ahmadzai Pakhtun *kuchi* (nomadic) and Pakhtun landlords lost their pastures and agricultural lands in Northern steppes when Hazaras reclaimed these and Kandahari and Herati landlords lost land control to their tenants. There the ulema's distributed lands to martyr's families. See Rubin, "*Political Economy*", 1799.

regime. Foreign interference is a major factor preventing stabilization of the Afghan state in the last few decades.

Afghanistan's physical environment and ecological conditions have also determined the nature of local interaction of local groups with the central authority. The basic unit organizing political and social life for the Afghans is the tribe— a larger kinship group unified through belief in a common descent. One of the major governance problems for Afghanistan has been the relationship of the tribe with the state and the difficulties of extending centralized control over tribal autonomy. The State and tribe in Afghanistan have existed in a relationship of mutual existence and coexistence, though the relationship has come under considerable strain. Under early Afghan rulers, the tribe supported the state for the favours bestowed on it by the king's person. The state on its part tried to control and centralize the tribes through different mechanisms, including: distribution of state titles and other concessions (complementary relationship); appointment of non-Pakhtun and non royal state officials, administrators and governors; reducing dependence on tribal protection by appointment of personal guards from smaller Durrani tribes and from among Shiite Qizilbash as Ghulamishah's-the king's slaves (contending); creation of new administrative divisions-provinces, districts and sub districts, not conforming to ethnic or tribal divisions; transferring of rebellious Pakhtun tribes to Northern Afghanistan for surrounding these by hostile ethnicities and for making these loyal supporters of the central government; and use of coercive apparatus of the state against recalcitrant and rebellious tribes (conflictual). These shrewd policies reflected attempts by Afghan rulers at state making independent of tribal manipulation. The state kept tribal energies in check, either by engaging these in external expeditions and invasions, or by giving these a taste of power sharing, through appointments in state offices and decision making bodies.

Tribal quest for domination over the state was also kept in check by developing coercive apparatus/ standing armies ready for use against rebellious ambitions. In instances, where growth of coercive apparatus was willfully neglected (in Amanullah's time), the state found it highly problematic to control and suppress tribal upheavals against state authority. Conversely, the state has often relied on rival tribes to put down tribal uprisings, just when the central army failed in its attempt to do so. Such tribal *lashkars* have provided support and stability to central government, on army's failure to quell tribal insurgency. This is paradoxical, for tribe has become an ally of the state in the fight against another tribe, which tried asserting its autonomy through violent means. The state also dealt with tribal fervor of autonomy by decentralization of authority and decision making to local level non-state mediators. It confined its functions to a minimalist

maintenance of order, collection of taxes and conscription of soldiers.⁴¹ Resultantly, a complex pattern of Afghan society's overlapping solidarity obligations have emerged, from not just the tribe, but also family, village and religiously defined local communities; which altogether have frustrated state's centralized control beyond its urban centres.⁴²

While these geographical and infrastructural constraints carried into the 20th Century, defective economic policies also did not help. Under Musahibeen rulers, limited industrial growth was stimulated through creating small and medium sized industries, a modest banking apparatus and some communication networks. A small entrepreneur class began to emerge and trading sector also witnessed growth. But lack of clear policies to help grow capital accumulation and industrial sector for extended period, coupled with low growth priority to a stagnant agricultural sector and stunted bureaucratic capacity, served as major constraints in generating substantial revenues from domestic economy. Rentier dependence continued unabated into the 20th Century. Under Musahibeen rulers, from 1958-1968, and in 1970s, major share of the financial expenditure was covered by foreign aid and sale of natural gas to the Soviet Union.⁴³ The Soviet help was also significant in the financing of five year development plans during Daoud and Zahir Shah's regime. Karmal's regime had a heavy dependence on Soviet aid, over 60 percent of the total government expenditure came from rentier income.⁴⁴

Loss in external revenue income meant the rulers found it increasingly difficult either to sponsor developmental needs or keep allies support. This happened in 1967-68 and 1970-71, when foreign loans and grants fell by over 50 percent, from roughly \$62 million a year to about \$ 27.5 million.⁴⁵ By 1992, Najibullah's regime also fell with the drying up of foreign Soviet subsidy. An additional outgrowth of dependence on foreign finances emerged after 1992. The drying up of external sources of finances for warring parties involved in the Afghan civil war (1992 onwards) led them to look out for and control other illegal revenue generating sources, for example, control over trade in black and grey markets. There was a resultant grow of shadow economy, which has developed a network of contacts across neighboring countries. War further hastened the distance between central

⁴¹ Thomas, B., and N. Nojumi, "Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability" *Middle East Policy* 17(4), (Winter 2010), pp 40-52.

⁴² Wimmer, A., and Schetter, C., "Putting State Formation First: Some Recommendations for Reconstruction and Peace-Making in Afghanistan" *Journal of International Development* 15 (2003), pp 529-535.

⁴³ Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, p 65.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p130.

⁴⁵ Arnold, *Afghanistan*, p 27.

state and its control over provincial and peripheral administrations. In 1990s, the provincial set-ups, for example under Rabbani's Jamait-e Islami government exercised considerable financial independence from the centre.⁴⁶ Such a pervasive development had a long term impact on Afghan state building in post 2001 period.

Rentier Statehood and Post-2001 Afghanistan

The rentier status of Afghan polity and economy continues unabated in the post 2001 period. A large number of donors are financing the state building project in Afghanistan. Among these donors, the US, Canada, the EC, Germany, Japan, the UK and the WB are the largest ones contributing 90% of all external support. This dependence on foreign funding for state building projects has increased with each passing year. Official overseas development assistance by OECD members to Afghanistan climbed from US \$ 87 million in 2000 to US \$ 2.2 billion in 2005. Aid flow amounts to more than 50 % of Afghanistan's GDP.⁴⁷ But more recent figure show aid contribution to GDP to climb up to 75 %, which is highest in the world⁴⁸ and of the total national budget, 89 % contributed from foreign sources (2008).⁴⁹

Such dependence on foreign funding for domestic institution building has raised serious doubts over the financial sustainability of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), especially the Afghan National Army (ANA), which is hugely debated and the Afghan National Police (ANP). The US stands out as the major donor of the ANA; out of its total investment of \$ 25.2 billion in the Afghan Security Forces Fund (up to April 2010), half have been spent on ANA. Besides, 46 National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and non-NATO nations have donated \$ 822 in equipment to the ANSF.⁵⁰ With a GDP of \$ 11 billion and an annual federal budget of \$ 4 billion, mostly sponsored by foreign aid, the issue of sustaining a big ANA

⁴⁶ The issue of tax returns to the central government had estranged relations between Ismail Khan of Herat and Jamiat's top leadership in Kabul.

⁴⁷ In absolute terms, the US is by far the largest donor, contributing one third of all aid since 2001. See Goodhand, J., and Sedra, M., "Who Owns the Peace: Aid, reconstruction and peace building in Afghanistan." *Disasters* 34,(3), 2010, p 84.

⁴⁸ Ministry of Finance, *Development Cooperation Report 2012*, (n.d.), 6. Retrieved from <http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/2013/Development%20Cooperation%Report%20>, accessed April 2, 2013.

⁴⁹ See "UNDP and UNDF Draft Country Programme Document for Afghanistan 2010-2013," (United Nations, 7 April 2009. Retrieved from <http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/2010-2013CPD/UNDDPAFG>, accessed April 2, 2013.

⁵⁰ See, "A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army." International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 190, May 12, 2010, 2. Retrieved from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190%20A%20Force%20in%20Fragments%20-%20Reconstituting%20the%20Afghan%20National%20Army.ashx>, accessed June 2, 2012.

assumes grave proportions, especially in the wake of reduction in foreign aid and subsidy.⁵¹ Other figures note security sector expansion equaling 500 % of domestic revenues in fiscal year 2004-05, raising serious concerns about its financial sustainability. Goodhand and Sedra, rightly express fears about the danger of state collapsing in the face of external budgetary support to the Security Sector Reforms declining after foreign state builders exit. They give a historical pattern of Afghan state's patronage networks decline associated with waning discipline and integrity in the armed forces and resultant vulnerability to internal political pressures.⁵² This financial dependence unfortunately is universally common to other institutions. Suhrke and Borchgrevink note an overwhelming dependence of the judicial sector on foreign assistance.⁵³

The failure to raise domestic sources of income in legal means has led to the rise of a shadow economy in Afghanistan. This shadow economy created by drug and trade in other contraband items has spread its tentacles across its borders. Almost 30 % of Afghanistan's GDP is contributed in the post 2001 period by opium production and trafficking,⁵⁴ with adverse impacts on the stability and cohesion of the state. Other figures cite almost 60 % of the GDP contributed by opium cultivation and export.⁵⁵ Additionally bulk of the economic activity- around 80-90 % is informal, decentralized and fragmented. There was a growth of non-drug related economy by 15 % from 2002-06 but it dropped to 6 % in 2006-07 because of increased petroleum and food prices and a renewed draught.⁵⁶

Afghanistan's vital economic statistics including its Human Development Indicators (HDI) militate against its rise as self sufficient rentier free economy. Its rural population is currently estimated at 75 % of the country's 30 million people.⁵⁷ Though 80 % of the labor force is

⁵¹ Younossi, O., Thruelsen, P.D., Vaccaro, J., Solinger, J.M. and Grady, B., "The Long march: Building an Afghan National Army," Santa Monica, CA., *Rand Corporation Report*, 2009, p 26.

⁵² Goodhand and Sedra, "Who Owns the Peace," p 88.

⁵³ In 2007, 90 % of the official funds came from foreign sources, excluding the three-quarters aid bypassing it and disbursed in the field by aid agencies. See Suhrke, A., and Borchgrevink, K., "Negotiating Justice Sector Reform in Afghanistan," *Crime Law and Social Change* 51(2), 2009, p 213.

⁵⁴ Canas, V., *Governance Challenges in Afghanistan: An Update* NATO Parliamentary Assembly Special Report. October 2011, 12. Retrieved from <http://www.nato-pa.int>, accessed March 12, 2012.

⁵⁵ Goodson, L.P., "Lessons of Nation Building in Afghanistan," In *Nation Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, edited by Francis Fukuyama. Baltimore, M.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, pp 154-155.

⁵⁶ Goodhand and Sedra, "Who Owns the Peace," p 80.

⁵⁷ Barfield, T. and N. Nojumi., "Bringing More Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability," *Middle East Policy* 17(4), Winter 2010, p 43.

employed by the agriculture sector, however, unemployment ratios stand at 40%.⁵⁸ Afghanistan's poor macro-economic and social indicators are complicating its economic revival. Only 23 % population has access to safe drinking water, 12 % to adequate sanitation and 6 % to electricity. Infant mortality is 115 per 1000 live births, life expectancy is 44 years and illiteracy ratio is 71%.⁵⁹ Afghanistan weak economic characteristics not only give it a rentier status, but also place inroads in the re-integration of former combatants into Afghan economy. Institutional ineffectiveness at the central and local level and ineffective implementation of reforms makes economic stimulation hard. The unemployment ratio between 18-25 year age groups, ranges from 39 % in the Central region to 19 % in the Western region. Lack of human capacity translates into very low literacy rates. According to UNICEF, 71% of the over-all population of Afghanistan and 92 % of the females remain illiterate in rural areas.⁶⁰ These human resource deficiencies are a further obstacle in the economic revival of Afghanistan. The main drivers of the economy consist in shadow economy (production, smuggling of narcotics) or money pumped by foreign intervention in the economy. The Government expenditure is 19.1 % of the GDP and its revenues are barely 7 % of the GDP.⁶¹ The economic problems compounded for refugees returning home in post 2001 period. UNHCR, reports 46 % of the returning refugees facing housing problems and 28 % facing problems related to stable income.⁶² These economic realities paint a rather disappointing scenario for Afghanistan's future as a rentier free state and makes the task of state building from indigenous resources very arduous and problematic for the current state builders.

Conclusions

This paper argued that the state of Afghanistan since its very inception in 1747 has seen massive dependence on capital from unearned sources including tributes from outlying areas, subsidies and foreign development aid. On a positive note, the reliance of Afghan regimes on flow of income from external sources helped to initiate and sustain centralization and modernization reforms. But such dependence on rentier income adversely impacted the growth of Afghan state. Dependence, for example, on British subsidy cost the Afghan state its independence over external matters and

⁵⁸ Guistozi, A., "Afghanistan: Getting Worse Before Getting Better?". United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Emergency Preparedness and Response Section EPRS, June 2009, p 2.

⁵⁹ Goodson, "Lessons of Nation Building," pp 154-155.

⁶⁰ Chrobok, V., *Demobilizing and Reintegrating Afghanistan's Young Soldiers: A Review and Assessment of Program Planning and Implementation*. Bonn International Center for Conversion BICC, 2005, pp. 10,13.

⁶¹ Guistozi, "Afghanistan: Getting Worse," p 2.

⁶² Ibid, p13.

turned it into a buffer between major power politics in the region. A continuous supply of subsidy and limited attempts at economic revival relieved the Afghan rulers from undertaking reformation of the taxation system on modern lines. Conversely, a withdrawal of external subsidies under king Amanullah, without alternate development of domestic revenue base hurt implementation of his reforms, turned the tribal chiefs hostile on withdrawal of privileges and weakened the military, ultimately bringing his regime down.

The paper further argued that Afghan ruler's attempts at modernizing the economy led to the growth of a nascent industrial and banking sector and modest growth in education. However, low levels of domestic resource extraction made the elite take recourse to external funding, giving a rentier character to state income. War further damaged the fragile economy and the drying up of external funding sources to resistance parties led to the emergence of robber barons and warlords, who monopolized trade and taxes over trade in illegal and contraband items. Rentier economy stunted bureaucratization and removed compulsion from rulers to develop effective state institutions.

In the realm of capital, non-development of domestic heads of revenue has been the most ceremonious failure of the Afghan elite. Economic problems were compounded by harsh geographical terrain, low infrastructure growth, bad economic policies and lack of trust over industrial bourgeoisie by the Afghan elites. Non-extraction of domestic sources of income led to the growth of rentier statehood in Afghanistan. This rentier statehood which has been a major destabilizing factor in the past has continued to dominate present day Afghanistan. In the post 2001 period, rentier statehood has assumed alarming proportions; especially the complete dependence of security establishment on foreign income has raised issues over its viability and the stability of Afghan state in general. The Geographical and ecological features still militate against the creation of a strong and self sufficient economy to serve revenue generation purpose of the Afghan state.

The new institutions of Afghan state building are heavily rentier dependent. Serious concerns are shown over the financial sustainability of the ANA, and other security sector institutions, expenditure on which at one time climbed 500 % of domestic revenues. It sets in motion the classic pattern of state failure in Afghanistan. Historically, rentier income has proved quite destabilizing for Afghan regimes and when ever, there was a reduction in such income, the regime in power was destabilized. Afghanistan's geographical constraints in rocky mountains, difficult passes and harsh terrain has complicated state builder's goal of centralizing regions and groups under a centralized rule and in raising the cost of laying

infrastructure has also depressed extraction of resources from domestic economy. These geographical constraints continue to inhibit the state building goals in post 2001 period. With 75 % population concentrated in rural areas, 80 % labour force employed in agriculture, unemployment ratio standing at 40 %, life expectancy, and illiteracy among the lowest in the world and drug economy constituting more than 30 % of the population, it is hardly surprising that human development indicators impose double constraints on the state building project. On the one hand, there is not enough capable population in terms of education and technical expertise to run the state successfully and on the other hand, such deficiencies engage a large amount of state resources for spending on the removal of such deficiencies.

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF INDIAN MUSLIMS IN DEVELOPING PRINT MEDIA AND SPREADING ENLIGHTENMENT IN AFGHANISTAN (1870-1930)

Sarfraz Khan Noor Ul Amin***

Abstract

It is generally believed that invaders, men of letters and religion, from Afghanistan, have significantly influenced the course of history in India. The contribution of Indians, especially Muslims, in spreading knowledge, enlightenment and modernization in Afghanistan did not attract much scholarly attention. This paper attempts to highlight the contribution of British Indian Muslims towards dissemination of knowledge, enlightenment and information in Afghanistan, while working for Afghan newspapers and periodicals in 1870- 1930. Qazi Abdul Qadir Yousafzai Peshawari, the Chief Editor of Shamsul Nahaar; Mauolvi Najaf Ali, Sub-Editor of Sirajul Akhbar; Allah Nawaz, Assistant Editor of Ethihad-i Mashriqi; Fazal Mahmud Makhfi, translator (Pashto, English) of Daily Anees, and Etihad-e-Mashriqi; and Muhammad Hussain, calligrapher, Toloe-Afghan, and Director magazine, Habibul Islam, included some of those personalities who pioneered and assisted in developing print media to promote enlightenment and modernization in Afghanistan.

Key Words: Indian Muslims, enlightenment, Shamsul Nahaar, Sirajul Akhbar, Etihad-e-Mashraqi, Anees, Indian Muslims' Contributions: liberalism, modernism, constitutionalism, democracy, and nationalism.

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Introduction

Afghanistan, in the second half of the nineteenth century, faced numerous internal and external challenges. Overall backwardness and tribal formation coupled with lack of strong centralizing authority had given birth to several factions in the country. The Afghan government and intelligentsia of that time felt increased and urgent need to develop modern means of communications to unite and put the country on path of progress. Print media especially newspapers, journal, magazines and periodicals had already been playing a positive role in disseminating information and enlightenment in the adjoining British India since long (1780s). Afghan government did realize importance and role of print media in awakening the masses and raising enlightenment but lacked professionals and experts along with technical equipment. Indian Muslims were instrumental in resolving problem of professional expertise by offering services to Afghan print media and enthusiastically worked for various newspapers and periodicals as editors, sub-editors, assistant-editors, managers, translators and calligraphers in Afghanistan.

This paper briefly discusses enlightening/modernizing role of some Indian Muslims working for the British Indian and Afghan newspapers and periodicals appearing during 1870-1930. It sheds light on role of Indian Muslims in awakening Afghans by citing services of five leading Indian Muslims who specifically spread printed word. They include: Qazi Abdul Qadir Yousafzai Peshawari (1841-1913); Mauolvi Najaf Ali (1860-1950); Allah Nawaz (1880-1935), Fazal Mahmud Makhfi (1882-1935), and Muhammad Hussain (1883-1939).

Print Media in Colonial India: Prelude to Afghan Printed Word (1780s-1830s)

In 1757, the East India Company became a formidable power in the Indian Sub-continent following the victory in Battle of Plassey.¹ The need of new rulers for day to day information resulted in the emergence of the first newspaper in the region. Mr. James Augustus Hicky, an employee of the East India Company, in 1780, launched an English language newspaper, *Hicky Gazette*, published from Calcutta² (now Kolkata). Following disagreement between Mr. Hicky and the East India Company, within a

¹ British rule in India is conventionally described as having begun in 1757. On June 23rd of that year, at the Battle of Plassey, a small village and mango grove between Calcutta and Murshidabad, the forces of the East India Company under Robert Clive defeated the army of Siraj-ud-daulah, the Nawab of Bengal.

² Ajmal, M., *Sahafat Soba Sarhad May*. Qaumi Publishers, Lahore 1980, p10.

year, the company closed the *Hicky Gazette*,³ instead launched, *The India Gazette*, in 1781.⁴ Many more newspapers emerged in the area during subsequent decades, however, the first local language newspaper, *The Bengal Gazette*, appeared in 1816.⁵

The first Urdu newspaper, *Jam-e-Jahan Numa*⁶ appeared in 1822, originally published, in Persian, was subsequently supplemented in Urdu. The first Muslim-owned newspaper had been *Aine-i Sikandari*⁷, published from Calcutta, in 1831, under supervision of Mirza Ghalib and edited by *Maulvi* Sirajuddin Ahmad Lukhanavi.⁸ It was followed by *Meh-i-alam Afroze*⁹ from Calcutta, edited by *Maulvi* Wahaj-ud-din. In 1835, two Persian language newspapers: *Ludhiana Akhbar*¹⁰ from Ludhiana and *Sultan-ul-Akhbar*¹¹ from Calcutta appeared. *Maulvi* Sayyed Muhammad Khan, elder brother of Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan, published a newspaper *Zubdet-ul-Akhbar* from Agra in 1837.¹²

These pioneering newspapers and periodicals in history of print media of this region played an important role in spreading enlightenment, modernization, political awareness and became major source of influencing leaders and interests of particular communities.

Print Media in Frontier Region and Punjab,¹³ Adjoining Afghanistan (1840s-1860s)

Printed word in the region now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, former NWFP, appeared for the first time in 1853. Earlier, Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780-1839) appointed news writers/reporters to collect local and international news, in various parts of the Punjab that included the Frontier

³ Omer, A., *A History of Press in N.W.F.P.* Sadiq Commission Agency, Khyber Bazar Peshawar 1986, p 27.

⁴ Ibid., p 29.

⁵ Rahman, J.U, *Press History of NWFP up to 1947*. Unpublished M.A Thesis. Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1999, p 15.

⁶ With the advent of the printing press and western journalism after the establishment of British government in Bengal, a brainy entrepreneur of Calcutta, Hari Har Dutt, floated the first Urdu newspaper under the title of "*Jam-i-Jahan Numa*" (a Persian term meaning Mirror of the World) in March 1822, just six years after the first short-lived Bengali journal, "*Bengal Gazette*" was published.

⁷ Yousafi, A. B., *Sarhad awr Jaddo Jihad-e-Azadi (Urdu)*. Markazi Urdu Board, Lahore 1968, p 143.

⁸ Khurshid, A. S., *Sahaf Pakistan-o-hind may (Urdu)*, Maktabe Karwan, Lahore nd, p 71.

⁹ Ibid., p 75.

¹⁰ Pushkalawati, I.U.R., *Dictionary of Mass Media and Journalism*. Unpublished p139.

¹¹ Ibid., p 140.

¹² Retrieved from <http://www.milligazette.com/news/1196-birth-of-urdu-journalism-in-the-indian-subcontinent-news>, accessed on 20-11-2015.

¹³ Punjab till 1818, remained a part of the Durrani Empire established by Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1747. It was then taken over by Sikh ruler Maharaja Rageet Singh. The Sikh rule ended in 1849 by the East India Company.

region and Afghanistan too. The reporters stationed at Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Kabul, Herat and other places in Afghanistan served as correspondents to his *Punjab Akhbar*.¹⁴ Major sources to collect news for *Punjab Akhbar* had been trade caravans and travelers. Battles between locals and Sikh government or infighting got much coverage in this newspaper.¹⁵ In 1849, East India Company defeated Sikhs and took control of the region including Punjab.¹⁶ Meanwhile opposition and hostility to rule of East India Company continued to grow and resulted in the uprising of 1857.

Allah Baksh Yusufi¹⁷ (1900-1968), in *Sarhad aur Jadujahd-e-Azadi*, claims that “around 1849, a newspaper had been publishing in this region”.¹⁸ He fails to cite its title and exact date of publication. Files of *Mutiny Reports*¹⁹ exhibit that in 1857, a newspaper publishing from Peshawar, had been forced to close down due to alleged links with mutineers.²⁰ In 1853, an Urdu Weekly *Murtazai*,²¹ edited by Haji Karam Ali Sherazi, appeared from Peshawar. Karam Ali, originally from Persia, settled in Peshawar²² and owned *Murtazai* Printing Press.²³ The *Murtazai* reached not only influentials of Punjab and Delhi but also as far as Kabul, Rampur and Banaras. The first page carried

¹⁴ A complete record of the work of the news writers, correspondents and journalists is available in the Punjab Akhbar of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. An English translation of these newsletters has been given by Mr. Ganda Singh, former Director of Archives, Patiala, in his book the *Punjab Akhbar*. The collection carries hundreds of newsletters written by correspondents of the *Punjab Akhbar*, stationed at Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Kabul, Herat and other places in the frontier region and Afghanistan.

¹⁵ Ajmal, M., *Sahafat Soba Sarhad May*. Qaumi Publishers, Lahore 1980, p 27.

¹⁶ Omer, A., *A History of Press in N.W.F.P.* Sadiq Commission Agency, Khyber Bazar Peshawar 1986, p 47.

¹⁷ Allah Bakhsh, son of Muhammad Sharif Jan, was born on 25th December, 1900 at Karim Pura, Peshawar city. Mohammad Sharif Jan, originally from Ghazna, Afghanistan was more interested in Afghan politics than that of India and paid frequent visits to Peshawar. Following defeat of his political faction in Afghanistan, he fled Afghanistan for Peshawar. His great grand-father, Yousaf Khan, held a house each in Peshawar and Ghazna, known in Afghan terminology, “DwaKora” (dual house). Later, his son Niaz Muhammad Khan and grandson, Mohammad Khan also migrated to Peshawar. Allah Bakhsh Yousafi, after getting basic and elementary religious knowledge and having learnt reciting the Holy Quran, at home, was sent to the central Model School Peshawar (Now Government High School No.1). During his school days, Allah Bakhsh had acquired considerable proficiency in Persian and Arabic and chose ‘Yousafi’ his pen name, passed B.A. examination, in 1915 from University of Punjab. He proceeded to the United Kingdom for higher studies in Journalism and returned to Peshawar in 1918.

¹⁸ Yousafi, A. B., *Sarhad aur Jaddo Jihad-e-Azadi (Urdu)*. Markazi Urdu Board, Lahore 1968, p165.

¹⁹ Hilton, E.H., *The Mutiny Records*. Sang-e-Meel publications, Lahore 2004, p 27.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Two hundred copies of eight to twelve pages, comprising two columns in 8"x12" size were lithographed. The annual subscription of the newspaper had been rupees ten, and six rupees for six-monthly, while one rupee and four Anna for monthly.

²² Omer, A., *A History of Press in N.W.F.P.* Sadiq Commission Agency Khyber Bazar, Peshawar 1986, p 58.

²³ Rahman, J.U., ‘*Press History of NWFP up to 1947*’. Unpublished M.A Thesis, submitted to Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1999, p 25.

announcements, advertisement rates of the newspaper while local, national and international news and poems filled other pages of this newspaper.²⁴

At that time even a mild adverse comment published in an Indian newspaper could earn displeasure of the rulers and lead to closure of newspaper and arrest of the editor. The editor of *Murtazai* was arrested and sent to jail, in 1857, resulting into the closure of this weekly.²⁵ Abdus Salam Khurshid explained that during the mutiny, the paper had allegedly published false news of revolt by Kalat Ghalzai regiment and killing of officers.²⁶ Consequently, Col. Nicholson,²⁷ Deputy Commissioner Peshawar (1821-1857), imprisoned the editor forthwith, consequently, the paper ceased to appear.²⁸ *Koh-i-Noor*,²⁹ first cited the Weekly *Murtazai* and picked a news item from it, in 1856.³⁰ Weekly *Khushbudar* or *Khushbahar*, appearing from Peshawar, in 1854³¹, were some of the contemporaries of *Murtazai*.

A Pashto religious newspaper *Al Islam* or *Al Jihad* owned by renowned spiritual leader Hazrat Abdul Ghafoor Shaheed Babaji alias Hazrat Akhund Saidu Baba Abdul Ghafoor (1794-1877) and edited by Khalifa Abdul Ghaffar

²⁴ Mohammad Ibrahim Zia has testified in his article, *Peshawar men Sahafat*, In, “*Maazi Ke Dareechum Se*” that there existed no printing press in Peshawar at that time, therefore, the paper might have been published from Lahore. He reports that Haji Karam Sherazi belonged to Muhalla Gul Badshah Jee in Peshawar city.

²⁵ Amer, U., *History of Press NWFP*. Freelance Research Publications, Peshawar 1986, p 24.

²⁶ Khurshid, A. S., *Sahafat-e-Pakistan wa Hind main (Urdu)*. Carwan Press, Lahore (n.d), p19.

²⁷ In October 1840, he accompanied a regiment to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. In July 1841, he went with the regiment to Peshawar to bring a convoy under Major Broad foot, on return to Jalalabad, they were sent to Kabul, to Ghazni, to join the garrison under Colonel Palmer. When Ghazni was attacked in December 1841 by Afghans, young Nicholson took a active part in the defence. When the Indian mutiny broke out and the news of the outbreak at Mirat and the seizure of Delhi reached the Punjab in May 1857, Nicholson was deputy-commissioner at Peshawar. At once movable columns under Chamberlain and Reed were formed, while Cotton, Edwardes, and Nicholson watched/observed the frontier. In May, the news of the outbreak of two native regiments at Nowshera reached Peshawar-Mardan to deal with the mutinous 55th native infantry from Nowshera. No sooner did the force appear near Mardan than the mutineers fled towards the hills of Swat. Nicholson, with a handful of horsemen pursued and charged them. They broke and dispersed, but the detached parties were followed to the boarders of Swat, where a remnant escaped.

²⁸ Parthasarathy, R., *Journalism in India from the earliest times to the present day*. Sterling publishers, New Delhi 1991, p 31.

²⁹ *Kohi-Noor* newspaper, published in Urdu, was began publishing in Punjab. MunshiHarsukRai, was the editor, and a seasoned and rational/reasonable journalist. The historians are divided on the issue of the starting date of *Kohi-Noor*, majority of historians have mentioned 1849, however, it began publication in 1850. Some of its issues exist in the library of *Anjuman Taraqqai Urdu*. Some issue amentioned 1851 as year of publication. In the first year of its circulation it was a bi-weekly. Kaifi Sb, Abdus-Salam Khurshed and Mr. Nitrajen, the researchers have also verified the date.

³⁰ Pushkalawati, I.U.R., *Dictionary of Mass Media and Journalism*. Unpublished p 166.

³¹ Hayder, K.R., *Allah Baksh Yusfi-Baba-e- Sahafat Sarhad*, Karachi: Allah Baksh Yusfi Research Council March 2003, p 26.

Peshawari of Turu, Mardan, appeared in 1854.³² It countered propaganda of Christian Missionaries against Islam and was published and distributed secretly in various parts of the Frontier region and Afghanistan. At times, hand written copies were issued too. No subscription was charged and Saidu Baba remained its patron. It had a short life since it was not sighted in 1857.³³ The paper lacked any proper declaration, bore no date, day or place of issue.³⁴ Abdus Salam Khurshid and Sultan Muhammad Sabir cite the name of the paper *Al Islam*, while Pervish Shaheen and Ajmal Malik, *Al Jihad*.³⁵ Sultan Muhammad Sabir points to its place of publication as Amritsar or Lahore.³⁶ It is also said that the paper used to be printed on a piece of paper which was patched by *Halwa* (Paste).³⁷ Not a single copy is available and no one has seen this paper.

Emergence of Print Media in Afghanistan

Various scholars disagree on the name, year of publication and name of the editor of the first newspaper of Afghanistan.³⁸ Habibullah Rafi, in his Pashto article "*Pa Afghanistan ke da Jamaluddin Afghani Khidmatona*" (Services of Jamalludin Afghani to Afghanistan) referred to L. Bagdanov's article, "*Notes on the Afghan Periodical Press*", published in "*Islamic Culture*"³⁹, 1929, II, pp. 126-152, in this regard. He mentions periodical *Kabul*,⁴⁰ circulated in 1868, during the regime of Amir Muhammad Azam Khan (r.1867-68).⁴¹ It assumes circulation of *Kabul* corresponds with the 2nd tenure (1868-79) of Amir Sher Ali Khan.⁴² However, W. Noor claims that printed word, in Afghanistan, appeared in 1871, in *Shamsul Nahaar* at the

³² According to Ajmal Malik, it used to appear during the jihad Movement of Syed Ahmad Shaheed (1776-1831), but it is not true because Saidu Baba was not present at Swat in those days, he returned to Swat, in 1835 and settled in Saidu Sharif in 1845.

³³ Amer, O., *A History of Press in N.W.F.P.* Freelance Research Publications, Peshawar 1986, p 18.

³⁴ Malik, A., *Sahafat Soba Sarhad main* (Urdu). Qaumi Publishers, Lahore 1980, p 159.

³⁵ Sabir, Sultan Muhammad., *Pashto Resala* (Pashto). Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar, Peshawar, 1986, p 12.

³⁶ Ibid., p 14.

³⁷ It was special Paste, which was the combination of few chemicals. Before writing on the paste, it used to press in a tray same size of paper. Special ink was used for calligraphy on the Paste. Then a white paper used to press on the Paste and calligraphy got transferred on the paper.

³⁸ Benawa, A.R., *Awwalin Jarid-e-Afghanistan: Shamsul Nahaar* (The first newspaper in Afghanistan Shamsul Nahaar). Aryana, 1951, ix, p 4.

³⁹ Schinsai, M., *Afghanistan at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: Nationalism and Journalism in Afghanistan; A Study of Serajul Akhbar (1911-1918)*. Istituto Universitario Orientale, Seminario Di Studi AsiaticI, Series Minor III. NAPLES 1979, P.51.

⁴⁰ Mirza, A., *Hayat Jamaluddin Afghani*, Ishtiaq Press, Lahore 1959, p 19.

⁴¹ Syed Jamaluddin Afghani had been a tutor of Amir Muhammad Azam Khan, an elder half-brother of Amir Sher Ali Khan. Azam Khan was known as an adventurous and aggressive prince brother of the Amir Sher Ali Khan.

⁴² Reshtiya, S. Q., *Afghanistan in the 19th century*. Kabul 1968, p 89.

Lithographic⁴³ Printing Press Kabul.⁴⁴ Amir Sher Ali (r. 1863-1879), the third son of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1826-63), sponsored it. He also considers Syed Jamal- ul- Din Afghani (1839-1897) its founder and mentor.⁴⁵ Some others too hold that *Shamsul Nahaar* was founded and circulated by Syed Jamaluddin Afghani.⁴⁶ Since no copy of *Kabul* is available, hence, no decisive evidence of the said periodical can be cited. It is argued that the name *Kabul* might have been remnant of the name *Shamsul Nahaar Kabul*, written on the corners of the newspaper.⁴⁷

Afghanistan witnessed some of its early reforms during the second tenure of Amir Sher Ali Khan (r.1863-1866 & 1868-1879),⁴⁸ the first books, mostly translations of British Military works, were published during this period. The launch of first Afghan Newspaper *Shamsul Nahaar* has been reported in 1873 too,⁴⁹ though another source cites its year of publishing 1871. The *Shamsul Nahaar* mainly focused on spreading Jamaluddin Afghani's ideas, and also helped keeping the public informed of government's decisions besides raising awareness, enlightenment discussing situation in the country. Qazi Abdul Qadir Yousafzai Peshawari was the Chief Editor and Mirza Abdul Aali, Sub-Editor, of *Shamsul Nahaar*. Initially it was published fortnightly, later weekly and finally daily.⁵⁰ The number of pages also increased from four to sixteen, and most of the editorials were written in Dari. Anti-British feelings visibly manifested in Afghanistan, and amongst the Muslims of India, its political repercussions were discussed. The British government believed *Shamsul Nahaar* caused alarming situation in India by spreading anti-British propaganda, therefore,

⁴³ Lithographic printing, invented in Europe in the late 18th century, spread widely in the Indian subcontinent from the early 19th century. Its popularity stemmed from the relative ease with which it could be used to reproduce different scripts not based on the Latin alphabet. By the 1860s, lithographic printing had spread to Afghanistan, including Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.

⁴⁴ Noor, W., *Newspapers and Journals of Afghanistan* (Persian). Central Asia, no.3, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Peshawar 1979, p 61.

⁴⁵ Schinsai, M., *Afghanistan at the Beginning of The Twentieth Century: Nationalism and Journalism in Afghanistan; A Study of Serajul Akhbar (1911-1918)*. Istituto Universitario Orientale, Seminario Di Studi Asiatici, Series Minor III. Naples 1979, p 51.

⁴⁶ Abdur Rauf Benawa, *Awwalin Jarid-e-Afghanistan: Shamsul Nahaar* (The first newspaper in Afghanistan Shams-un-Nahaar). Aryana, 1951, p 14.

⁴⁷ Afghani, J., *Tarikh-ul-Afghan* (History of Afghans), a translated version of Jamaludin Afghani work by Allama Sayyid Abdul Qadus Hashmi. Nafees Academy, Karachi 1976.

⁴⁸ Sher Ali returned Kabul and energetically began a series of far reaching reforms, created a National Army, instituted a system collecting land revenues, founded a Council of Elders to advise him on affairs of state, began a postal system, and published the very first newspaper in Afghanistan, *Shams-ul-Nahaar* (Morning Sun).

⁴⁹ Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/2333.1/msbcc2pw>., and <http://afghanistandl.nyu.edu/>

⁵⁰ After the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-1879), which effectively put an end to Afghanistan's first newspapers, *Shamsul Nahar*, foreign imports such as the Calcutta based *Habl-al-Matin* provided the main source of information on what was happening abroad.

took steps to stop it.⁵¹ Thus, in 1878, the newspaper was shut down due to the second Anglo-Afghan War.⁵²

Syed Jamaluddin Afghani's eagerness to publish a newspaper may be traced to early 1860s by referring to a society, *Um-ul-Qura*, founded in Hijaz, prior to his coming to Afghanistan, in 1864.⁵³ The society intended to publish a newspaper carrying the name, *Shamsul Nahaar Kabul*. Syed Jamaluddin Afghani had prepared a sketch of this newspaper but it could not be published regularly. It might have been instrumental in giving birth to *Shamsul Nahaar*, in Afghanistan.⁵⁴

The idea of public responsibility of the print media in Afghanistan was introduced by Syed Jamaluddin Afghani,⁵⁵ during the short reign of Amir Muhammad Azam Khan (1867-1868). In strife and civil war ridden Afghanistan, Azam Khan trapped feuding chieftains to embrace Jamaluddin's ideas thinking that publication of newspaper might help in bringing unity and harmony. Jamaluddin Afghani became Azam Khan's Prime Minister in 1868, has been credited to be the editor of a journal entitled *Kabul*. Unfortunately, no issue of this Journal is available in public libraries, although references are made to it in several Afghan publications affirming Jamaluddin Afghani, as editor.⁵⁶

Qazi Abdul Qadir Yousafzai Peshawari, the Chief Editor⁵⁷ of *Shamsul Nahaar* had been a contemporary and follower of Syed Jamaluddin Afghani. As chief Editor, he propagated modern and enlightened ideas of Jamaluddin Afghani, promoted and published articles regarding unity of Muslim Ummah in general and Afghanistan in particular. Mirza Abdul Aali acted as the Sub-Editor.⁵⁸

⁵¹ [Http://afghanistandl.nyu.edu/](http://afghanistandl.nyu.edu/).

⁵² Noor, W., *Newspapers and Journals of Afghanistan* (Persian). *Central Asia*, no. 3, 1979. Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Peshawar, p 60.

⁵³ Dedicating his whole life to the defense of the Islamic Commonwealth, and moving restlessly throughout the Muslim world, Al-Afghani appealed to the rulers of the Muslims to gather their subjects against Western imperialism. While calling for internal reform in line with the Qur'an and prophetic traditions, he insisted on the need for military power in order to end foreign occupation. He founded the *Ummul Qura* which symbolized the concept of Islamic unity and to unite the whole Islamic world. His revolutionary ideas have had a deep impact on the reawakening in the Muslim world. Oh! You poor fellah (peasants and farmers)! You break the heart the heart of the earth in order to draw sustenance from it and to support your family. Why do you not break the heat of those who eat the fruit of your labor? – Jamaluddin Al Afghani.

⁵⁴ Rafi, H., *Pa Afghanistan ky Jamaluddin Afghani Khidmatooona*. *Central Asia*, no. 11. Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Peshawar 1982, p.p 12-14.

⁵⁵ Loudwing, W. A., *Biographical Encyclopedia of Afghanistan*. Pentagon Press, India 2008, p 267.

⁵⁶ Marwat, F. R., *Jamaluddin Afghani and Islamic Resurgence in Egypt*. *Pakistan* no. 31-32. Pakistan Study Centre, Peshawar 1995, pp 46-49.

⁵⁷ The top editorial executive of a publishing organization directly responsible for the operations and policies of a publication, sometimes known as editor in chief.

⁵⁸ Sub-editor same as co-editor or copy-Reader; one of the many subordinate editors who reads, edits; and writes head lines to news stories. He/She may also supervise the lay out and makeup of the copy to be published.

Urwah al-Wuthqa by Jamaluddin Afghani in 1880s

Jamaluddin Afghani began publishing *al-Urwah al-Wuthqa*, 'The Indissoluble Link', an Arabic language newspaper edited by Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905),⁵⁹ from Paris, in 1884.⁶⁰ Advocating return to the original, unadulterated principles and ideals of Islam, and unity amongst Muslim masses, the newspaper considered return to pristine Islam a must to regain its lost strength and glory and to throw away yoke of European powers.⁶¹ After departing Afghanistan and subsequently India, Afghani proceeded on a journey through Europe, resided in London, Paris and St. Petersburg, for various lengths of time. In Paris, he founded a political organization *Urwah al Wuthqa (The Unbreakable Bond)* with Egyptian modernist, Muhammad Abduh. To modernize Islam and protecting Islamic world from greedy foreigners they published Arabic Journal *Al Urwat-ul-Wuthqa*, from Paris.⁶² Scathing criticism and fiery articles in this anti-British organ created a furor in the imperialist circles, however, gained popularity in the Arabic speaking world, eventually the British banned its entry into India.⁶³ Annoyed, due to its strident anti-European message, the British, engineered shut down of this organization and its mouthpiece, the *Minaret*.⁶⁴ The Journal circulated throughout the Muslim world including Afghanistan, since Afghani's activities were not confined to Paris alone. He moved about in the continent, contacting important personalities and impressing upon them a progressive outlook of Islam. He even proceeded to London, had prolonged discussions on international relations with Lord Salisbury, a high dignitary of British.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ Muhammad Abduh, a student of Jamaluddin Afghani, under Afghani's influence combined Journalism, Politics and his own fascination in Islamic mystical spirituality. Abduh was appointed editor in Chief of *al-Waqt-al-Misriyya*, the official state newspaper. He was dedicated to reforming all aspects of Egyptian society. In 1884, Abduh moved to Paris, France, where he joined Afghani in publishing *The Firmest Bond* (*al-Urwah al-Wuthqa*), and Islamic revolutionary journal that promoted anti-British views.

⁶⁰ Wasil Noor mentioned 1881 as the beginning date of *al-Urwah al-Wuthqa* in *Newspapers and Journals of Afghanistan—Bibliography*, published in Central Asia, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar issue No. 3 on Page 101

⁶¹ Khan, S., *Muslim Reformist Political Thought, Revivalists, Modernists and Free Will*. Routledge Curzon, London 2003, p 163.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Marwat, F.R., *Jamaluddin Afghani and Islamic Resurgence in Egypt*. Pakistan no.31-32. Pakistan Study Centre, Peshawar 1995, p 65.

⁶⁴ Shafi, M., *Developments of Reformist and Liberal Ideas in Afghanistan (1900-1950)*. Unpublished thesis submitted to Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 2010, p 91.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p 69.

Anjuman-i-Serajul Akhbar: The Newspaper Sirajul Akhbarul Afghanistan

A nine member Society, *Anjuman-i-Seraj-ul-Akhbar*, was founded in 1905, by *Maulvi* Abdul Rauf Khan, Alias Khaki, Headmaster of *Madrassa-i-Shahi* (Royal School/College), attached to Chob Faroshi mosque, Kabul, the members of the Society include; *Maulvi* Abdul Rauf Khan alias Khaki-Editor, *Maulvi* Najaf Ali Khan-Sub Editor, *Maulvi* Mohammad Sarwar Khan Assef-Clerk, Haji Bashi Ghulam Naqashband Khan-Translator of Turkish Language, Munshi Hafiz Haider Ali Khan, Translator of Turkish Language, Abdul Rahim Beg, Assistant Translator of Urdu Newspaper, Mirza Ghulam Qadir Khan, Scribe/Calligrapher, Mirza Muhammad Ishaq Khan-Scribe/Calligrapher, Qari Nek Muhammad- Proof Reader.⁶⁶

A group, named of Constitutionalists, within this society emerged and founded a newspaper *Serajul Akhbar-i-Afghanistan* on January 11, 1906.⁶⁷ Most of the 'Constitutionalists' were Indian teachers of *Habibia* School led by Dr. Abdul Ghani, the founder and second principal of *Habibia* School (1903).⁶⁸ Other members of the group included *Maulvi* Mohammad Hussain (Punjab), *Maulvi* Muzaffar Khan Marwat and Saeed Ahmad Khan Kandahari. The organization was also known as '*Jan Nisaran-i-Melat*' (Devotees to Nation) and *Anjuman-i-Moalleman-i-Hindi* (Council of the Indian Teachers). The objective of this association was the same as that of the Society of *Seraj-ul-Akhbaar*. However, the newspaper lasted just one issue and was closed down by the Amir on the behest of the British Indian government.⁶⁹

Weekly *Sirajul Akhbar Afghanistan*, first appeared, in 1906, has been the second, more widely known, Pashto newspaper. *Maulvi* Abdur Rauf Khaki, Headmaster of *Shahi* Madrassa, Kabul had been its managing Editor and *Maulvi* Najaf Ali, an Indian Muslim, its Sub- Editor.⁷⁰ The first issue of this newspaper contained anti-imperialist articles. The British Indian government did not like the tone of the newspaper and pressurized Amir Habibullah to close it, thus, was shut down immediately.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Younis, F. S., *Afghanistan: A Political History; The Afghans and The Rise and Fall of the Ruling Afghan Dynasties and Rulers, Volume-1*. The Aays, Peshawar 2005, p 571.

⁶⁷ Noor, W., *Newspapers and Journals of Afghanistan* (Persian). Peshawar: Bi-annual Research Journal, *Central Asia*, no. 3. Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar 1979, p 61.

⁶⁸ Ghani, A., *A Brief Political History of Afghanistan*. Najaf Publisher, Lahore 1989, p 36.

⁶⁹ Shafi, M., *The Reformist Movement and Liberal Ideas in Afghanistan 1901-1950*. Peshawar: Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, submitted to Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Peshawar 2010.

⁷⁰ Haleem, S., *Da Afghanistan Tarikh Ao Khprawanay* (History and Journalism in Afghanistan). Saboor Publishing Centre, Peshawar 2001, p 31.

⁷¹ Ghani, A., *A Review of the Political Situation in Central Asia*. Aziz Publishers, Lahore 1980.

Sirajul Akhbar Afghania

Mehmud Tarzi began publishing the newspaper named, *Sirajul Akhbar Afghania* (1911-1918) as editor, in 1911. He used it as a means to introduce his readers to the new ideas and modernization. Within eight years of its publication, *Sirajul Akhbar Afghania* prepared Afghans, emotionally if not politically, to demand complete independence from the British.⁷² Tarzi served as a mouthpiece for 'Young Afghans', and disseminated their ideas in public at large. The *Young Afghans*, initially aimed at spreading enlightenment, advocating education, development of culture, national unity and struggle against religious fanaticism⁷³, later the *Young Afghan's* activities became increasingly political. *Sirajul Akhbar Afghania* denounced colonial policies of the British and openly called for the people to struggle for the country's independence, which thought inseparable from the struggle against backwardness. The *Young Afghans* were organized in a secret society called *Mashruta* (the constitution) within all major cities.⁷⁴

In 1912, *Sirajul Akhbar* circulation reached 1600 in Kabul. State patronage was evident as each government office subscribed a copy. *Sirajul Akhbar* was also distributed in the Tribal Areas across the Durand line.⁷⁵ In mid of 1915, it published anti-British and pro-German news, it was also distributed to all leading mullahs. Copies were sent by hand to the few readers in Peshawar.⁷⁶ It was during this time that Haji Sahib Turangzai (1858-1937) setup a lithographic press at Lakarhai (Mohmand Agency), published pamphlets against the British government.⁷⁷ *Sirajul Akhbar* closed down in 1918, however, Amir Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1928) began *Aman-i Afghania*, a new official newspaper.⁷⁸

It is probable that the name of *Sirajul Akhbar* may be copied in Afghanistan from the *Sirajul Akhbar* of Delhi, which began in 1841. It issued from Mughal Court as a Daily Newspaper by the last Mughal ruler,

⁷² The background and the beginning of the Afghan Press system: Part: V and VI. *Afghanistan* (Historical and Cultural Quarterly, 1969. Vol: XXII. No.2, Ibrahim Pourhadi, Afghanistan press and its literary influence 1829–1969. *Afghanistan Journal* USA. 1976; Notes on the Afghan Periodical Press. *The Hyderabad Quarterly Review*, -Vol –III 1929.

⁷³ Shafi, M., *The Reformist Movement and Liberal Ideas in Afghanistan 1901-1950*. Peshawar: Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, submitted to Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Peshawar 2010.

⁷⁴ Habibi, A.H., *Pa Afghanistan Kay Da Mushrooti at Ghurzang*. (The Constitutional Party in Afghanistan). Peshawar Danish Kutab Khana Kisakhwani Bazar 2006, p 49.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Hindi, A., *Zawal-e-Ghazi Amanullah Khan 1928: Inqilab-e-Afghanistan* (Downfall of Amir Amanullah Khan: Afghan Revolution), 1931.

⁷⁷ Javed, A., *Haji Sahib Turangzai*. Aziz publishers, Peshawar 1980, p 59.

⁷⁸ May, S., *Afghanistan at the beginning of twentieth century: Nationalism and Journalism in Afghanistan—A study of seraj-ul-akhbar (1911-1919)*. Naples, Institute Universitario Orientale, Seminario Di Studi Asiatici 1979.

Bahadur Shah-II, popularly known as Bahadur Shah Zafar (r. 1837-58). Musleh-ud Daula Sayed Abdul Qasim supervised it, the last Royal Scribe (Chronicler). Its editor was Syed Aulad Ali. The Magistrate of Delhi J. Lawrance reported about *Sirajul Akhbar* that it was a Court chronicle and issued from the Mughal Court. According to Mehdi Hassan and Dr. Abdul Salam Khurshid in “*Journalism for All*”, *Sirajul Akhbar* started by *Maulvi* Faqir Muhammad of Lahore in 1885 and it continued till 1916.⁷⁹

Services of Molvi Najaf Ali (1862-1950)

Amir Abdur Rahman (r.1880-1901) realized the importance of education for Afghanistan, ordered translation of the useful foreign books into Persian. He employed scholars to translate books written in English and Urdu for this purpose.⁸⁰ *Maulana* Najaf Ali, one among the translators recommended by Dr. Abdul Ghani (his younger brother) to the Amir in 1892,⁸¹ earlier, he headed the translation Department of Lahore High Court. He made a brief visit of Kabul during the reign of Nadir Shah (1929-33), translated a few books into Persian at the request of the King, and his brother *Sardar* Muhammad Hasham Khan. *Maulvi* Najaf Ali has been criticized by some researchers, terming him a British agent/spy protected by Yahya Khel⁸² family in Afghanistan. Thus, his name appeared boldly in almost all political activities in Kabul.⁸³

An Overview of Print Media in Afghanistan (1918-1929)

The following chart provides an overview of Afghan Print media in the period under discussion:

⁷⁹ Pushkalawati, I., *Journalism*. Cristal Publications, Peshawar 2011, p 189.

⁸⁰ Hindi, A., *Zawal-e-Ghazi Amanullah Khan, Inqelab-e-Afghanistan, 1928 fall of king Amanullah Khan, Afghan Revolution of 1928*. Multan 1931, p 136.

⁸¹ The name of the father of Abdul Qadeer Najafi was *Hafiz* Abdul Majeed Najafi; he was the son of *Maulana* Najaf Ali.

⁸² Those who fled to Pakistan formed an anti-Yahya Khel party known as ‘Afghan Democratic Party’ in the tribal area of N.W.F.P and Quetta, with the collaboration of the Pakistani Government. Abdul Hay Habibi, Abdul Wadood (brother in law of Dr. Mahmudi), Mazrak Zadran (a staunch supporter of Amanullah, the father of Syed Akbar) were some of the leaders of the party. They published a journal *Azad Afghanistan* for propagating their views. The formation of the Afghanistan Democratic party in the tribal territory of Pakistan by the dissident Afghans had considerably upset the Afghan government. Pro-government members of the Afghan National Assembly condemned Habibi and declared him a traitor; but Dr. Muhamudi and his group in the assembly strongly supported Habibi by declaring that all people with public interest are friends of Habibi. Even Abdul Majeed Zabuli, who was always criticized by the Mahmudi group, had made a common cause with the progressive group, with a view of enlisting their support for pro-communist propaganda in Afghanistan.

⁸³ Tazi, S.Z., *Saur Revolution in Afghanistan*. Peshawar: Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, submitted to Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Peshawar 1997, p 89.

Newspaper	1st Year of issue	Editor
Siraj ul Atfal	1918	Mahmud Tarzi
Amani Afghan	1919	Abdul Hadi Davi
Marf Maarf	1919	Muhammad Hussain Khan
Etehad-e-Mashraqi	1919	Burhanuddin Kashki
Afghan	1920	Muhammad Jafar Khan
Etefaq-e-Islam	1920	Abdullah Khan
Sitar-e Afghan	1920	Mir Ghulam Muhammad Hussaini
Irshad-ul Naswan	1921	Asmar Samya
Alghazi	1921	Abdullah Khan
Talae-e-Afghan	1921	<i>Maulvi</i> Salah Muhammad Hotak
Majmua-e Askaria	1921	Abdul Latif Khan
Eblagh	1921	Mirza Muhammad Akbar Khan
Itihade	1922	Muhammad Bashir Khan
Bedaar	1922	Abdul Samad Jahid
Ainae Irfan	1924	Hashim Shaiq
Haqiqat	1924	Burhanuddin Kashki
Sarwat	1924	Salahuddin Saljoqi
Eid ul Istiqlal	1925	Abdul Hadidavi
Anees	1927	Mahuddin Khan Anees
Majmua-e Sahiya	1927	Hasan Saleemi
Al Eman	1927	<i>Maulvi</i> Muhammad Ibrahim
Itihade Afghan	1927	<i>Maulvi</i> Muhammad Yaqoob
Nasim-e Sahar	1928	Hasan
Naoroz	1928	Ahmad Ratib Khan
Pakhton ghag	1928	Muhammad Naoroz Khan
Da kor gham	1928	Faiz Muhammad Khan Nasri
Ghairate Islam	1928	Hasan khan
Habibul Islam	1929	Abdul Hakim Khan
Islah	1929	Ghulam Mahauddin Anees
Maktab	1929	Muhammad Noroz Khan
		Jalaluddin

Amani-i Afghan

Aman-i Afghan (1919-1929), a semi-official weekly newspaper, stretched over 8-12 pages, appeared after *Sirajul Akhbar*. Abdul Hadi Davi and Sayad Qasim Khan remained its founding editors, respectively; the latter was replaced by Ghulam Ahmad in 1927. However, *Aman-i-Afghan* could not achieve the caliber of *Sirajul Akhbar*, both culturally and politically. No role was played by the Indian Muslims in this newspaper.

Ittihad-e-Mashriqi

The first issue of *Ittihad-e-Mashriqi*, a weekly journal published and circulated in 1919.⁸⁴ Its first issue was did not carry the name of its editor, however, 8th issue during first year, named Burhan Ud Din as Senior Editor, while 13th and following issues of the journal lacked editor's name.⁸⁵ For 3 year, the journal continued without editor in 4th year (in 1923), Muhammad Bashir became Editor. In 1928, *Ittihad-e-Mashriqi* printed under the editorship of Muhammad Amin Khogyani with an increased circulation in the period of Nadir Shah. Shams Ud Din became its Editor In Chief in 1931. *Ittihad-e-Mashriqi* printed in six pages, two in Pashto and four in Dari in size 3x ½, x2 ½.⁸⁶

Ittihad-e-Mashriqi produced keeping in view of the demands of readers of different periods, such as during *Amani* era, for the first time Pashto Poetry was given place in *Ittihad-e-Mashriqi*, with the passage of time, prose writing also began to be published.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ The first issue of *Ittihad-e-Mashriqi* appeared in four pages mostly covering writings. *Bismillah-e-Rehman Arrahim, La Elaha Ellallah Muhammd Ur Rasulullah* was written on right sode on the top. Nasruminallah Fathun Qareb is engraved. On the same side in a bracket name of Amanullah Alghazi is mentioned with 1298 H. On the left side of the same page *Ittihad-e-Mashriqi* 1338 H is given. In the bottom of the bracket "*WaKafa Billahi Shaheeda Muhammad Ur Rasulullah Wallazeena Magha Ashad Alal kuffar Rehmen Benahim*" is inscribed. In front of the bracket on the left side IDara, Jalal Abad and date, Jamadiussani 1338 is given followed by a writing "Farman Alhazrat Ghazi" an announcement from Ghazi Amanullah has been given place. In the writing commitment has been made for the uplift and defending of Afghanistan. The addressers are people of Nangarhar. In the middle of all pages information about "writer, Aziz Ur Rehman Safi, Office located inside the old city. The writer reserves the right of publishing the article received by the Office. Telephone No, 240. On the left side in four lines it is given, price annually 6 Afghani in Jalal Abad. 7:00 Afghani throughout Afghanistan and 4:00 Kaldari abroad" along with other statistical information.

⁸⁵ Rafi, H., *Pukhto Khabravane*. Kabul 1927, p 38.

⁸⁶ In the year 1941, after 25 issues, *Ittihad-e- Mashriqi* increased its circulation. In the year 1941, Qayam Ud Din Khadim was nominated as its Editor In Chief. At that time the journal started to be print in Pashto only. In the year 1955, *Ittihad-e- Mashriqi* used to appeared under the editorship of Aziz Ur Rehman Sefi and in 1956 its editorship has been assigned to Ustad Ulfat. In the year 1949 its Editor was Mr Younas Murad and in the year 1951 Mr Abdul Baqi Baghniwal was nominated as its editor. In his editorship before 1958, the name of *Ittihad-e- Mashriqi* was used as Nangarhar and it was issued as Newspaper in place of Journal. In the year 1959 Abdullah Bakhtani has been nominated as its Editor. In the year 1953 Mr Abdul Jalel Wajdi was Editor of Nangarhar.

⁸⁷ In round about 1936, Pashto was given place on the first two pages. A permanent place had been assigned to Pashto Article on the first page. On the other side poetry was given position expressing Nationalism beside news of Peshawar and news provided by different correspondents. On the same page, agricultural news under the heading of *FALAHAT* used to be given regularly. Articles used to appeare under these headings like *Sehawat Ao Jawan mardi wasta Da Abadai Ao Ittifaq, Da Gul La Khwa Zarghonegi Ao Zar La Shagona Haselegi, Da Jaredo mujallo Nafa O Faida. Hes Tegh La Jabi Sara Hamsari Ao Sialina Shi Kawali, Effat Ao Asmat*. Analysis has been given place in Pashto section i.e. in the 21st

Allah Nawaz Khan Services to Afghanistan in 1920s

Allah Nawaz (1880-1935), son of Khan Bahadur Rab Nawaz Khan, Honorary Magistrate, Multan, and one of the eleven students of Government College Lahore, who entered Afghanistan, in 1915, during the First World War. Having completed their education in Lahore, he became an Afghan national. He assisted the editor Burhan ud din Kashkaki of the *Itihad-i-Mashriqi*⁸⁸, the first newspaper of the province of Nagrahar, in 1920. It was founded by Nadir Khan, the Raees (the Executive Head) of the eastern province, in February 1920 and published twice a week, Saturday and Wednesday. A single page newspaper initially, it progressed to four pages, was simultaneously published in two languages, Pashto and Dari.

In 1928, Afghanistan was rocked by a rebellion led by Habibullah alias Bacha Saqa (r.Oct 1928 to July 1929) resulting into self-exile of Amanullah. Habibullah was ousted by Nadir Khan after nine months with the help of Waziri Lashker led by Allah Nawaz.⁸⁹ He was appointed as minister of court in October 1929,⁹⁰ and also served as an interpreter to Nadir Shah. In May 1930, he supervised the work on *Dar-ul-Aman*, a government building, in the new capital, assisted the Minister of Justice in holding negotiations with the Sulaiman Khel in Ghazni, in July 1930. In June 1933, he was appointed Minister of Public Works but spent most of the year in the Southern Province in quelling disturbances there. In December 1933, he left Kabul on a visit to Europe for medical treatment and served as Afghan Ambassador in Berlin during 1935 to 1945. He spent his last years in Germany where he

issue of the year, 1936. such analysis appeared. Issue of 1943 is lying before me. On the first page headlines followed by domestic news further followed by subheadings. On the same page news of Delhi and China can be seen. On the second, a heading under Ilmi Behes (Educational Discussions) with text that so far 16 different kinds of natural salt have been discovered as part of our body. At the bottom harms of drug addiction are mentioned. Third page is limited to Literature only where a large portion is given to Pashto poetry. Itihad Afsana is also part of this page on the top unlike other journals where Novels are given place at bottom. The fourth page is assigned to local news of surrounding areas. At the bottom an announcement is given, "The current issue of Nangarhar is covering each and every thing just on one page and circulated to everyone in the area". I want to go through the journal thoroughly and don't hesitate to say that it rightly covers everything. News, secrets, current issues etc. it has also given place to novels, political analysis and letters received by the Editor.

⁸⁸ It was the first newspaper of the province of Nagrahar, founded by Nadir Khan, the Raees (the Executive Head) of the eastern province in February, 1920. Its editor was Bahauddin Kashkaki, and was published twice a week (Saturday and Wednesday). In the initial stages it one page paper, while later on it was increased to four. It was published in two languages, Pashto and Dari, simultaneously. Later, it was stopped.

⁸⁹ The actual support came from the tribesmen of the Waziristan organized by Allah Nawaz, a Multani residing in Afghanistan since 1915, thus placing Nadir Khan on the throne of Afghanistan.

⁹⁰ The ministry of court was held between 1920-27 by Yaqub Khan.

lived up to 1971. His son Ali Nawaz has been the president of the Chamber of Commerce Multan.

Tulo-e- Afghan (Rising Afghan)

Tulo-e-Afghan, a weekly newspaper, appeared in 1921 from Qandahar and circulated in large numbers under the ownership of Moulvi Saleh Hotak in editorship of Abdul Aziz⁹¹ 1921-1930. In 1928, Khwaja Muhammad worked as co-editor and Muhammad Hussain, an Indian Muslim, as calligrapher. Later Abdul Haye Habibi⁹² became its assistant editor in 1928 and after three years rose to the post of Editor in Chief.⁹³ This newspaper covered major news stories of Qandahar, local news, foreign news and articles on Afghanistan's history, literature and editorials notes on political issues.⁹⁴

The Services of *Maulvi* Muhammad Hussain Punjabi

Muhammad Hussain was born in Jallander (Punjab) in 1883. His ancestors belonged to the Afghan Urmur tribe;⁹⁵ he obtained his bachelor degree from Aligarh University. Being of Afghan origin and educated at Aligarh University, he was equally at home in English, Urdu, Dari and Pashto languages. Muhammad Hussain, in Afghanistan, taught at the premier modern educational institute of Afghanistan. He taught history and

⁹¹ Abdul Aziz Alkozai Kandahari, the son of Mirza Atta Muhammad Kandahari, worked first in Kabul press (1905) and later in Kandahar press (1921) as the chief editor of Tulo-e-Afghan. He served as member of National Assembly from Kandahar during King Zahir Shah's early reign, but later imprisoned for 13 years in connection with attack on British Embassy. He also remained the Mayor of Kandahar city in 1950s and died in 1963.

⁹² Abdul Haye Habibi was born in 1910 in Kandahar in a reputed Pashtun tribe, Kakar. He started his career as a primary school teacher (1927), joined *Tulo-e-Afghan*, and served in different capacities during 1940s, including the director general Pashto *Tolana*, advisor in Ministry of Education, president faculty of literature Kabul University, director general Education Kandahar, and as Afghan trade agent at Chaman (Pakistan). He spent the next two decades in Pakistan due to his disillusionment with Afghan government. He started a weekly publication of paper '*Azad Afghanistan*' from Peshawar and '*Sarosh*' magazine from Karachi. He returned to Kabul in 1960s and served in different position; teacher of Pashto literature at Kabul University; President of historical society; advisor Ministry of Information and culture; and member Academy of Sciences till his death in 1984. He authored many books, pamphlets, and articles.

⁹³ In each issue of *Tulo-e-Afghan*, Pashto prose and poetry had been given due place. In 1932, Pashto was allocated half of its part. In 1941, due to its increase demands, *Tulo-e-Islam* began its issue twice a week. In 1943, its size had been reduced to 34x21 inches, and circulated daily. In 1950, Mr Qiam Ud Din Khadim had been nominated as its editor and 1951, the same responsibility had been assigned to Mr Muhammad Shah Irshad. In 1954, *Tulo-e-Afghan* used to be produced by Mr Najim Aryan.

⁹⁴ Rafi, H., *Pakhto Khaprawana* (Pashto), p13.

⁹⁵ The Urmur, also called Burki, are a Pashtun tribe mainly living in Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan. Urmur is part of the Pashtun tribal system and identify with the Karlan confederacy of the region. The 16th-century Pashtun warrior-poet Pir Roshan belonged to the Urmur tribe.

Geography at The Habibia School, founded and promoted by Amir Habibullah Khan. He remained imprisoned for more than a decade for his role in the constitutionalist movement advocating limits to powers of the Amir in 1909. He was released by Amir Amanullah Khan, in 1919. Subsequently, he served as a Calligrapher in *Tulo-e-Afghan*, and the Director Primary Schools, Ministry of Education, in 1926. After the fall of Amanullah, Muhammad Hussain served as Magazine Director '*Habibul-Islam*' in the reign of Habibullah alias Bacha Saqa. He escaped to India and remained there till Kabul was captured by Nadir Khan. He wrote 75 books and magazines during his stay in Kabul in Dari, Pashto, Urdu and English.⁹⁶

Ittehad

Ittehad magazine, a weekly newspaper from Jalal Abad appeared, in 1922, its publisher Mohammad Bashir Munshizadah⁹⁷, born in Kabul in 1905, belonged to an Indian family. His father, Munshi Nazir, was a refugee from Lahore, then India. Bashir was educated at Habibia School, worked for the Ministry of Education as teacher. His close relations with General Nadir Khan granted him permission to publish *Ittehad*. Apart from him no role was assigned to Indian Muslims in this newspaper.⁹⁸

Anees

The bi-weekly newspaper *Anees* (companion) appeared in 1927 under the supervision of Ghulam Mohi-uddin Anees.⁹⁹ The progressive and enlightened minded friends of Mohi-uddin like Mir Muhammad Aziz and Abdur Rashid Latifi also joined the *Anees* and contributed to its progress. An A12 page newspaper, published after five days, a weekly newspaper during the early days of Nadir shah's reign, and became a daily in 1929 reducing the pages to 04. Although pages of *Anees* were filled with discussions of the nexus of rights and obligations binding the citizens and the government in a democratic state, the editor did not shy from making his points through the poetry of the great Sufi mystics.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Younis, F. S., *Afghanistan: A Political History; The Afghans and The Rise and Fall of the Ruling Afghan Dynasties and Rulers, Vol.1*. The Aays, Peshawar 2005, p 571.

⁹⁷ King Nadir Shah made him Director Literary council. In 1933 he was imprisoned for involvement in the second Constitutionalism Movement and died therein.

⁹⁸ Rafi, H., *Pakhto Khaprawana* (Pashto), p13.

⁹⁹ He was a graduate from Egypt, sided with General Nadir Khan against Bach Saqao, and wrote a book '*Bohran O Nijat*' (In Persian) on the events leading to the rise of Nadir Shah. However, in 1933, he was arrested following Nadir Shah's assassination, died in 1944 under house arrest. His brother, Mohammad Khalid Anees, sent to Germany for education in 1924, but returned without completing his course, was also arrested and imprisoned.

¹⁰⁰ Chughtai, M. I., *Iqbal Afghan and Afghanistan (Urdu)*. Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore 2004, p 75.

The Services of *Maulvi* Fazal Mahmud Makhfi

Maulvi Fazal Mahmud Makhfi, another eminent scholar, rendered his services in print media to promote enlightenment and modernization as well as consultancy in Afghanistan.¹⁰¹ He offered his services as an advisor in the Court of Amir Amanullah Khan and also worked as a translator of English and Pashto for Bi-weekly *Anees* (Companion). His nationalistic ideas and his association with the leading nationalist leaders in the NWFP, British India, made him a pioneer of nationalism in Afghanistan.¹⁰²

Maulvi Fazal Mahmud completed his Secondary School Certificate (SSC) from the Islamia High School Peshawar, in 1900 and was admitted to Edwards College Peshawar. Later he joined *Dar-ul-uloom* Agra, and studied religious subjects for five years. For advance knowledge, he was sent to *Darululoom Deoband* by his uncle. *Deoband* sharpened his political views further, and he was accepted into the circle of the favoured and trusted students of Sheikh-ul-Hind, Maulana Mahmud-al Hassan. Following his advice, Makhfi joined Hizbullah movement. In Pakhtunkhwa, Haji Sahib of Turangzai, *Maulana* Abdul Aziz, *Maulvi* Fazal Rabbi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan organised activities against the British.¹⁰³ Sheikh-ul-Hind, in 1910, authorized him and sent for establishing contact with Pakhtun leaders.

Political leader *Maulvi Makhfi* had been a pioneer of nationalist movement in North West India and consistently opposed and severely condemned the British when others could not even dare speak in their *Hujra* against the British.¹⁰⁴ He was dubbed as Soviet agent/spy by the British

¹⁰¹ *Maulvi* Fazal Mahmud Makhfi belonged to Mamund, a Pashtun clan from Tarkalarni tribe, in Bajaur. Due to family feud, his grandfather migrated to Manrogai, a small village in Dir, there got his pen name *Makhfi*, meaning mysterious or hidden one. In acquisition of knowledge, his family migrated to Charsadda, where *Maulvi* Fazal Mahmud Makhfi was born in 1882 at Mohallah Painsa Khel, Charsadda.

¹⁰² Abdul Akbar Khan Akbar, a landlord of Umarzai (Charsadda), and a leading figure of the *Khudai Khidmatgar* movement, considered *Maulvi* Fazal Mahmud Makhfi as his teacher, and wrote that he topped the list of those figures who worked for an awakening of the spirit of nationalism. He described the outlook of *Maulana* as, "The clothes of *Maulvi Makhfi* were always torn and footwear worn out. Sometimes, he was hungry. But he did not lose heart even in the face of ignorant religious and spiritual leaders and the people deceived by them. He was a man of firm determination. He was not the type of leader who enjoy the luxury of cars and who deliver speeches on the stage, but when they lose membership and ministry then they forget the nation and Islam".

¹⁰³ In part, Nadir's coolness can be attributed to Red Shirts Progressive ideas and Abdul Ghaffar Khan's close ties with Amanullah, Nadir had reason to suppose that Movement might be used against the Afghan monarchy and Afghan interests. But really Nadir did not want to become involved in a military conflict with the British, and he did not want to see the tribal belt make into an ideological and political base for a movement that might easily turn against the Afghan throne.

¹⁰⁴ Yousafi, A. B., *Sarhad awr Jado Jihad-e-Azadi* (Urdu). Markazi Urdu Bazar, Lahore 2004, p 124.

Indian government to,¹⁰⁵ undermine him and his political struggle. Fazal Mahmud was a follower of Mahmud-ul-Hassan (1851-1920)¹⁰⁶ who along with Saif-ur-Rahman and Fazle Rabi, to organize the tribesmen across the Durand line against the British.

Haji Sahib of Turangzai an eminent leader from Hasht Nagar with cooperation of *Maulvi Makhfi* formed numerous advisory committees, in Mohmand Agency, to create strong armed militia. Haji Sahib with *Maulvi Makhfi*'s assistance mobilized Indian revolutionaries to go abroad, to Kabul on 30th June 1916 in order to coordinate efforts with *Sardar* Nasrullah Khan opposing the British. He also persuaded Amir Habibullah Khan, brother of *Sardar* Nasrullah Khan to fight against the British. *Sardar* Nasrullah Khan supported the movement and strengthened the cause by supplying munitions in cash and kind. Conversely Amir Habibullah sided entirely with the British. Record of the British government demonstrates that members of that deputation occasionally visited Kabul and lodged with Ubaidullah Sindhi.¹⁰⁷

During his stay in Kabul *Maulvi Makhfi* joined the *Jadid*, Modernist movement. On July 1916, *Maulvi Makhfi* visited Haji Sahib of Turangzai and delivered a message from *Sardar* Nasrullah Khan. It is believed that *Maulvi Makhfi* was involved in the assassination of Amir Habibullah Khan on 19/20th February, 1919 and supported Amanullah Khan in accession to the Afghan throne. *Maulvi Makhfi* was appointed by Amanullah Khan as an adviser representing group of Indian revolutionaries, residing Kabul. The Amir Amanullah Khan was hugely popular amongst Indians as an enlightened reformer and anti imperialist political leader supporting aspirations of Indians for independence.¹⁰⁸

Maulvi Makhfi held long discussions with Ghaffar Khan known as Bacha Khan on the political and educational conditions of *Pukhtuns* in Hashtnagar. He travel from Kabul in 1920, via Bajaur secretly to reach Hashtnagar for this purpose and helped formed *Anjuman-e-Islah-e-Afaghina*, in 1921. The *Anjuman* professed to work for spread of education and awareness amongst the *Pukhtuns* against British rule, and to reform Muslims masses. Bacha Khan and his comrades spread their nationalist and reformist ideas and kept close contact with *Pakhtun* peasants.¹⁰⁹

King Nadir Shah used to invite *Maulvi Makhfi* to Afghanistan to discuss situation of British India and Afghanistan. For instance, in 1931, *Maulvi Makhfi* visited Kabul on Nadir Shah's invitation to discuss situation in

¹⁰⁵ Javed, A., *Haji Sahib Turangzai* (Urdu). Azeem Publisher, Peshawar 1960, p 95.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p 97.

¹⁰⁷ Zalmay, M. W., *Zamung Ghazyian*. Kabul, 1368 AHS, p 260.

¹⁰⁸ Marwat, F.R., *Celebrities of NWFP Vol-I & II*. Nes Awan printers, Peshawar 2005, pp 41-42.

¹⁰⁹ Tendulkar, D.G., *Faith is battle Abdul Ghaffar Khan*. Bombay, pp 33-36.

Afghanistan and proposed formation of organization of Islamic States in order to defend and develop the Islamic world.¹¹⁰

Maulvi Makhfi worked as translator of English and *Pashto* for daily *Anees*, Kabul.¹¹¹ and for *Ittehad-i-Mashriqi*, Jalalabad. He was prolific both verse and prose writer to weekly *Pukhtun*, published by Bacha Khan, and recited poetry during annual gatherings of *Anjuman-e-Islah-e-Afghania*, which not only earned awards, but were much popular too. As a press correspondent, *Makhfi* provided news regarding the Holy War to *Al-Hilal*, published by *Maulana* Abdul Kalam Azad.¹¹²

On 8th November 1933, *Maulvi Makhfi* returned to Peshawar, remained in contact with nationalist political leaders until his arrest in 1934. After his release, the *Maulana*, along with his nephew and son-in-law Fath-ur-Rahman, left for India on 23rd March 1936. He held long meetings with *Maulana* Uzair Gul (prisoner of Malta), supervisor of *Dar-ul-Uloom* at Rorki, *Maulana* Hussain Ahmad Madani and *Maulana* Kifayat Ullah. He also met *Maulana* Azad, in Calcutta, Habib-ur-Rahman, in Dhaka and Dr. Abdul Karim, in Habib Ganj. The main topic of their discussions and consultations remained Independence of India from colonial yoke. He spent three weeks with his nephew Siddique in Agra and upon return settled himself in ancestral village, Manrogai, to many he was known as Manrogai *Mullah*.

Conclusion

There is no denying the fact that invaders, men of letters and religion entering India from Afghanistan did significantly influence the course of history in India. However, influence of Muslim intellectuals and revolutionaries from India on events in Afghanistan in 19th and 20th centuries had not been adequately studied. India under direct colonial rule of the British came into contact with print technology, journalism, concepts of modernization, liberalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the universal secular modern education. These technologies, ideas of development and nationalism diffused from colonial India towards north i.e., Afghanistan too. Printed word played pivotal role in spreading modern ideas and concepts reversing flow of ideas rather paid back historical debt to north. Ideas of modernity enlightenment and development moved from India to Afghanistan, as Indian Muslims served in various capacities there. Since 1747, many inhabitants of British India had been displaying keen interest in

¹¹⁰ Government of India. *Who is Who in Dir, Swat, and Chitral Agencies*. Government of India Press, New Delhi 1937, p 18.

¹¹¹ Chughthai, Ikramullah., *Iqbal and Afghanistan* (Urdu). Sang-i-meel Publication, Lahore 2004, p 227.

¹¹² Marwat, F.R., Fazal Mahmood Makhfi. In Marwat, F.R., (Ed.). *Celebrities of N.W.F.P.* Vol-I. Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Peshawar 2005, p 85.

the socio-political developments of Afghanistan. Migration on both sides occurred having varied purposes: ranging from search of food, political safety, teaching and preaching their own respective versions of Islam to military conquests. Earlier numerous conquerors, *sufis*, saints, *Muhadeseen* and *Mufasssireen* from Afghanistan visited India due to their superior sociopolitical and military strength. The change in pattern in 18th and 19th centuries was evident since Afghan remained tribal and fragmented devoid of modern ideas, scientific education and technology. Therefore, Indian Muslims contributed significantly to Afghanistan in the fields of education, printed word, modernization and constitutionalism.

The services of Qazi Abdul Qadir Peshawari Yousafzai, Najaf Ali, Allah Nawaz Khan, Muhammad Hussian, and *Maulvi* Fazal Mahmud Makhfi include some of the leading lights in this regard. Intellectuals and other Indian Muslims served with missionary zeal for a long time in Afghanistan in return for insignificant remunerations considering it a duty to Islam and their own kith and kin. Some researchers raised objection to dual role of these Muslims doubting their commitment to Afghanistan and termed them agents working under the banner of British imperialist India. Yet their job had been tremendously important for Afghanistan especially in terms of spread of information and education. Contrarily, the British government considered *Maulvi* Fazal Mahmud Makhfi as agent/spy of the Soviet Union. The British agents termed "*Mullah Makhfi* as Bolshevik agent".¹¹³ Similarly, *Maulvi* Najaf Ali has been criticized by some researchers, terming him as a British agent/spy under the protection of Yahya Khel. Despite such controversies the fact remains that Indian Muslims played a leading role in Afghanistan's march towards enlightenment and modernization through their services in the Newspapers to spread ideas of enlightenment in Afghanistan.

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¹¹³ File. No.8, Head XXVI, Dir Affairs and Office of the Political Agent, Malakand.

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HISTORY OF DIR VALLEY PAKISTAN: FROM ARYANS TO THE ARRIVAL OF AFGHAN PASHTUNS

Fazlul Haq* Fazlur-Rahman**

Abstract

This study is focused on exploring the historical background of Dir Valley located in the Hindu Raj Range of the Eastern Hindukush Range. This region offers a wide potential for research in various sectors of life and environment. However, it is still unexplored and research activities are almost negligible. Other valleys located in the northern mountains of Pakistan such as Swat, Chitral and Gilgit-Baltistan regions are extensively studied and exclusive literature is available on every aspect of social as well as physical environment of these regions. Contrary to this, Dir Valley is completely neglected by researchers both in past and present and no such organized and detail studies can be found in any field. Hence, this study may be stated as the beginning of research in this area and it will open new windows for research and debates on this unexplored mountainous valley.


Introduction

Contrary to its neighboring areas such as Chitral, Gilgit region and Swat (Figure 1), little written material is available on Dir valley although it has been the center of various spiritual and religious personalities and has a rich history. The main factor behind the lack of colonial literature on Dir is perhaps the restrictions on movements through the valley in the past and its isolation from external influences. Most of the books and other written records about the history of Chitral and Swat valleys and arrival of Pashtun civilization belong to the British writers and expeditors who traveled and stayed here. The British government officials and agents have exclusively traveled through the other parts of this mountainous belt and have written their experiences in the form of books, biographies and reports.

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Figure 1 Location of Dir Valley



Dir being an easy route connecting Chitral and other parts of northern Pakistan to the plains of Peshawar Vale (Figure 1) could have been an area of interest for the explorers and expeditors of the British Era; however, the unfriendly nature of the inhabitants restricted the movements of British Officials through this route and thus keeping it hidden from writers and historians. One of the British agents Durand, (2001: 112, 182) has written his views about travel through Dir valley as, “... we got no sport here, but I got orders to return to India by Kashmir, and not to attempt the Dir road. The proposed return to India via Dir and Bajaur was discussed with care, and the general opinion was that I could go down in safety if Umara Khan invited me. Both the Khan of Dir and the Khan of Aladand, the last man through whose bonds I should have pass, were said to be most anxious to

arrange my passage, but all depended on the Napoleon of Bajaur". Due to its location bordering Afghanistan, tribal areas and the then princely states of Swat and Bajaur, Dir valley has remained an important route and has a rich history of chronological dynasties. However, due to poor research activities, the history of the area – as well as other socio-economic and biophysical aspects – is not properly documented.

Besides two available colonial sources (McMahon & Ramsay, 1897; General Staff of India, 1901), in the recent past, a book is published in Urdu Language by Shahid, (2005) attempting to document the history of Dir. Moreover, Dir has been mentioned and short descriptions have been given in various other books (Robertson, 1896; Barth, 1956; Caroe, 1958; Spain, 1973). The history documented in this study is based on information taken from these sources along with interviews conducted with a number of elders in the study area.

History of the Name ‘DIR’

There are a number of opinions and contradictions regarding the name ‘DIR’ among the elders and those who have written about it. Dir has remained the center of various religious orthodoxies and spiritualism and several civilizations have developed and passed through this region. As a result the valley has been known by different names as well as its present name ‘Dir’ has been used in different meanings time to time.

According to the elders Dir has been known in ancient times by various names such as Goraiy, Yaghistan, Biloristan and Masaga. The name Dir was first used in the time of Buddhist Civilization in Panjkora valley (Shahid, 2005). In Arabic Language the word ‘Dir’ means ‘Monastery’ and it was used to describe Buddhist Monasteries constructed on both the banks of River Panjkora. Another ancient name of Dir was Kafiristan which means the land of Kafir (Non-Muslims). This name was given to it after the dynasty of Kafirs living in the Kohistan region of Dir valley. These Kafirs ruled over the area from 10th to 15th century AD. After 15th century AD, the Pashtuns of Yosafazai Tribe conquered the area and named it as Dir. It is said that Dir was derived from the Persian word ‘dair’ which meant ‘far off’ and ‘hard to reach’. This name was used for the area because of its remoteness.

Ancient History

Stone Age to Achaemenian Civilization

The history of Dir valley is very old and can be traced back to the Stone Age, Dravidians and Arian civilizations. A town in the present day Upper Dir district known as Darora is believed had been named after Dravidians Civilization (Shahid, 2005). After the arrival of Arians, the whole Gandhara Region including Dir, Swat and Taxila etc. remained under the influence of

Persian Empire in 522 BC (Spain, 1963). The remains of the Fire Temples along the banks of River Panjkora in the lower parts of the valley are the evidences of Achaemenian Civilization in the area (Spain, 1963; Dani, 1986). Dir and Swat valleys have always remained either under direct control of big empires or partially under their influence due to the availability of natural resources.

Greeks, Buddhist and Hindu Dynasties

In 327 BC, this area was conquered by Greeks under the command of Alexander the Great who entered into Dir Valley from Jalalabad, Afghanistan through Bajaur Agency. During that time Dir and Swat valleys were part of the Masaga State, stretching from Lawari (the boundary between Dir and Chitral) up to Attock covering the present day Bunir district, Malakand and Bajaur Agencies and the surrounding mountainous areas. Dir remained under Greeks' influence for the next two centuries (Spain, 1963; Ahmad, 1976; Nichols, 2008).

The Arrival of Muslims

After the decline of Greeks Empire, it came under the rule of different dynasties such as Buddhists, Huns, and Hindus etc. till 998 AD when the area was conquered by Muslims. Although Islam reached to the sub-continent in 712 when Muhammad Bin Qasim came here through Karachi – the then Debal – however, Muslim Civilization in Dir started in 998 AD after the arrival of Mahmood Ghaznavi who defeated the Hindus and established Muslim rule in the area. According to Shahid, (2005) Dir Valley has also remained under the rule of the great Mongol emperor 'Timur' when he stayed here in 1369 AD. According to him, Timur during his expeditions, stayed in a town Timergara on the bank of River Panjkora which was named Timurgarh after his name in that time. Later on Timurgarh changed into Timergara, which is presently the largest town and urban center of Dir Valley. The ancient history of Dir reveals that this area has remained under the influence of more than fifteen different civilizations from 1500 BC to 1500 AD. The arrival of Pashtun Civilization in 1519 AD, when Yousafzai Tribe occupied the area, was the beginning of a new era in the history of Dir. This civilization is going to complete its 5th century and is still persisting.

The Arrival of Pashtuns from Afghanistan (1519 AD to the Present)

Yousafzai¹ was one of the four major clans of Khashi Tribe living in Afghanistan. After getting prosperity in Kabul, the Yousafzai openly defied

¹ The history of changes in the socio-physical environment and natural resource management systems began after the occupation and permanent inhabitation of Pashtun Tribe in Dir valley. Due to frequent political changes before the arrival of Pashtuns, no records of resource ownership and revenue system can be found here. The available literature reveals

the then ruler Sultan Ulugh Bag, who was the grandson of Turk King Taimur and the uncle of Babur. Ulugh Bag tried to suppress the tribe but he failed, and therefore, he staged a massacre and killed all the leaders of Yousafzai. A very few members of the tribe survived in this massacre with two renowned persons i.e. Malik Shah Mansur and his nephew Malik Ahmad. Later on, the young Malik Ahmad played the key role in the rehabilitation and reunion of the Yousafzai Tribe. Those who survived migrated from Afghanistan and entered into Pakistan through Khyber Pass. Slowly and gradually, the people of Yousafzai occupied the areas from Peshawar up to Swat, Dir and Buner after a number of battles with the local tribes and the then Sultan of Swat².

Malak Ahmad, Shekh Mali and Shah Mansor were among the major commanders and leaders of Yousafzai Tribe. Malak Ahmad was a great warrior and played the key role in several battles fought with other tribes particularly the Dalazak Tribe. In 1523 AD he commanded the Yousafzai troops in the last battle against Dalazak Tribe. After this fight, Yousafzai Tribe lived in peace and prosperity and devoted themselves to agriculture activities and economic development. Shekh Mali was a great leader, scholar and expert of the Muslim Law and Jurisprudence. Besides his considerable contributions in the battle field, he was a great policy maker and always led his tribe in every sphere of social affairs. He was respected by his followers and his decisions were accepted by everyone. His greatest contribution was the introduction of land ownership system and the formulation of rules and regulations for the appropriation of land and resources among various clans of Yousafzai Tribe and their allies in 1523. This system of land tenure was termed as *wesh*, which became one of the most important institutions in Pashtun society. The importance of this system is evident from the colonial literature (McMahon and Ramsay, 1897; Government of the Punjab, 1898; General Staff of India, 1901; Barth, 1956; Caroe, 1958; Spain, 1963, 1973) as well as the present day studies (Nichols, 2001; Sultan-i-Rome, 2005, 2007, 2008; Nafees et al., 2009; Rahman et al., 2014; Haq et al., 2012).

The main purpose behind the introduction of *wesh* system was the equitable distribution of land and resources among the inhabitants of Yousafzai Territory, the present day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. This territory includes both the plain areas of Peshawar Vale (*sama*) and the mountainous terrain (*gharaiza*) of Dir and Swat etc. The distribution of natural resources is determined by wide altitudinal and topographical

that proper resource ownership and management system was formally introduced by the Yousafzai Tribe after settling over in this area (General Staff of India, 1901; McMahon and Ramsay, 1981).

² This was the time of Mughul King Zaher-ud-Din Babur's expeditions whose troops were fighting with the tribes of Bajaur. Keeping in mind the bravery of Yousafzai people, Babur established diplomatic relations with them and married a Yousafzai daughter in order to keep them in order and get their support in the time of need (cf. Spain, 1963, 1973, 1995; Ahmad, 1976; Nichols, 2001).

variations among the plains and the mountains. The plain areas were more fertile and productive with irrigation arrangements as compared to the rain fed and relatively less fertile lands of mountains. The uneven distribution of natural resources accompanied by accessibility factor among the plains and mountains were not favoring the permanent distribution of *sama* and *gharaiza* among the tribes and the co-owners.

Therefore, Shekh Mali introduced temporal circulatory appropriation of areas and resources for different time intervals under the *wesh* system. The plain and mountainous areas and the fertile and infertile lands were allotted to the co-owners through a drawing lot system (*khasanry*) for a period of five or six years. After the expiry of that time period, the process of allotment was revised and the rights of owners were circulated. The inhabitants of mountainous areas were shifted to the plain and those of the fertile land to the infertile one and vice versa. The rules and regulations for the functioning of *wesh* system were formulated in the form of law, which was termed as *daftar*. This law not only covered the land ownership system, but also defined several other acts and rules for the integration and successful functioning of Pashtun society. According to this law, the murderer's house should be burnt, he should be exiled from the village and his share in the land should be handed over to the victimized family. The term *daftar* was also used for the territory and resources belonging to a particular tribe or owner and presently it is used in this context only. This system of periodical distribution and re-distribution and the law of *daftar* were very successful and remained in vogue for centuries. Later on certain weaknesses and changes in the socio-economic and political setup resulted into the abandonment of this system from the plain as well as most parts of the mountainous areas. Nevertheless, the system is still practiced on local level in several small valleys of Dir, Swat and Kohistan etc. with some modifications and transformations.

Feudalism in Dir: The Arrival of Khans and Nawabs

Khanism in Dir

Khanism started in Dir valley in 1626 AD by a spiritual leader of Maly Zai Tribe named Akhund Ilyas Baba. He was a religious scholar used to preach Islamic education and resolve the tribal disputes and conflicts through Muslims Law and Jurisprudence and also had deep knowledge on local social systems. Slowly and gradually he became popular, effective and respected person in the Maly Zai area. The people began to honor his sayings and soon he established his rule in Dir Village and became the first Khan. His successors managed to extend the territorial limits of their rule giving birth to an autonomous political entity, which later on became the princely state of Dir. After his death in 1676 AD his son Mulla Ismail succeeded to the throne (*Gaddi*) and remained Khan until 1752. He was also

educated in Muslims Law and ruled the state in a good manner following his father footsteps.

Khan Ghulam Khan became the successor of Mulla Ismail in 1752 and remained in rule till 1804. Unlike his father and grandfather, Ghulam Khan was more interested in ruling the people and living a royal life style instead following the way of his forefathers. Khan Zafar Khan succeeded Ghulam Khan in 1804 and ruled the state till 1814. He established a formal and paid military force and started to extend his rule to the surrounding areas. His major achievement was the invasion on the Kohistani Kafirs when he defeated them in a battle and conquered the area. The next successor in the Khanizm was Khan Qasim Khan Shahid who ruled Dir state from 1814 to 1822. He was assassinated by his sons in 1822.

The golden period, in the three centuries Khanizm, was the rule of Khan Ghazan Khan who ruled the state for 46 years from 1822 to 1868. He re-organized his military force and started to recover the areas which were lost by his predecessors. This was the time of several internal and external threats because of the freedom movement of 1857. However, he overcome the challenges through his wisdom and didn't lose control of his state. He died in 1870 and his son Khan Rahmatullah Khan took charge of the Gaddi of Dir who was a great warrior and a judicious ruler. Rahmatullah Khan on the one hand was facing the opposition of his brothers who were not ready to accept his rule, while on the other hand he was threatened by his son Khan Sharif Khan. With the help of Umara Khan of Jandol, Khan Sharif Khan attacked his father's state. However, the commanding skills and wisdom of his father always defeated him.

During that time Jandool principality was under the rule of Umara Khan who was known by the British as Napoleon of the East due to his expeditions. Umara Khan after fighting with his brothers succeeded to the throne of Jandool in 1880 and started invading the neighboring localities of Dir state. Umara Khan made several attacks on Dir and until 1884, more than half of the Dir state came under his rule. After the death of Khan Rahmatullah Khan in 1884, his son Sharif Khan succeeded as the new Khan of Dir. The continuous pressure from his brothers enforced Sharif Khan to recover the areas conquered by Umara Khan. Until 1890, these two forces remained in a state of continuous aggression against each other and several battles were fought. This was the sixth attack of Umara Khan on the territory of Dir, when he finally succeeded in occupying the whole state. By the autumn 1890 the whole of Dir state was under the control of Umara Khan and Sharif Khan was exiled to Swat. He appointed his brother Muhammad Shah Khan as the Governor of the state who started collecting revenue from the people of the area and also took the timber trade of Panjkora into his hands.

The Arrival of Nawabism in Dir

After the merger of Dir into Jandool, Umara Khan continued his expeditions and started invasions on the other surrounding principalities such as Nawagai, Nikabi Khel and Ranizai. His power expanded up to Dargai Skhakot in the south of Malakand and up to Chitral state in the north. Umara Khan was at the top of his power in the year 1894, having completely recovered all his previous possessions and now began to actively intrigue in Chitral. The advancement of Umara Khan and Sher Afzal³ into the Chitral territory resulted into a series of incidents which ultimately led to Chitral Siege on March 3rd. The incidence of Chitral Siege brought a new turn in the history of Dir, Chitral and other principalities. Due to increasing powers of Umara Khan in Chitral, the British agents in Gilgit directly came into the play and confronted the *lashkar* of Umara Khan. This confrontation converted into a long lasting bloody war between the British army and Umara Khan. The British advised Umara Khan again and again to withdraw his forces and interference from Chitral but he paid no heed to their warnings.

In this situation, the dispatch of Chitral Relief Force became necessary for the British government in order to settle the Chitral dispute. However, the Chitral Relief Force had to pass through the Dir route where there was no passage for the British army. This was the time for the involvement of the exiled Khan of Dir, the Khan Sharif Khan. The British Officials knowing about the past conflicts between the Khan of Dir and Umara Khan used this opportunity and invited the former to dialogues on the issue. A deal was signed between the British forces and the ex Khan of Dir. The Khan was offered the throne of Dir and possession of the lost areas in return for his assistance in providing safe passage through the Dir route and support against the Khan of Jandool. Khan Muhammad Sharif Khan, who up to now had been a refugee in Swat was too glade to accept that offer. He with the help of the tribes in his support conquered the forts on the banks of River Panjkora and made the passage clear for the Chitral Relief Force. In this way the British forces reached Chitral and the powers of Umara Khan came to an end.

After the Chitral dispute was resolved, the Khan of Dir Muhammad Sharif Khan was rewarded the throne of Dir and he came into power as per agreement with the British officers. He was declared as the first Nawab of Dir in 1895 and his rule was formally recognized by the British government. The succession of Sharif Khan to the *Gaddi* of Dir as the first Nawab was accompanied by substantial changes in the political and social setup of Dir principality. Sharif Khan remained Nawab till 1904 and ruled the state for nine years. However, during his rule, the state didn't progress properly because of financial, political and social constraints faced by this embryonic

³ For details about Sher Afzal's advancement and Chital Siege, see Robertson, (1895).

state and its new ruler. Besides these unfavorable conditions, the Movement of Sartor Fakir (a rebellion against the British rule) during 1897 resulted into a long lasting conflict between British forces and the religious elements of Dir state. Due to these upheavals, no development activities were undertaken in the state during the rule of first Nawab.

Sharif Khan died in 1904 and his son Muhammad Awrangzeb Khan known by *Chara* Nawab⁴ (dumb) succeeded as the second Nawab of Dir. According to the elders, *Chara* Nawab was a spiritual person and a judicious leader. However, he was handed over the throne of Dir with a countless number of internal and external threats limiting his capacity to lead the state towards prosperity, peace and development. He remained Nawab for 20 years. This whole time was spent in a situation of insecurity and aggressions from the Swat and Jandool states on account of boundaries demarcation. It is said that a total of 45 battles were fought with the forces of Swat and Jandool during the rule of *Chara* Nawab. The continuous uprisings between Dir and Swat were creating security threats for the British movements through the Dir-Chitral Highway. Therefore, they planned to settle the issue between these two principalities by demarcating the boundary permanently. Finally, it was 1923 when an agreement was signed by the Wali of Swat and the Nawab of Dir and the boundary issue between the two states was resolved. After this agreement, *Chara* Nawab got rid of the conflicts and insurgency from Swat state but the issues of Jandool rebellions persisted.

After his death, *Chara* Nawab was succeeded by his son Muhammad Shah Jehan Khan in 1924. Shah Jehan Khan was a disobedient son not complying with the teachings of his father contrary to his younger brother Alamzeb Khan. Therefore, he lived most of his life out of his father's rule away from his family. According to the elders, the officers and ministers of Awrangzeb Khan were very corrupt and were trying to take the powers of state into their hands during the illness of Nawab. Moreover, a number of the officers were not in favor of Shah Jehan Khan and used to support the succession of his younger brother Alamzeb Khan. However, Shah Jehan was very clever and planned to get the favor of all the resourceful persons. Initially he settled the matter with his younger brother through a Jirga and immediately reached to India in order to get the title of Nawab from the British Viceroy. In this way Shah Jehan Khan succeeded to the throne and became the third Nawab of Dir. Soon after coming into power, he gathered the corrupt officers of the preceding rule and punished them with death in a very violent and wild manner.

Shah Jehan Khan established good ties with the British representatives and Political Agent of Malakand in order to get their full support. Nevertheless, he was never in favor of the British presence and interference

⁴ *Chara* Nawab lost his power of speech in the childhood due to some incident and hence named as *chara* or dumb which later on became his pet name.

in his rule. Moreover, he never wanted the free and unrestricted movement of British officers in Dir state. However, he didn't opt for any direct confrontation with British authorities as it would have weakened his power in ruling the people and protecting the state from any outside aggression.

The period of Shah Jehan's rule was undoubtedly the darkest stage in the history of Dir state and the negative impacts of his miserable and shortsighted governance can still be observed in every sector of the society even after passing of more than five decades. During his rule, there was a complete ban on education and the construction of health centers. Pursuing education in the jurisdiction of the state was considered as a serious offense and those who tried to get education were punished and exiled from the state. There were very few people who were able to afford education outside Dir. Majority of common people remained in the darkness of illiteracy and deprived of basic health facilities. This act of ignorance made the state one of the most undeveloped areas of the country.

The construction of big houses was seriously restricted and those who constructed such buildings were jailed and their dwellings were demolished. Moreover, there was a ban on the execution of any development project or construction of infrastructure in the limits of the state. There were only one major route connecting Chikdara (Lower Dir) with Proper Dir, which was the capital of the state. People were not allowed to keep private vehicles and were compelled to travel in the state buses, which were very few in number and in very pathetic conditions. His revenue system was also biased and was not based on equal collection of tax from every part of the state jurisdiction. He appointed his men in every village and used to collect grains in each cropping season known as *Nawab's Ushar*. The people belonging to the royal tribe were exempted from revenue collection and the others were compelled to pay all the duties. Certain tribes were to feed his horses and dogs and others were to provide a fix number of hunted birds on monthly basis.

In short, the period of Nawab's rule was full of inhuman acts and darkness for the inhabitants of the valley. Everything belonged to the people who run the state, while the public was treated in a very unlawful and cruel manner. The state remained in backwardness and couldn't progress in any sector until the end of Nawabism and arrival of formal governance. This darkest age of Dir Valley came to an end in 1969 when Shah Jehan was arrested and took away by the Government of Pakistan. Dir was declared as a settled district of Pakistan in 1970 and since then the area started to develop. Education and health facilities were established and development projects were initiated. Hence, it can be said that development started in Dir after 1960.

Conclusion

It can be concluded from this study that Dir Valley has remained the home of different civilizations throughout history. Sources (Spain, 1963; Dani, 1986; Ahmad, 1976; Nichols, 2008) reveal that Dir Valley has remained under the influence of more than fifteen different civilizations from 1500 BC to 1500 AD including, Achaemenian Civilization, Greeks' influence, Dravidians, Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims. The geographical location of the valley has played a key role in the invasions of different rulers and dynasties as it is bounded by Afghanistan in the west while two other historically important valleys i.e. Chitral and Swat in the north and east respectively. Dir Valley provides an easy and shortest route to Chitral, which has also remained under the influence and rule of various dynasties throughout its entire history. Moreover, Dir has been continuously influenced by the civilizations remained in its western neighbor i.e. Afghanistan.

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ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN DROUGHT PRONE DISTRICT OF NUSHKI BALOCHISTAN

Nasrullah* Syed Ainuddin**

Abstract

Resilience is the ability of system, community or society exposed to hazards to absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a disaster in a timely and efficient manner. In achieving community resilience, the role of local institutions is of prime importance. Local institutions can be used as catalyst in mainstreaming the community to withstand and recover from natural disaster. The prime objective of this paper is to evaluate the role of local institutions in providing social resilience in district Nushki. Which is an administrative district of Balochistan province of Pakistan. Located at the western end of the country's border with Afghanistan. The indicators used to measure the social resilience are community awareness, age, educational level, health insurance facility and social capital in community. The results specify that the status of social resilience of drought prone community is poor. The formal public sector district level institutions and civil society organizations have limited role in promoting community resilience in regard to formal risk assessment, identification, dissemination and mitigation. These institutions also have played minimum role to enhance the awareness and capacity building of local vulnerable communities, develop the coping mechanisms and implement the already existing laws. Their role has seen as disaster response activities and coordination with non-governance organizations during the disaster period in the district. The study recommends that the capacity of local level governance institution should be built regarding training and resources availability to play effective role in promoting social resilience in district Nushki.

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Key Words: Role, Governance Institutions, Resilience, Drought, and Balochistan.

Introduction

Drought is elaborated as the availability of minimum natural water. The pivotal and plausible causes of drought are low rates of rain, snow and hail and maximum evaporation and evapotranspiration ratio.¹ Drought is a process, which is happening regularly worldwide and it has the distinguished quality of both the space and the earth, and it differs to a great extent from one place to another. It should not be mixed-up with barrenness and dryness as it is the average attribute of a lengthy cycle of the dry climate, which shows the conditions of long-range instability between the available water resources and the requirements.² Drought is a dangerous threat of nature that results from shortage of rainfall for a long period of time, generally one or more seasons, which culminates in the scarcity of water for some initiatives, group or natural environment.

Historically, Balochistan has encountered serious hazard of floods, earthquakes, droughts and tsunami. During 1997 to 2004, Balochistan experienced the serious drought; the major cause of droughts in Balochistan was the shortage of precipitation. Recently Provincial Disaster Management Authority declared majority of districts of the Balochistan affected by the drought and among other districts Nushki is one of most effected districts of Balochistan The district Nushki was also seriously affected by drought between 1997 and 2004. Consequently, the prices of the food raised, malnutrition spread out over a large area of the district, which was resulted in the widespread diseases such as tuberculosis (TB) and hepatitis A, B.C. that affected the people of the area (PDMA 2012) especially deprived segment of society including women and children. It has also resulted in the scarcity of the quantity of fodder, and livestock breed rearing in the area.³

In areas, which were gravely and seriously influenced by drought, livestock was destroyed up to 80 percent.⁴ Moreover, another significant means of subsistence i.e. orchards were also ruined up to 80 percent. This resulted in the migration of the people from their native places to the big cities of the province in order to survive. This migration from rural to urban

¹ Hanson, R.L., *Evapotranspiration and Droughts, Hydrologic Events and Floods and Droughts: U.S. Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper 2375*, 1991, pp. 99-104

² Tallaksen, L. M. & Lanen, H. A. J. van, *Hydrological Drought – Processes and Estimation Methods for Stream flow and Groundwater: Developments in Water Sciences*. Elsevier, The Netherlands 2004

³ Balochistan Disaster Management Authority, 2012

⁴ Jamali, H., *Drought Coping Strategies in Nushki District Pakistan and their Policy Implications*, University of Victoria, 2006

settlements eventually led into the social and economic issues in the province.⁵

In Pakistan, governance institutions for the Disaster Risk Reduction have been established at various levels in 2010 i.e. one at the national level such as National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and four at the provincial level i.e. the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) with an objective to implement the policy level decisions of provincial disaster commissions and monitor the disaster management in their respective areas. Other major objective of the establishment of the NDMA is to perform the duty of focal point and coordinating institute in order to assist in the execution of the strategies regarding the disaster risk management in their particular jurisdictions. The authority carries out the duty of focal point for the provincial and regional commissions. It will carry out its duties of development, execution, and monitoring and evaluation of disaster risk management in vulnerable areas in the provinces.

At the local level district and municipal, Disaster Management Authorities are consisted of the elected heads of the districts and municipalities and head of different line departments, Similarly at the union council-UCs level structure of the governance, consisting of the nominated local level elected representatives from the respective villages and wards.

These Local level line departments have pivotal role in resource mobilization for domestic development initiatives and augmentation need of the respective communities at gross root level in the orbit of the targeted districts. Furthermore these institutions develops the capacity of community based organizations leaders by developing different skills and knowledge to effectively manage the finances, people and mobilize resources, interpersonal communication and presentation and negotiation skills.

The major aim of the research study is to analyze the resilience of communities, local governance institutional role and capacity in uplifting and promoting social resilience to natural catastrophe. The categories of local Governance Institutions included in the evaluation are: (1) Formal public sector local governance at district, municipal and union council levels, (2) Non-Governmental Organizations and (3) Tribal and Faith based along with professional Organizations.

⁵ Government of Pakistan. *Meteorologist Department*, 2015

Profile of Study Area:

Map of Balochistan highlighting District Nushki



Source: Adopted from Government of Balochistan 1998.

Location of the Study Area

District Nushki is one among 33 administrative districts of Balochistan province of Pakistan. Located at the western end of the country border with Afghanistan. The district is bounded on the north by desert region of Afghanistan called Shorawak, on the east by sarlath hill range and Mastung district, on the west district Chaghi and on the south by Kharan District. Nushki was part of district Chaghi earlier in 2003 the area was notified as separate district,. Nushki is at the distance of 105 KM in the west of Provincial Headquarter. The British linked Nushki with Quetta through railway line in 1905. Administratively Nushki district is further divided in one tehsil and ten union councils with Tehsil Nushki and 10 Union Councils known as; Ahmed Wall, Anam Bostan, Badini, Baghak Mall, Dak, Jamaldini, Kashingi, Mengal, Noshki and Noshki Bazar. According to the census of 1998 the total population of District Nushki is 98,030 (51,394 Males, 46,636 Females). The household size is 7.2 and housing units are 13417. As per 3.27 annual growth rate the district-projected population is 149309 and housing units are 20739, 2015. The population of Nushki

District is not homogeneous. The main tribes in the district are Baloch, Bareach, Badini, Jamaldini, Mengal, Syed, Yallanzai, Muhammad Hassani, Sasoli and Qazi. The major languages spoken are Balochi, Brahvi, Pashto and Urdu.⁶

Climate of Nushki District

Climatically Nushki has both hot and cold weathers, from April to September the district is extremely hot and from December to February Nushki is crucially cold. The temperature varies from Day and Night due to the combination of dessert, mountains and plains, the climate also varies from area to area. The rain is irregular and scanty due to its location outside the monsoon region.⁷ The table below shows the rainfall and temperature of the district month wise:

Table: Rainfall and Temperature of District Nushki

	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	Total
Rainfall	70	2	0	0	0	0	0	1.7	0	0	0	9	83
Max. temp	13	20	32	35	42	46	45	41	39	36	27	22	
Min. temp	0	-1	10	16	22	27	27	23	n/a	14	6	4	

Source: Regional Metrological center Karachi 2008
Rainfall (mm) and Temperature (°C):

Framework for Evaluating Community Resilience

Assessing community resilience is a difficult process due to the vibrant relations of the environment with society, community, and the people. Different conceptual frameworks were developed by different researchers to measure the specific disaster resilience. For example Cutter’s (2010) framework was developed for ecological and social resilience. Ainuddin’s framework was developed for earthquake disaster resilience and Joseph’s

⁶ Government of Balochistan. *District Development Profile*. Planning and Development Department, Quetta 2011. Retrieved from <http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/DistrictProfile/DDP%20Final%202012/Quetta/Quetta.pdf>, accessed on March 25, 2016


⁷ Retrieved from http://www.balochistan.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=3684&Itemid=754, accessed on April 19,2016.

capital framework, which posited that every framework has its own strengths and weaknesses or limitations. The conceptual framework adopted for this study was taken from different frameworks including Cutter 2010, Ainuddin S. 2012, and Joseph S. 2010, capital based approach. The five main factors focused in this framework include social resilience, economic resilience, physical resilience and institutional resilience for the measurement of community resilience.

In social aspects of resilience the social network including community based and non-governmental organizations, tribal and religious and professional organizations were focused to measure the community resilience. While conceptualizing the economic aspect of community resilience, specific factors such as household income, expenditures, assets, loans, saving, diversification of household livelihood were considered as major indicators along with social fund. For the physical aspect of community resilience the ownership of houses, capacity of houses, nature of houses, basic public facilities in household, means of communications are included in this aspect of resilience. Human aspects of community resilience including the education, health, information and skills of community members that influences the skills and knowledge of human in communities are also taken into account. The institutional aspects are measured through the role of governance institutions (Public and private institutions) at district level including administration, education, health, social welfare, local government, building and road department, civil defense and meteorological departments as key institutions that can contribute in community resilience in disaster management.

The impact of above-mentioned social, economic, physical, human and institutional aspects of resilience can produce a socially integrated, economically vibrant, physically developed, knowledgeable and skilled society with coordinated and efficient institutions that will contribute to a resilient society in the occasion of a natural disaster.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for community Resilience



Source: Conceptual framework adopted from Cutter 2010, Ainuddin 2012, and Joseph 2007.

Materials and Methods

This research study is basically exploratory and descriptive in nature. Both secondary and primary sources of data are utilized for this research. Secondary data is important for any research to understand the prevailing condition and can also guide the researcher. Therefore secondary data was collected from published articles, policy documents, online sources and books. Primary data was collected from the drought prone union councils of the study area using questionnaire survey, key informants interviews and

focused group discussions with community. Key informant interviews were conducted with line departments of the district, which was followed, by conducting focused group discussions with community to understand the problems and identify the grey areas.

Assessing the social resilience of a community the indicators used were higher the education level which enhance the capacity and understanding of early warning and evacuation decision and have positive impact and the lower level of education have the negative impact. The second indicator was the age, if the age is less than 15 years and more then 45 years, mobility during disasters and evacuation always remains a challenge that have negative impact. Health insurance can enable the people to get the timely treatment and reduce the effects during secondary disasters following a major disaster such as increase of epidemic diseases. People with physical and mental disability will overburden the household finance during disaster recovery and create mobility problems during emergency evacuation this has negative impact. Social capital is another indicator that will facilitate the people in accessing the community resources and strengthen the coordination and cooperation during emergency (Adger 2000 Norris et al. 2008, Heinz center 2002, Morrow 2008, Cutter et al. 2010, Cutter et al. 2008, Tobin et al. 1999, Cutter et al. 2003).⁸ The scale used for the assessment of community resilience was taken from Ainuddins 2012 published paper in 2012, the range of assessment was 0-1, the I reflects the maximum resilience and 0 minimum resilience in some cases the maximum rate indicated the minimum resilience and result were concerning social resilience.

Resilience Factor Index

The values of the indices can be interpreted as, higher the value of the indicator, higher is the weight and index value, and finally higher is the resilience of that particular variable within a domain/component or zone. The resilience factor index of any selected indicator used under any component is worked out as:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{Resilience Factor Index .RFI) of ith indicator} \\ &= (\% \text{Value of the ith indicator (actual)} / \\ &\% \text{Value taken as the level of the resilience of the ith indicator} \end{aligned}$$

Less value or those around or close to zero should be considered less resilient, and high values toward to 1 should be considered more resilient. For some indicators in which high values reflect low level of resilience, precaution has been taken to make them comparable in the same way (higher the value of a variable, higher is the resilience) by reversing the calculation

⁸ Adger, W.N., Social and Ecological Resilience: Are they Related? *Prog Hum Geogr* 24(3), 2000, pp. 347-364 and Morrow, B., Community Resilience: A Societal Justice Perspective. *CARRI Research Report 4*. Oak Ridge, 2008

of resilience factor index as mentioned below.

Resilience Factor Index (RFI) of ith indicator

$$= (\% \text{Value taken as the level of resilience of the } i\text{th indicator} / \%$$

$$\text{Value of the } i\text{th indicator (actual)}):$$

For each indicator, it has been tried to assign a particular percentage value for the optimum level of community like the optimum value for the high school and higher education is 60%

Resilience Factor Index of education indicator, which is positive impact=
Real value= 18.26% divided by given value=60 % = 18.26/60= 0.3%

Resilience Factor Index of age less than 15 years indicator, which is negative impact=

Given value = 20% divided by real value =24.37% = 20/24.37=0.82%

Results and Discussions

Social Resilience

Data highlighted in Figure 1 of component indicators in disaster prone districts of Nushki Balochistan revealed that:

The Education level in district Nushki was with poor only 18.26 % and the resilience factor index was 0.3 % people, with 6 optimum level, were having high school and above education in district Nushki. These results are in conformity with Norris et al.2008, Morrow 2008 and Cutter et al 2010, that argue that higher education level raises the awareness and preparedness activities of the communities. It was observed that in district Nushki that the awareness level was low.


The maximum age group above 45 years were 6.94% and the resilience factor index was 2.16 % people, with 1.5 % optimum level, was living in district Nushki of Balochistan, The below 15 years age group were 24.37% and the resilience factor index was 0.82, with 2 optimum level, in District Nushki of Balochistan, This means that Nushki is vulnerable or less resilient in terms of age group of the communities because in both indicators Nushki had higher number of people above 45 years of age and below 15 years of age. These results are in line with Morrow, 2008, Cutter et al 2010, Cutter et al 2010 Tobin et al 1999 & Cutter et al 2003.

The health coverage was minimum in district Nushki. The availability of health insurance facility in district Nushki was only 2% and the resilience factor index was 0.04 with 5 optimum level that shows the minimum resilience of communities in district Nushki. The results are in agreement with Heinz Center 2002 and Cutter et al 2010.

The ideal situation in relation to the high and maximum non-availability of physical and mental disability, the minimum 87% with 1.16 resilience factor index and the optimum level was 7.5 prevailing in district Nushki. That also reflects the weak resilience

In term of physical accessibility to community trust during disaster. The district Nushki had 57% with 1.12 resilience factor index and the optimum level is 5. The situation of community trust that has to be very higher in rural communities is not as expected in the study area. This indicates that communities themselves do not have trust and collective wisdom to work during any disaster exhibits minimum resilience in district Nushki. These results are in line with Heinz Center 2002 and Cutter et al 2010.

Figure 1: Social Resilience factor index (Nushki)



Source: Survey data 2016.

Role of Local Governance Institutions

Data pertaining to the role of local governance institutions as exhibited in Figure-2 in relation to information provided by governance institution about natural disaster. It is shown through tabulated Data that 90.71 % respondents having 127 frequencies were with negative remarks. 7.86 %

respondents having 11 frequencies were with no comments about non familiarity with such kind of information and 1.43 % respondents having 2 frequencies were with positive comments and they were provided with the information related to natural disasters in district Nushki.

Data in Figure-2 illustrates the conduction of any training for reduction of effects of natural disasters by any governance institution. It is evident from the tabulated data that 82.14 % respondents having 115 frequencies were with negative remarks that no kind of training was imparted by any governance institution, 17.14 % respondents having 24 frequencies were with no comments about no familiarity with such kind of trainings and 0.71 % respondents having 1 frequency were with positive comments and they were trained regarding reduction of effects of natural disasters in district Nushki.

Regarding the existence of law in relation to land utilization for different purposes in disasters proven districts namely Nushki Balochistan, data mentioned in Figure 2 reflects that 50.71 percent respondents having 71 frequencies were with negative remarks that no kind of law was present regarding land utilization for different purposes. 48.57 % respondents having 68 frequencies were with no comments about non familiarity with law related to land utilization and 0.71 % respondents having 1 frequency were with positive remarks and expressed that they had certain law in relation to land utilization for different purposes in district Nushki.

Data pointed in Figure-2 highlighting training of children in schools during natural disasters by any governance department in disasters prone districts Nushki, Data revealed that 76.43 % respondents having 107 frequencies were with negative remarks that none of the governance department had trained their children in schools regarding how to act during natural disasters. 22.86 % respondents having 32 frequencies were unaware, about non familiarity with such kind of training by any governance department in schools to train children to address natural disasters and only 0.71 % respondents having 1 frequency were having positive comments about the governance departments training their children in schools about how to act during the occurrence of a natural disaster in district Nushki.

Data mentioned in Figure-2 regarding the availability of any early warning system about natural disasters in disasters prone area like Nushki. Tabulated data revealed that 82.86 % respondents having 116 frequencies were with negative remarks about any early warning system about natural disasters and 17.14 % respondents with 24 frequencies were without any remarks and were having no information about any early warning system in district Nushki.


Data comprising Figure-2 is about the existence of NGOs or CBOs in the areas concerned. The analysis of the data revealed that 52.14 % respondents with 73 frequencies mentioned that no NGO or CBO was present in their area in district Nushki. While 47.86% respondent with 67 frequencies expressed positive views about the existence of NGO or CBO in their area in the same district.

Data highlighted in Figure-2 regarding the existence of any tribal organization in the areas concerned. Explanation of the data augmented that 93.57 % respondents with 131 frequencies mentioned that no kind of tribal organization was present in their area in district Nushki. While 6.43 % respondents with 9 frequencies expressed positively that yes there was tribal organization in their area.

Data mentioned in Figure-2 relating to the presence of any religious organization in relation to addressing disaster management in the areas concerned. Analysis of the data revealed that 85.00 % respondents with 119 frequencies mentioned that no religious organization was present in their area in district Nushki. While 12.14 % respondents with 17 frequencies were unaware about the existence of religious organization in their area and 2.86 respondents having 4 frequencies showed their positive remarks about the presence of religious organization in their areas, in regard to disaster management.

Data pertaining in Figure-2 regarding existence of farmers' association in respective areas, statistical analysis of the data revealed that 92.86 % respondents having 130 frequencies mentioned that no farmer's association was present in their area in district Nushki. While 7.14 % respondents with 10 frequencies expressed positive views about the existence of farmers association in the respective areas in the district.

Figure 2: Role of Local Governance Institutions in promoting social Resilience in Natural Disaster



Source: Survey results 2016.

Conclusion

Vital emphasis and concentration of the research study was the assessment and evaluation to check the community resilience status and role of local governance institutions in drought prone district of Balochistan. Resilience is considered as ability of system, community or society exposed to hazards to absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, in achieving community resilience, the role of local institutions are of prime importance. Local Institutions can be used as catalyst in mainstreaming the community to withstand and recover from natural disaster.

The role of local governance institution were analyzed in the framework of information dissemination about natural disaster among the communities to raise their awareness and improve their perception regarding natural catastrophes, capacity building of effected communities to absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, Legal arrangements of land use and land use planning, to establish the Early warning system mechanisms and link the communities with intermediately level institutions which contribute in enhancing the social resilience of a society. The finding of study reflects that the institutions did not played their effective role to disseminate the relevant information and raise the awareness among community, build the capacity of communities, establish an early warning system, disseminate and implement the laws regarding the land use and land use planning to minimize the vulnerability and enhance the social resilience.

The overall finding of the research study regarding role of local governance institutions in promoting social resilience in drought prone district of Nushki showed that although at policy level Pakistan has decentralized. Disaster Risk Reduction institutions at provincial/regional, district, tehsil and union council level and also has commitment of integrating Disaster Risk Reduction in all development initiatives at all levels but at Implementation level has been operating only at central and provincial level institutions. The formal public governance institutions at local level have very limited resources and capacity to work with communities and enhance their social resilience, the second major issue is the integration of disaster risk reduction initiatives mainstreaming in development projects but again the capacity is lacking, therefore the study recommends that the resources should be channelized with local level governance institutions and their capacity has to enhance for fulfilling the policy commitments toward enhancing the social resilience of communities in regard to formal risk assessment, identification, dissemination and mitigation, building the capacity of local vulnerable communities, develop the coping mechanisms, implement the already existing laws of land use and

initiate the land use planning in natural disasters and integrate the disaster risk reduction in all development initiatives.

The results of study also reflected that Non-Governance organization played vital role in relief and rehabilitation activities with the support of international relief organizations but their role are also very limited in regard to promoting community resilience. The data reflected that their work is limited to awareness sessions in limited numbers and areas. The social capital in the shape of tribal, faith based and professional organizations are there and can play very active role in community resilience promotion in natural disaster but their potential role is also needed to explore and integrate at different levels.

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Appendixes

Table 1: Resilience factor index (Nushki)

Resilience factor Index				
Social Resilience	Indicators		Percent Value	Resilience factor Index
	1	Percent of people with high school and above education	18.26%	0.3
	2	Percent of people >45 years of age	6.94%	2.16
	3	Percent of People<15 years of age	24.37%	0.82
	4	Percent of people with health insurance	02 %	0.04
	5	Percent of people without any physical and mental disability	87%	1.16
	6	Community trust during disaster	57%	1.12
	Component resilience factor index (average)			0.93

Source: Primary data survey result 2016.

Table 2: Role of Local Governance Institutions in promoting Social resilience in disaster

Nushki										
	Information	Capacity Building	Curriculum Design	law	Land Use Planning	Early warning system	NGO/CBO	Tribal Orgs	Faith Based Orgs.	Farmers Associations
Yes	1.43	0.71	0	0	0.71	0	47.86	6.43	2.86	7.14
No	90.71	82.14	82.86	60	50.71	82.86	52.14	93.57	85	92.86
Don't Know	7.86	17.14	17.14	40	48.57	17.14	-	-	12.14	-

Source: Primary data survey result 2016.